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Sunnnary 
The lack of entrepreneurial know-how in many developing 
countries is closely correlated with the low social 
status given to entrepreneurial act ivities . Further 
hampering the development of domestic entrepren eurs 
is the endangering of the sys tem s t ennning from evolving 
economic and political demands . 
This s tudy shows that overcoming sys t emic and 
political crises by using traditional s tructures as 
well as by es tablishing modern institutions can effect 
a change in the pres t ige hierarchy to the extent that 
the entrepreneurial act ivities are given a high social 
s tatus . In addition to such a change in the pres tige 
hierarchy, Taiwan ' s  economic development process was 
charac terized by an importat ion of know-how from abroad , 
as well as a promotion of know-how by the government 
and via the market or market-supplement ing institutions . 
People were made aware not only of the possib ility of 
gaining wealth and soc ial s tatus in the course of 
b ecoming successful entrepreneurs but also of the risk 
of los ing both through entrepreneurial ineptitude . 
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Pref ace 
I received init ial encouragement to study As ian develop­
ing count ries from Dr K. Billerbeck , Director , Deut sches 
Inst itut fiir Entwicklungspolit ik in Berlin , and Dr B .  
Grossmann , Director o f  the German Chamber o f  Industry an d  
Commerce in Tokyo , who both helped me to  spend a total o f  
two years doing research in the Far East . 
My main activity while abroad was studying the files 
and document s  of the agricultural reform agencies in Taiwan 
and the Philippines , of the central banks of Taiwan and 
South Korea,  as well as the As ian Development Bank in Manila , 
and the E conomic Commission for As ia an d  the Far East in 
Bangkok . I was able to extend and test  the informat ion thus 
gained through empirical studies on proj ect s in Taiwan , South 
Korea,  and the Philippines . It became clear that the subj ect 
matt er dealt with in this book is j ust as relevant in the 
context of other count ries , certainly those lying between 
Japan and Australia . 
The present s t udy represents an attempt at an int er­
dis ciplinary attack on economic , sociological , and polit ical 
aspects of a particular problem, that is a study accept able 
to each of these disciplines individually . The is sue of the 
development of native entrepreneurship is the centre of 
at tention . To the best of my knowledge , interdisciplinary 
empirical research of such prob lems has received lit t le 
attention . Therefore , explicit formulat ion of a model will 
be postponed for a pos s ib le future study , while I will con­
centrate here on analys ing the issues  in the framework of a 
country case s t udy . 
Parti cular thanks are due Professor H . V .  Arndt , Aus tralian 
National University , who generously aided the study with his 
advice and experien ce . Through him I had the good fortune 
to  become acquainted with some dis t inguished economist s . 
Besides Professor Arndt , Pro fes sors E . K. Fisk and T . H. Silcock 
of the Aus tralian Nat ional Univers ity , as well as Professor 
J. Wilczynski of the University of New South Wales, gave me 
many opportunit ies to  dis cus s various prob lems . 
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I should particularly thank my t eacher , Professor C. 
Bohret of the Ho chs chule fiir Verwaltungswissenschaft in 
Speye r .  He , together with Dr D .  Weiss and Dr S .  Musto of 
the Deut s ches Ins t it ut fur Entwicklungspolit ik in Berlin ,  
helped me overcome many methodological problems , an d  promo t ed 
my underst anding of the s imult aneous workings of complementary 
polit ical , sociological , and e conomi c pro ces ses . Part icular 
thanks are due also to Friedrich Ebert Stiftung , whose under­
s tanding made the complet ion of this study poss ible . 
Manfred S teinhoff 
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Chapter 1 
CRISIS  MANAGEMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ABILITIES 
Determinants of human behaviour 
Profit s as a means of achievin g  income and prestige . 
In the development of ent repreneurship , the problem o f  
innovation an d  adaptation o f  invent ions acquires a decis ive 
signi fican ce . Co rrespondingly , we term such changes as the 
emergence , conveyance , and acquisition of ent repreneurial 
know-how as a cons ciousness-creat ing pro cess . With respect 
to this is sue in the industrialized cotmt ries one st ill 
frequent ly leans on one ' s  own experience when looking at the 
special problems of cotmt ries with a low per capita income , 
that is the developin g  count ries . Not infrequently , they 
are analysed within mo dels which assume economic individualism 
and concentrate almost exclusively on the monetary sphere 
(Marshall 1 9 6 7 : 30ff . ) .  
According to the concept of economic individualism, 
private interest is the main mot ivational force of  the 
e conomic sys tem .  By system w e  �ean ' a  s e t  of obj ect s which 
form an inter-related whole , and which are delineat ed from 
their environment '  (Werner 19 7 3 : 2 92 ) . The con cept of economic 
individualism assumes that the sum tot al of the economic 
elites ' activit ies , att ributable in the final analysis to 
private int erest s , ! leads to  a maximization of  the difference 
between advant ages and disadvantages , after weighing costs  
and ben efits (Parsons 1954 : 19 8) . 
Opporttmities  for profit are thought to b e  a mechanism 
which t riggers e conomic initiat ives . This presupposes a 
certain ' readiness to react to specific changes in the actor ' s  
1The t erm ' elite ' here refers to  the funct ional elites in 
the developmen t  pro cess .  It implies no j udgment as to their 
moral or  intellectual qualit ies . Cf . Behrendt. (1965 : 2 12 ) . 
1 
2 
situation , namely in prices , supply , and the demand condit ions' 
on the part of the entrepreneurs (Parsons 1954 : 134 ) . Above 
and b eyond that , the entrepreneur is expected to be able t o  
acquire t h e  modern know-how needed to operate p lants espec-
. ially to fulfil! the functions of innovation or adaptation 
of inventions , and of profit maximization , given available 
resources . New profit opportunities have the character o f  
impulses . The task o f  the market is t o  signal such changes 
( see Li 1956 : 13ff . , also Nurkse 1953 : 6 ff . ) .  
Now at l east in some s ocieties there are population 
strat a whose behaviour is not exclusively determined by profit 
seeking . Thus some of the Indian Brahmans are more int erested 
in certain types of mystical and ascetic behaviour ; not 
infrequent ly Europe;an aristocrat s preferred military service 
to a mo re profitable activity in indust ry ;  many members of 
the wealthy classes in China studied Confucius so  as to take 
positions in the adminis tration which assured high social 
status , but often only low income (Parsons 1954 : 151) . 
Critics of the principle of in<l:tvi.dualism contend that  
not  only the behaviour of t he aforementioned groups , but also 
that of the ent repreneurs , is in additi.on determined by status 
seeking . For them , prof it-seeking in the goal-means hierarchy 
is no ' final ' motive , but rather a means to obt ain goods and 
services , either for consumption or  to demonstrate a certai.n 
s t atus ( cf .  Lewis 1956 : 24ff . ) .  An1dt , for example , thinks 
that s triving for income and prest ige lie at the heart of 
the profit motive . Here the term ' presti.ge ' ,  besfdes including 
a status mentality , also includes the sort o f  self-respect 
which iEplies certain types of  behaviour within a community 
(Arndt 19 72 : 5 84ff . ) .  Thus , an analytical focus of the 
prestige mentality defined in this way is not only the 
behaviour pattern of a society or of a social stratum, but 
also the s elf-respect , the assessment of the individual . 
All of  this is of lit tle significance for the relevance 
of  the individualis t principle so long as the activity of 
the economic elite , for whatever reason , leads to one result -
the maximization of profit . According to Max Weber , prelim­
inary condition s for this are given whenever an identity 
between a s tatus ment ality and prof it seeking , comparable t o  
that found in Puritanism or Judaism, obtains (Weber 1956 : 
esp. 9 llff . ) .  But Veblen had already shown that a prestige 
mentality on the part of the economic elites can lead to 
luxury consumption which const rains growth (Veblen 1924 : esp . 
3 
35-6 ) . Therefo re, congruence o f  behaviour - result ing from 
profit-seeking and prestige-seeking - cannot always b e  
assumed a priori. 
A further prerequisite would be the existence of a 
mechanism for mob iliz ing all available factors of production . 
The best known model in this regard is that of Lewis . This 
model assumes that monetary incent ives are suitable for 
mob iliz ing product ion factors in the t radit ional sector of 
the economy , characteriz ed mainly by non-monetary ac tivit ies . 
It neglect s the fact that the elast icity of labour supply 
may be reduced by the low level of educat ion of the workers 
and by low demand for goods which cannot be obt ained by 
barter , but only with money ( see Lewis 1954 : 400ff . ;  also 
Korner 19 68 : 2 72 ff . , Fisk 1964 : 158ff . ) .  
Thus , pro fit and prest ige belong to different levels of 
the economic sys tem (Arndt 19 72 : 5 89) . The quest ion that 
arises here is what this conclus ion means for the explanat ion 
of endogenous change in the economic system. 2 
Prestige under heterogeneous social expectat ion pat terns . 
Entrepreneurial know-how is also gained by means of specific 
experience within the framework of given market condit ions . 
In the developing coun tries , insufficient informat ion con­
cerning pro f it opportunit ies in the secondary sector con­
s titut es one determinan t of market conditions . Under given 
market imperfect ions  a rest rict ion of economic activit ies to 
buying land , money lending , speculation and capit al flight 
may be in the in terest of the entrepreneurs . Here , according 
to Jochimsen ( 196 8 : 65ff . ) ,  imp rovement of the material 
infrast ructure and adaptat ion of the inst itut ional infra­
st ructure would be a precondit ion for an improved ut ilizat ion 
of exist ing resources . 
One cannot exclude the po ssib ility that such changes in 
market condition s  would cont ribut e  to an increase in the 
ent repreneurial abilit ies of the exis t ing economic elite . 
Indeed those entrepreneurs who were less success ful under 
previous condit ions , and who now see the change to satisfy 
their desire for prestige for the first t ime , may react 
positively t o  new incent ives . For the previous economic 
elite this would imply the risk of losing its advantages 
within a restrat ificat ion process . 
2This prob lem is formulat ed generally in Bohret ( 195 7:2 lff . ) .  
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The economic advantages were the result partly of high 
profits and partly of  low costs , such as for b asic foods and 
domest ic servants . The lat ter are seldom a status symbol 
in developing count ries . Therefore there are suf ficien t  
reasons for the previously privileged to limit changes t o  
fields which do n o t  threat en their earlier pos it ions , that 
is their previous status . This is easier for them if they 
are personally relat ed to the polit ical elites or if they 
are viewed by these as important domest ic policy supporters . 
In so far as such interact ion influences the establishment 
of  nat ive entrepreneurship , the analys is must take it int o  
account ( cf .  Behrendt 1965 : 2 13 , als o Frey 19 72 : 32 2 ff . ) .  
For economic policy in a developing country a particular 
kind of prob lem results from the relat ionship between the 
relevant social ins t itutions and the dete rminants of economic 
behaviour in the tradit ional sector ( Fisk 19 7 1) . Borrowing 
from Talcott Pearson s ,  we t erm a social inst it ut ion that 
system of expectat ion pat terns which has gone into determining 
�ehaviour so deeply that it is viewed as legit imate as a 
matter of course . Analagously , economic institut ions  are 
those  areas which resp ect ively permit profit format ion and 
the exercis e of power according to these expectat ion pat terns 
(Parsons 1954 : 56 ) . Besides addit ional demand caused by 
populat ion growth , a social expectat ion pattern which has 
developed independently of economic ins t itut ions determines 
economic b ehaviour in the t radit ional sector .  Under such 
conditions , as Epst ein shows fo r the Tolais in New Brit ain 
(Epstein 19 68 : esp . 26 ff . ) ,  posit ive react ions to monet ary 
incent ives cannot b e  co unted upon . Therefore it seems 
obvious to att empt the integration of the tradit ional sector 
of the economy into the growth process by using non-monetary 
incent ives and inst itut ionaliz ing existing expectat ion 
patterns . In so far as such a process contributes to the 
creation of native ent repreneurship by means of an opt imal 
use of the labour factor , it must b e  inco rporated int o  the 
analys is . 
Influencin g human b ehaviour 
Foreign challenges to the power structure . Taiwan is 
part of the East Asian island chain , and with an area o f  
36 , 000 km2 i s  ab out a s  large as the Netherlands . It lies on 
the Tropic of Cancer , and hence is partly in the tropics , 
part ly in the sub t ropics . The mountains covering the eas t ern 
half of t he island and running in a no rth-south direct ion 
5 
have a mild climate ( Sheng 1968:55-6 ) .  
At the b eginning of  the seventeenth century Taiwan became 
for the first t ime a focal point of interest for the great 
powers . Portugal , Spain and Holland hoped to improve their 
init ial posit ions in trade with China and Japan . But Taiwan 
waned in importance after Japanese ports were clo sed to 
foreign ships in 16 36 . The defeat of Chinese troops under 
Cheng Ch ' eng-kung (Koxinga) ended the first period during 
which Taiwan was a centre of interest  for the hegemonial 
powers in East As ia. Internal conflict s between Chinese 
settlers and nat ives on the one hand , as well as among the 
individual clans on the other determined development s on the 
island for mo re than two hundred years after 1661 (Et o 1964 : 
4 3ff . ) .  
Taiwan once again assumed importance for the great 
powers with the b eginning of colonialism and Japan ' s  imperial 
period . France temporarily occupied the port of Keelung in 
1884 . In 1895 , after the S ino-Japanese War , Taiwan became 
part of the Japanese Empire . 3 The is land b ecame involved in 
both the S ino-Japanese conflict of the thirties and in World 
War II . As a result of the war , Japan had to cede the island 
to China in 1945 . The Chinese nat ionalist government set tled 
in Taiwan in 1949 , at the end of the Chinese Civil War . 
Afterwards , the island developed in close as sociat ion with 
the new he gemonial powe r ,  the United States . Hence the 
island ' s  economy was also affected by the shift from the 
military to the economic fields in the confrontation b etween 
the Unit ed States and the Soviet Union . As a result of US 
President Nixon ' s  vis it to Peking in 19 72 , a re-evaluat ion 
of the China quest ion by mos t  coun tries in East and Southeast 
As ia took place . 
In 19 74 , after I had complet ed the empirical work for 
this study , the results  of this general reorientation were 
difficult to separate from the consequences of the emerging 
energy cris is . And becaus e usab le data concerning the 
island's economic development have exist ed only s ince 1880 , 
this study i s  limited t o  the period 1880-19 72 . 
Four foreign challenges t o  the domest ic power st ructure 
fall int o  this period : 
3cf . Praliminarfrie de von Shimonose ki ,  ,1958 , vol . 3 : 380ff . 
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( a) changes in the power st ructure after the armed 
conflict s between Japan and China in 1895 and 
again in 1945 ; 
(b ) limitations on the power st ructure on the eve of  
World War II in 19 38-40 and after the  shift of the 
col d war to the economic field in 1958-60 . 
Crises of the power s tructure and changes in economic 
st ructure . In 1895 , upon incorporation of  Taiwan into the 
Japanese e conomy , the populat ion dens ity amounted to 12 5 
inhabitants per square kilometre of hab itable land. Already 
then , Taiwan b elon ged to the relat ively dens ely populated 
regions of  the early (Kawano 1968 : 1 30f f . ; Lu 1968 : 5 3lf f . ) .  
Sub sequen t population developmen ts are given in Tab le 1 .  
Such rap id populat ion growth makes indust rializat ion 
inevitab le if rising per capita in come is the goal of economic 
po licy . Accordingly , the economic development of  Taiwan 
during the period under st udy was associated with the declining 
import ance of agriculture . As Fig . 1 shows , the share of 
agriculture in the national product which was over 50  p er 
cent at the end of the nineteen th cen tury , declined steadily 
unt il the late 1930s , then , aft er a rise att ributable to 
World War II con ditions , fell even more sharply to under 2 0  
per cent in 19 70- 72 . 
S imultaneous ly , t rade , water , energy , and t ransportat ion 
gained in significance . As Fig .  1 shows , these development s  
occurred in several ' j umps ' . Thus , the share of  nat ional 
product o riginat ing in the t ert iary sector was between 2 0  
an d  25  p e r  cent before 1915-17 .  I t  rose b y  t en p ercentage 
points innnediat ely aft er 1950-52 . 
A comparison with the se condary sector shows that each 
of these jumps was associated with a turning point in 
indus t rial development . The dashes in the growth of the 
tert iary sector followed the development of the secondary 
sector with a certain t imelag . At the same t ime , and inde­
pendent o f  the size of these j umps ,  the growth rate of the 
secondary sector  increased by almost as much during the two 
phases 1920-40 and 1950-70 . 
One is tempt ed to suspect that , during crises , the 
polit ical deci sion-makers suc ceeded in carrying out dispro­
port ionately heavy short-term investment s in the ter t iary 
sector . Such investment could b e  considered as an indicat ion 
7 
Table 1 
The growth of Taiwan ' s  population 
Period Populat ion Rate o f  growth 'OOO % p . a . 
1906-10 3 , 2 11 0 . 8 
19 11-15 3 , 4 35 1 . 4  
19 16-20 3 , 664 1.  3 
192 1-25 3 , 95 3  1 .  5 
19 26-30 4 , 413 2 . 2  
19 31-35 4 , 99 7  2 . 5  
1936-40 5 , 69 7  2 . 7  
1941-45 6 , 50 7  2 . 7 
1946-50 7 , 65 3  3 . 3 
1951-55 8 , 31 7  1 .  7 
1956-60 9 , 9 35 3 . 6  
19 61-65 11 , 710 3 . 4 
1966-70 1 3 , 652 3 . 1  
Source : Based on Taiwanese Provincial Governmen t (1946 ) ; 
Taiw an Statis tical Data Boo k, 19?3, Taipei , 19 7 3 .  
o f  an increase in the capacity to  cope with crises . Changes 
in the secon dary sector support the hypothesis of a dependence 
between the political and economic sys tems . 4 A comparison 
of  changes in income ( Table 2 )  with the s tructural changes 
given in Fig. 1 shows that a relat ionship indeed exists 
between thes e  changes . 
4 On the problem of the capacity for coping with crises , see 
Janicke ( 19 7 3 : 6ff . ) .  The hypothesis that disequilibria 
might serve to promote rather than hin der the growth process 
is advanced by Hirs chman (1958 : esp . Chapters 3-5 ) and Enke 
(1963 : 315 ff . ) .  
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Thus the heavy sho rt-term inves tment in the tert iary 
sector was carried out while per capita income was either 
stagnat ing or declin ing . It initiated a shift in the trend 
of the development of national product and p er capita income , 
as well as being associated with the increased importance of 
the secondary sector . 
Tab le 2 
The development of  Gross National Product 
and p er cap ita income in Taiwan 
( 19 11-15 = 100 ) 
Period GNP Per capita income 
1890-95 99 . 1  12 7 . 7  
189 6-1900 98 . 3  105 . 2  
. . . . . . . . .  
19 11-15 100 . 0 100 . 0 
1916-20 114 . 6 100 . 4 
192 1-25 135 . 9  110 . 3 
192 6-30 190 . 7 137 . 6  
1931-35 2 40 . 5  154 . 5  
1936-40 2 71 . 3 152 . 8  
. . . . . . .  
19 46-51 137 . 2  66 . 2  
195 1-55 2 53 . 1 9 7 . 7  
1956-60 3 45 . 3  111 . 6 
1961-65 5 06 . 9  13 7 . 9  
1966-70 814 . 7 191 . 6 
Source : Huang , Chang and Lee ( 19 5 1 ) ;  materials from the 
DGBAS . 
Abnormally heavy investment was concentrated in the 
transport at ion ,  irrigat ion and communicat ion systems . Thus , 
during the colonial period , overland connections b etween all 
communit i es had been estab lished by 1920 , and in the following 
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twenty years two-thirds of arable land was brought under 
irrigation . From 1953 onwards ,  the prewar infrast ructure , 
which had meanwhile been restored , was ext ended by further 
development of the energy supply and connnunications systems. 
In agri culture the expans ion of  the infrast ructure was 
financed mainly by real savings ( Chen 19 63 : 52 4, 5 86ff . ;  Rada 
and Lee 1963 : 134) . Finally , the development of the interior 
of the island rep resents an at tempt to integrate wide se gments  
of  the population by  means of  a synthes is of elemen t s  based 
on traditional b ehaviour patterns with mechanisms borrowed 
from the indus trialized count ries . 
The deci sion to in tensify indust rialization was made 
during the limitat ion of the indigenous power st ructure in 
1938-40 and 195 8-60 .  Indus trial entrepreneurs received more 
weight in the process of opinion format ion at these per iods . 
Exis t ing bot tlenecks in the infras tructure were removed after 
1938 by means o f  increased energy generation , and addit ionally 
after 1958 through modernizat ion of freight transport . This 
in cluded electrificat ion of the railway , construct ion of 
highways , and erec tion of con tainer facilit ies in ports 
(Wilson 19 7 2 : 8 ff . ;  also documents of  the DGBAS ) . 
Measures taken complement ing this infrast ructural policy 
make clear the efforts undertaken by the political decision­
makers to take account of the int erests of the metropolitan 
or hegemonial power . Thus , for example , a Rice Exchange was 
created in Taipei after one was established in Tokyo in 192 4 . 
Daily quo tat ions on the radio and in the press made for an 
in creasing flow of informat ion . However , after 193 8) s tate 
control and direct ion appeared to be more suited to overcome 
the b ot tlenecks expected in a war economy .  Hence , state 
cont rolling b odies t ook over the funct ions  of the Rice 
Exchange (Yeh 1955 : 5 ff . ;  JCRR 1953 : 2 ff . ) .  
After 1945 , resurrect ion of control organs inst itut ed 
by the Japanese was at first under taken . Only under the 
influence of the limitat ions on the power structure around 
1958-60 were marked mechanisms once more s trongly cons idered . 
This is also shown by efforts to es tabl ish a stock exchange , 
and in the creat ion of a revolving fund and of a pioneer 
fund to support marke t oriented farmers . 5 
5According to CIECD and JCRR. 
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Development of ent repreneurial ab ilit ies 
The foregoing discussion support s Naschold ' s  thesis 
(Naschold 19 7 1 : 134ff . ) that a close correlation exist s 
between foreign threats t o  a power structure and the willing­
ness of the polit ical elite to give up it s anti-innovat ion 
attitudes . The quest ion arises as t o  the precise conscious­
ness-creating processes b est  suit ed to mot ivate estab lished 
elit es in such a way that they believe they can realize their 
desire for income and prest ige only by mean s of innovat ion­
oriented at t itudes . 
One poin t  of departure for verifying or falsifying 
Naschold ' s  thesis is the inhomegeneity of individual groups , 
already shown by Ponsioen ( 1962 : 10 7 ff . ) .  This may lead to 
ret rogress ive processes . According t o  the previous discus s ion , 
however ,  it seems po ssib le , especially in times o f  cris is , 
to reverse such processes by utilizing the diverging mot i­
vat ional st ructures of individual groups . If crisis manage­
ment based upon such divergencies leads to a solidificat ion 
of strata an d  ins t itutions supportin g  and protecting one 
group within the political elite , at the same t ime that the 
fotnldat ions for ano ther group ' s  s trivin g  for prest ige and 
profit are destroyed ,  then impuls es for social change can 
emerge . 
Such impulses lead to resul t s  which do not directly 
accord with the goals of the elites . They themselves con­
st itute new causes , and , in addition , limit or obviate their 
own cause . Results in a certain sense reflect back upon 
causes and work t o  influence the ir condit ion (Narr 19 7 3 : 101 ) . 
Such change can encompass prest ige hierarchies and thereby 
become an analyt ical point  of reference in the quest for 
income and prestige .  This change i s  expressed in a sub s t i­
tution process b etween income and pres t ige . 
The following bas ic theses result  from this analys is : 
a. There exists a close correlat ion between a foreign 
threat to a power s tructure and the willingness of 
the polit ical deci sion-makers to give up their anti­
innovation st ance . 
b .  It is po ssible partially to sub s t itut e  -income for 
prest ige , and to s teer this process sub s t itut ion in 
such a way as to influence innovation and adaptat ion 
processes . 
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Such substitut ion processes were set  off in Taiwan by 
economic and political challen ges to the power st ructure , 
challenges which threatened to destroy the power s tructure 
through systemic crises if they were not mastered . At the 
same time the foreign constellation in each case forced 
behaviour upon decision-makers which was success ful in the 
short run . The evaluation of  the importance o f  the economic 
decision-makers for the power posit ion of the political 
elite, that is for the ir bas is for achieving income and 
prest ige , in fluenced the decision , whether and to what degree 
existing preconditions for attain ing income and prest ige in 
the economic sphere were to be reinforced or newly distributed . 
Within the framework of a comparat ive analys is the 
second and third chapters of this book deal with these issues . 
In the second chapter , using the example o f  cris is management 
policy after  1880 and 1945 , the poss ibilities  and limit s of  
a policy aimin g at strengthening the  inst itutions supportin g  
and protecting existing ent repreneurship are shown . The 
example o f  at tempt s at crisis managemen t after 1895 and 1949 , 
as examined in the third chapt er , show which possib ilit ies 
and limit s arise when a stren gthening of  those inst itut ion s  
support ing and protecting the t radit ional sector and the urban 
population is coupled with a partial dest ruct ion of the b as is 
of income and prest ige for nat ive entrepreneurship . 
Only init ial preconditions can b e  s et for long-term 
change in the economic potential during the course o f  crises 
in the power structure . Chan ges in the terms of trade among 
individual b ran ches associated with the int roduct ion of  
chan ges are preconditioned upon the willin gness and ability 
of workers and entrepreneurs to be mob ile . The fourth and 
fifth chapters deal with the issues whethe r  and to what 
extent it is po ssible to influence such mobility by means of  
a combination of  the behaviour pat terns of developing 
collllt ries and t ho se of the indust rialized collllt ries , and to 
promote the required learning processes primarily with 
structures complementary to the market . 
Using the exampl e  of colonial development ,  the fourth 
chapter shows how such a process can proceed when changes 
are init iated and s teered largely by economic decision­
makers . During the colonial period , this development led 
the polit ical elit es increas ingly to take on the b ehaviour 
pat terns of the economic deci sion-makers . The resultant 
increasing dependence on the economic sphere of  the political 
decision-makers ' basis of power is reinforced , and , b ecause 
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of increasing industrial izat ion , large enterprises - and 
hence a small numb er of economic decision-makers - gain in 
weight . 
During the post-colonial perio d ,  limitat ion of such 
risks was a policy goal of the polit ical deci sion-makers . 
Us ing this example , the fifth chapter shows that the estab­
lishment of n ew prest ige hierarchies and the legitimat ion 
of the polit ical deci sion-makers as economic elit es are 
suitable ins truments for trans fering the mot ivat ion structure 
of the polit ical elit es to the economic sphere . In Taiwan , 
chan ges in the mot ivat ion structure emanat ing from the 
economic as well as political spheres cont ributed toward 
the prevention of anti-innovat ion structures comparable to 
the crises of the power s truct ure . 
Us in g  the analysis of  crises of  the power structure it  
is po ssib l e  to explain why Taiwanese society , or parts 
th ereo f ,  reacted quite enthus iast ically to some incen t ives , 
whereas o ther equally lucrat ive s ituat ions were hardly 
not iced . It is therefore poss ible , in the sixth chapter , t o  
verify o r  falsify the b asic hypotheses , namely to delineate 
and identify those structural chan ges which led to the 
development of modern ent repreneurship in Taiwan an d ,  for 
their part , were codet ermined by the developing economic 
elite . 
Chapter 2 
CAUSES AND PATTERNS OF CRI SES  
Dualistic s tructures in the past  
Precolonial developments  
China ' s  reform efforts in Taiwan . Precolonial Taiwan 
arol.llld 1880 was in es sen ce an agrarian country in which all 
arable land belonged to the state; and it was the state which 
also determined who could legally cultivate and use the land . 
Unfortl.lllately ,  however , reliable data on the amount of arable 
land are not available for this period , as the privileged 
few who were given land rights reported to the state - for 
obvious tax purposes - only part of the returns from their 
holdin gs .  
The right s so derived from the state were generally 
trans ferred via intermediaries to farmers , who cultivated 
the soil until it became in fertile owing to lack of  ferti­
lizers . They then either ren ted new lands or cultivated a 
different field . The average soil productivity was thus 
quite low . Natural catas trophes and pest blight s resulted 
in an increase in agricultural output which j ust  slightly 
exceeded the growth rate of the populat ion ( Bank of Taiwan 
1954 : 6 f f . ; Barclay 1954b : l8; also Lee 1968 : 42 ff . ) .  
Under these condit ion s and with the given techn ical and 
en trepreneurial ab ilities it  became in creasingly difficult 
durin g  the nineteenth cen tury to supply the growing populat ion 
with agricultural products from domestic sources . The Chinese 
government felt that potent ial social ten s ions resulting from 
such shortages might well be used by European powers to 
s trengthen their influence on the island . In order to prevent 
this , the Chinese governor Liu Ming-ch ' uan was given the task 
of  ins titutin g  reforms in Taiwan based on the Japanese 
experien ce (Myers 1969 : 31) . 
In China ( as well as in Japan at an earlier date )  
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(Hirschmeier 197 1; Marshall 196 7 : 112 ff . ) social tens ions and 
pressures from abroad prompted a power shift within the 
polit ical elit e ;  and it was this shift which triggered off 
the attempt to bring about changes in the economic syst em 
to conform to the new polit ical realit ies . ! 
A crucial s tumbling block for Liu Ming-ch ' uan ' s  reform 
attempts  was the lack of informat ion about available resources .  
Non etheless he cons idered the social st ructure and behavioural 
patterns , wherein of course the roots of the development 
dilennna lay , to contain the seeds for at least a partial 
solution to the problem of shortages and to the informat ion 
gap which con tributed to it . That is , he assumed that in 
t imes of cri s is the strengthening of ins titut ions and the 
s trata pro tect ing and support ing the decision-makers required 
adequate processes for the economic elit e .  
Under these condit ions h e  aimed at influencing economic 
development by taking advantage of some parts of the social 
structure but changing o the rs . He therefore viewed the clans , 
the closely knit villages and the societal strata (stemming 
from the land rights) as a starting point for his reforms. 
The following example illustrates quite will the impact of 
this  decis ion , but it also so deeply reflects the idiosyn­
cracies of the Chinese developmen t conditions that it can 
hardly be related to other countries . 2 
In many Pacific countries the Chinese minorit ies - j oined 
together in clans - b elonged (and st ill b elong) to the most 
act ive economic groups . In addition to ( f inancial) capital , 
they also already possessed an important ab ility , lacking 
among the Taiwan bus iness men , but essential for the future 
development of Taiwan : namely modern entrepreneurial know­
how. It thus seemed to b e  an appropriate policy to attempt 
to enlis t  the support of t he memb ers of the Chinese clans in 
Taiwan to help to develop the island . 
Emergence o f  a dual economy . One of the first steps in 
this direction was taken in 1886 in S ingapore when a Taiwanese 
investment promotion o ffice was set up . The cap ital invested 
through this off ice was directed via the Trade Bureau in 
Taiwan into the rail and shipping s ectors . This  arrangement 
1 In respect to the problem of  b ehaviourial adj ustment to new 
parameters see Burghardt ( 19 7 4 : 38ff . ) .  
2Hoffmann ( 19 62 : 83ff . ) deals with the quest ion of shifts in 
social structures necessary for growth .  
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did not t ake long to bear fruit ,  as in the year 1891 a rail 
link between the port of Keelung ( in northern Taiwan) and 
Hsinchu ( 70 km south of Taipei )  was opened with the ass istance 
of the invested cap ital . 
In the light of  such success ful investmen ts by the 
Chinese living ab road , the mainland Chinese became increas­
ingly willing to trans fer capital to Taiwan ; and it  was this 
financial suppor t which enabled important t elephone connect ions 
to b e  established between Taipei in the north and Tainun in 
the south , as well as b etween Taiwan and the mainland . 3 
The savings behaviour of the Chinese livin g  ab road as 
well as on the mainland indicates that it is no t necessarily 
the demon st ration by developed countries of  a high standard 
of living which results in a low propensity to invest , 4 but 
rather the lack of a consensus b etween the political and 
economic elite as well as incomplete market information 
(Hagen 19 6 8 : 136 ) . As long as this consensus between the 
elites exis ted it was possible to complement market mechanisms 
via given social ins t itut ions . 
The problems of inducing an int eractive proces s  between 
the elites , in order to achieve a consensus about new 
behavioural pat terns , can be seen in the react ion of local 
economic subj ects  to the short-term heavy investmen t in 
infrast ructure . That is , the sugar industry - a branch where 
downstream proces sing of raw materials takes place - expanded , 
solely as a result of investment by those Taiwanese who had 
a monopoly in the product ion of raw materials due to their 
land righ t s . An att empt to improve the statistical coverage 
of  availab le land - and thus improve the allocat ion of this 
factor of  product ion - failed , as those affected feared 
possib le tax increases or even a land reform. S ince many of  
the  civil servants involved in collect ing land s tatist ics were 
related to the ' landed elite ' ,  they could well understand 
such problems . 
In the nonmonetized areas of  the economy ( e . g .  in 
villages)  there was almost no reaction to the reform att empt s  
o f  the government . The first irrigat ion sys tems appeared 
30n the funct ioning of the clans in Thailand see Skinner 
( 195 7 ) , also Chu ( 1963 : 44 ) . 
4nuesenberry (1949)  is of this  opinion . 
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b 1 f . 5 ut on y near a ew rivers . 
The init iation of the modern ization proces s , limited in 
essence t o  changed behavioural pat terns in certain s ec tors 
of the economy , was successful to the extent  that the annual 
growth rate o f  per capita income increased to 2 per cent . 
As a result of neglec ting the nonmonetized areas of the 
economy , available resources could not all be ut ilized to 
overcome the cris is (Lee 19 71) . 
Post colonial development s 
The United States ' reconstruction efforts . By 194 3-44 
Taiwan ' s  indust rial sector had b een sufficiently developed 
so that a large share of the agricultural sector ' s  demand 
for intermediate input s as well as the materials required 
for main taining the ro ad system could be met by domestic pro­
duct ion; the ut ilities were also able to supply the economy 
with the required amounts of  gas and electricity . It was 
nonetheles s  s t ill necessary to import capital goods for the 
ra il and communicat ion systems and also  for the domestic 
capit al goods industry .  The war years , however , caused this 
picture to change dras tically - the bombings not only inflicted 
serious damage to the irrigat ion , energy and t ransportat ion 
sys tems , but also to the heavy indust ries . All this meant 
that a need developed to import goods that had been produced 
domes tically before ( Taiwanese Provincial Government 1946 : 
813 , 82 0 ,  12 81 , 12 89 ) . 
After the war the United States was in a position -
aside from its polit ical obligations - to ass ist with the 
reconstruction of Taiwan . Along with this ass istance , or 
rather as a re sult of the act ivities of US officials , those  
groups of elites gained in fluence whose economic behaviour 
pat tern was s trongly achievement motivated (Mcclelland 1966 : 
195ff . ) .  Their reconst ruct ion efforts were based on the 
philosophy that a rebuilding of the former product ion 
structure , together with supplying a suffic ient amount of 
curren cy ,  was suff icien t  t o  induce an economic recovery -
given the profit mo tive o f  local producers . 6 
50n the quest ion o f  institutionaliz ing new b ehaviour patterns 
see S chonherr (1975 : 138ff . ) ;  Myers ( 1969 : 31) ; Ballantine 
(1952 : 2 0-1 , 38 , 41-2 ) ;  also Chu ( 1963 : 3 7ff . ) .  · 
6The same bas ic philosophy was exhib ited by the US in their 
recons truct ion act ivit ies in Europe ;  see Baumgart (1961 : 2 3ff . ) .  
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In carrying out this po licy the American officials were 
naturally dependent upon the co-operat ion of the local admin­
ist rat ion . As can be seen in Fig . 2 the first problem that 
had to be solved in this respe ct was to f ill the gap caused 
by the deportat ion of the Japanese . One of the init ial steps 
thus taken after the Japanese defeat was the appo intment of 
the Chines e  General Chen Yi to set up a funct ioning adminis­
trat ion . He began his task by appo int in g  officers who were 
fo rmerly under his command to positions in pub lic adminis­
trat ion and in the t ransportation sector ( Riggs 19 72 : 63ff . ;  
Mendel 19 7 0 : 2 7-8) ; those po sitions that st ill remained open 
were f illed by Chinese civil servants . Although these 
appointees had a good backgrolUld of general educat ion , they 
were also ext remely s tatus- conscious and lacked o ccupational 
ab ilities . The re were of course the Taiwanese civil servants 
as  well , who - although not  versed in the  teachings o f  Con­
fucius - were nonetheless well equipped to tackle and solve 
practi cal everyday prob lems . They had been trained as 
achievement-oriented specialists during the colonial period, 
and - based on the ir experience - they expected that the 
gove rnment would inst itute  promo t ions based on ability , 
coupled with an in crease in stat us and pay (Parsons 19 75 : 
114ff . and 1 9 72 : 1 7 0ff . ) .  However , since Taiwan was initially 
considered by the Chinese to be a captured territory ( rather 
than a freed province) it is obvious that such personnel 
policies would lead to  conflicts within the administrat ion . 
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Because of the close co-operat ion b etween the Americans 
on the one side and the milit ary administration as well as 
the former off icers on the other , t hese con flicts , however , 
hardly affected the reconstruct ion of  the infrastructure , 
which ,  with the importat ion of generators ,  transformers and 
pumps , had already been able to supply one-sixth of all 
households with water by 1948 , thereby reaching prewar levels . 
Greater dif ficulties were encountered in repairing the 
electrical system ,  but even here remarkable progress was 
made , so that by 1950 , 80 per cent of the electrical power 
plants and 40 per cent of the gas generat ing plants were 
working again . As for the all- important cement industry 
(which easily met domest ic demand in 1942-43 when it produced 
303 . 5 mill ion tons in a y ear ) , its output was hardly enough 
in 1946 to repair the harbour facilit ies . However , with the 
help of US aid it was possible to eliminate the war damage 
by 194 8-49 . 
American development aid also cen tred on reconstructing 
the asphalt product ion facilities and gett ing the rail system 
back into shap e .  By 1949-50 about 3 . 3 million tons of asphalt 
were produced and at the same time sizeable shipments of  
important rail st ock and parts arrived . Thus , within five 
years after  the end o f  the war , the stage had been set for 
a complete reconstruct ion of the transportat ion system. 7 
The e�ergence of  dualist ic development patterns . In 
the years preceding World War II Japan was interested in an 
increased pro duct ion of goods essential in wartime . An 
attempt was made to achieve this by lowering the interest 
rate on investment loans in 1936 . At the same t ime the labour 
market {parti cularly for the consumer goods indust ry )  was 
subj ected to considerable strains st emming from a general 
mob ilization; thus excess demand for consumer goods soon 
developed . a 
During the war the large-scale manufacturing indust ries , 
whi ch were ma in ly concent rat ed in the cit ies ,  were heavily 
damaged . One of these , the artificial fertilizer industry , 
had its product ion reduced to  a mere 4 per cen t  of  its 
1941-42 leve l .  In the light of such dest ruct ion , it is 
7 See DGBAS ( 1955 : 65 ,  71 , 7 5 ) : Central Government (1951 : 222-3 ) ; 
also Taiwanese Provinc ial Government ( 1949 : 9 6�7 ) . 
8see Liu ( 1 9 7 0a : 9-10 ) . For a general discussion of war 
financing see Keynes (1940 : 65 ) . 
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hardly s urpris ing that a cons iderable amount o f  excess demand 
for consumer and investment goods developed in the immediate 
postwar perio d .  The response of small , medium and large­
s cale estab lishments to these market s ignals , however ,  was 
different . 
The small-s cale indust ries , for instan ce ,  which bas ically 
produced fo r local market s ,  lost some of their qualified 
workers to  large-s cale establishments ; but these indus t ries 
proved mo re flexible because o f  their limited dependence on 
outside markets and the bet ter commun icat ions sys tem among 
the Chinese at lower levels ,  originally created by the 
Japanese . This difference represented the real sales and 
growth po tent ial of the small-s cale indust ries . In addit ion 
to the commtmicat ions sytem, their entrepreneurial st ructure 
survived the war virtually int act . S ince the privately owned 
small and medium-scale indust ries employed almost no  mainland 
Chinese , the above-mentioned personnel con flict s  were non­
existent . wnile the small and medium-scale indust ries 
expanded concurrent ly with the recon st ruct ion of the in fra­
s tructure , the large-scale indus t ries reacted to it only with 
a conside rable timelag . 9 
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Post colonial economic condit ions 
Urban underemployment 
Urbanization policies of  the Japanese .  We have s een 
that tradit ional areas of the economy were hardly affected 
by severe crises ; they neither re inforced the crises nor did 
they serve to overcome them. In the modern areas of the 
economy ,  however ,  the situat ion was quit e differen t , as can 
be seen in the following example . 
Concomitant with the indust rializ at ion of an economy as 
a whole , the urbanizat ion o f  the populat ion proceeds as the 
indus trial demand for labour increases in urban areas , and ,  
drawing on underutilized labour in the agricultural sector ,  
a net inflow o f  th e populat ion in to urban areas occurs 
(Bairoch 19 7 3 : 2 6 ff . ) .  As oppo sed to the nonmonet ized , 
tradit ional areas of the economy , the behaviour of the popu­
lat ion in the urban areas is mo re explicitly influenced by 
income variab les . This can b e  int erpreted as mean ing that a 
greater willingness to adj ust to new parameters exists . 
That such behavioural pat terns are more relevant in urban 
areas can be cons idered to b e  the result of relatively greater 
communicat ion possib ilit ies and a more intensive confron tat ion 
with new consumpt ion pat terns . Whether or not (and to what 
exten t )  these  external ef fects of agglomerat ion lead to more 
development-oriented b ehavioural patterns depends on whether 
the urban labour market allows the desired monetary income 
increases  to be achieved (Muller-Hilleb rand 19 71 : 88ff . ; 
Ponsioen 1962 : 130ff . ) .  
The urbanization o f  Taiwan until 1942 reflected roughly 
the indust rializat ion pro cess . That is , up to 1920 ( in a 
period  of rural development )  the yearly growth o f  the urban 
populat ion exceeded the tot al populat ion growth by only 0 . 2  
per cent . In the following twenty years , however ,  the urban 
population grew at a rate  one percentage point above the 
total populat ion . 
Of crucial importan ce for the inst itut ionalizat ion of 
new behavioural patterns was the fact that companies could 
recruit the skilled workers they needed from either Japan or 
Taiwan . At the same t ime , immigrat ion into the cities was 
limited to those who could prove they had a j ob . 10 Under 
lOThis selection was accomplished by ref using to issue a 
residency p ermit to the Japanese  without proof of  a j ob ;  
see Raper , Chuan and Chen ( 1954 : 22 8 , 2 35 ) . 
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such condit ions Taiwanese were not trained if the j ob was 
too complicated or if the creation of the necessary facilit ies 
in which training would take place seemed to be tmeconomical 
in light of limited need for workers with special skills . 
The demand for workers as a result of  these policies led to 
an in-migrat ion of about 100 , 000 Japanese by the beginning 
of World War I I  (see Table 3) , most of  whom were concentrated 
in the modern s ector . To be specific , 75 per cent of all 
employees in adminis trat ive pos it ions , 69  per cent of all 
technicians and almost 50 per cent of all pro fessional s  ( e . g . 
doctors and lawyer s )  were Japanese . Even more enlight ening 
is a b reakdown of the o ccupat ions - techn icians and labourers -
by industry :  93  per cent of all technicians in transportat ion 
an d  commtmicat ion , 80 per cent in mining and manufacturing 
and almo st 40 per cent in the primary sector were Japanese . 
In the l atter case they were mainly con centrated in agricul­
tural research and experiment al ins t it utes . 
These o ccupational different ials b etween Japanese and 
Taiwanese were not quite so  extreme in the case o f  workers ,  
but even here , for in stance , in the electrotechnical and 
commtmicat ions equipment indust ry ,  one-third o f  the workers 
were Japanese ; and in the metal processing industry it was 
one- fifth (Barclay 1954a : 63ff . ) .  
This employment structure was the result o f  a double 
select ion pro cess . First of  all , the Japanese compan ies 
carefully selected in their home plants those skilled workers 
they knew to  be  well qualified and who coul d  easily adj ust 
to the conditions in Taiwan . Se cond , the Taiwanese , knowing 
that t hey would lose their j ob s  to  Japanese if they did not 
exhib it the neces sary degree o f  flexibility , at tempted to 
pattern their behaviour on the Japanese . 
In every cotmt ry part of the polit ical decision-making 
and administ rat ive bodies for all regions of the cotm t ry are 
located in the capital . If  large corporat ions prevail in the 
manufacturin g  sector ,  then quite o ft en their headquarters an d  
research facilit ies are located in j ust a few areas - often 
in the capital . 
In the Japanese Empire the centres of  e conomic and 
politi cal power for Taiwan were located on the main island 
of  Honshu . The research , decision-making and administrat ive 
funct ions were carried out here exclusively by Japanese . In 
1945 Taiwan was separat ed from the Japanese Empire and the 
Table 3 
Dist ribut ion o f  occupat ions in Taiwan , 1940 
Taiwanese 
Occupation 
No . Share 
Managers 8 , 558 0 . 6 
Clergy 40 , 389 2 . 7 
Technicians 4 , 966 0 . 4 
Labourers 1 , 419 , 8 9 8  95 , 2  
Administ rat ive personnel 
Professionals 
Other 
Total 
Source : Barclay ( 1954a : 61) . 
5 , 809 0 . 4  
9 , 89 3  0 . 7 
1 , 632 0 . 1 
100 
Japanese 
No . Share 
1 , 92 4  2 . 0  
2 1 , 2 7 7  22 . 7  
10 , 9 7 3  11 . 7 
35 , 464 3 7 . 8  
16 , 035 1 7 . 1  
8 , 092 8 . 6  
113 0 . 1  
100 
Share of 
Japanese 
% 
18 . 4  
34 . 5  
68 . 8  
2 . 4  
7 3 . 4  
45 . 0  
6 . 5  
N 
w 
2 4  
Japanese were evicted . In addit ion t o  this quant ifiable 
reduction in the  numb er of qualified personnel in Taiwan , 
there was also a nonquantifiable lo ss of entrepreneurial 
know-how and human cap ital in general . Furthermore , the 
above-des cribed adaptation pro cess was abruptly interrupted . 
Root s  of  polit ical con flicts .  In the y ears following 
1945 a large number o f  mainland Chinese migrated to Taiwan 
and by 1948 they al ready approached the number of Japanese 
which had been evicted ( see Table 4 ) . Once on the islan d ,  
the ma inland Chinese preferred t o  settle in the large urban 
areas and by 19 5 3  they comprised 38 per cent o f  the populat ion 
in Taipe i , 2 6  per cent in Keelun g,  2 1  per cent in Kaohsiung 
and 18 p er cent  in Tai chun g .  These cities also happened to  
be  the ones upon which the internal migrat ion was concent rated 
as well . The yearly growth rate of the populat ion in these 
areas thus far exceeded the national average and amounted to 
11 per cent . This development represented a definite shift 
in demographic (urbanization) trends ( see Fig . 4 ) . 
1946 
194 7 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
Source : 
Year 
Table 4 
Mainland Chinese o f  working age 
registered in  Taiwan , 19 46-52 
Numb er 
( ' OOO) 
16  
29  
63 
2 08 
2 62 
300 
325 
Per cent  
increase 
81 . 3 
1 1 7 . 2  
2 30 . 2 
25 . 9  
14 . 5  
8 . 3 
Raper, Clman and Chen (1954 : 216 , 2 33) . 
It is indeed quite not iceable that un t il 1940 commun i t ies 
with more than 30 , 000 inhab itants increased their share o f  
the populat ion at the expense o f  the towns with less than 
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10 , 000 inhabitant s . While the connnunit ies with populat ions  
b etween 10 , 000 and 30 , 000 more or less  held their own before 
1940 , they lost cons iderable ground in the years thereaft er . 
At t he same t ime the populat ion in the cit ies over 30 , 000 
was rapidly expanding and the problems caused by the war in 
these cit ies were increas in g .  In particular , ut ility services 
in these cities were hard hit (Barclay 1954a : 42 ) , and it had 
not b een possible to rebuild or repair quickly all those 
establ ishments damaged or destroyed in the war . Thus , along 
with a rapidly expanding demand for good s , the demand for 
labour was met by a relatively small supply of skilled workers 
( as compared with prewar t ime s ) , part icularly those workers 
who could restore ut ility s ervices and reconstruct factories . 
Taiwan was overurbanized . 11 
% 
1 0  
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
1 00 ..--����-..-���������----1-
1 920 1 930 1940 1952 
I = Towns up to 10.000 inhabitants 
1 1  Town between 10.001 a n d  20.000 inhabitants 
Ill = Town between 20.001 and 30.000 inhabitants 
IV = Towns over 30.000 i nhabitants 
Fig . 4  Dis tribution of Taiwan ' s  urban population , 19 20-52 . 
Source : Raper , Chuan and Chen (19 54 : 255 ) ; Taiwanese 
Provin.cial Government (1946 ) .  
�������� 
110n the quest ion of overurbanization in a developing count ry 
see Bairoch ( 19 7 3 : 2 1  ff . ) .  
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Owing to the lack of  living quarters in the rural areas 
it was not possib le to solve the prob lem by organiz ing an 
exodus from the urban centres . It was therefore of  crucial 
importan ce for the migrant s to f ill  the skilled-worker gap 
left by the Japanese , if the problem were to be solved . As 
far as the human capital potential o f  the immigrants is 
con cerned , some conclus ions can be drawn from the 194 7 
employment st ructure ( see Tab le 5 ) . 
The geographic centres  of modern Chinese indust ry were 
in areas formerly admin i st ered by Japan . However ,  the 
migrat ion out of these areas , in whi ch 90 per cent of the 
manufacturing workers in China were located , to Taiwan amotmted 
to only 2 0 , 000 ( in the working-age cohort s )  ( DGBAS 1955 : 52 ;  
Raper , Chuan and Chen 1954 : 2 46-7 ) ;  and most o f  these immi­
grants belonged to groups which felt threatened by the commu­
nist revolut ion , that is landowners , civil servants and 
merchant s .  The o ccupat ional structure of the migrants from 
other provinces on the mainland was similar . They mo stly 
had a good general education , but were hardly capable of  
carrying out the essent ial control , maintenance or  repair 
work that was p erformed earlier by the 11 , 000 Japanese tech­
nicians and 34 , 000 skilled workers . 
Immediately after the Japanese indust ries had been 
expropriated , the Chinese government - with American ass ist­
ance - att empted to reconst ruct these establishments . To 
accomplish this , the availab le entrepreneurial know-how and 
skilled workers were concentrated in these industries . Table 
6 shows the skill structure o f  the workers which resul t ed 
therefrom. By 1947 25  per cent of the workers in the manu­
facturing indust ry were in such companies . 
However , in respect to the shortage of  skilled workers , 
this policy was only part ially successful . For instance , 
the Taiwan Sugar Corpo ration and the Taiwan Power Company 
were able to s t ructure their labour force along earlier lines . 
On the o ther hand this was not possib le in the capit al-
in ten si ve Taiwan Fertilizer Company , where an even higher 
share of tmskilled and semi-skilled workers prevailed than 
in the more labour-intensive Taiwan Sugar Corporat ion . When 
the policy was implemented in the small and medium-s ize  
industries , a severe shortage of  skilled workers resulted ; 
thus this sector of the Taiwan economy operated inefficiently 
(DGBAS 1946 :No . 16 ,  Table 12 ) . 
Tab le 5 
Employment in industry, 1947 
( ' OOO) 
Indus t ry Managerial Eersonnel 
Metallurgy 4 . 2 
Machinery 8 . 6 
Metal produ ct s 3 . 6 
Electrical engineering 1 . 9  
Chemicals 2 3 . 9 
Textiles 2 8 . 0 
Food pro cessing 2 5 . 4  
Apparel 6 . 3  
Other 5 . 3  
Source : DGBAS (1955 : 53) . 
Table 6 
Labourers 
40 . 2  
4 7 . 5  
16 . 7  
9 . 1  
119 . 6  
2 29 . 7  
80 . 0  
32 . 6 
2 3 . 1 
Total 
44 . 4  
56 . 1  
2 0 . 3 
1 1 . 0 
143 . 5  
2 5 7 . 7 
105 . 4  
38 . 9  
2 8 . 4 
The skill st ructure of employment in large-scale 
Taiwanese indus try, 194 7 
Company Skilled Unskilled 
Taiwan Sugar Corporat ion 5, 360 16, 2 70 
Taiwan Power Company 1, 830 2 , 980 
Taiwan Paper Company 62 0 2 , 650 
Taiwan Cement Company 430 2 , 350 
Taiwan Gold & Copper 
Mining Administrat ion 140 2 , 150 
Shipb uilding Company 330 1 , 920 
Taiwan Fertili zer 
Company 260 1, 250 
Taiwan Alkali Company 2 7 0  1, 250 
Taiwan Aluminium 
Corporation 130 9 80 
Source :  Central Government (1951 : 396-7 ) . 
Rat io 
3 . 0  
1 .  6 
4 . 2  
5 . 4  
15 . 3  
5 . 8 
5 . 6  
4 . 6 
7 . 6  
2 7  
2 8  
Had the achievement principle b een applied in the state­
owned ent erprises the Taiwanese would have had a better 
chance o f  get t ing promoted . However , they were confronted 
with a management which was s tatus-o riented and which viewed 
t raining received during the Japanese occupat ion as something 
that only collaborators could have been given . Thus an 
achievement-oriented sys tem - as was in existence during the 
colonial times and used to in crease output - was lacking .  
Furthermo re ,  the Taiwanese had t o  b egin t o  worry about becoming 
tmemployed ,  should the in-migrat ion from the mainland cause 
them to los e  their j ob s  to these immigran t s . The result of  
this situat ion was that the Taiwanese rej ected the b ehavioural 
patterns of the mainland Chinese and unsucces sfully attempted 
to  stop a further overst rat ificat ion by revolt ing in 194 7  
(Barnett 1960 : 389 ) . 
Availab ility of technical know-how and f inancial resources 
Technical know-how . As can be seen by comparing pre­
colonial and po st colonial crises , a development s t rategy ,  
based on s trengthen ing st ructures supporting the e conomic 
elit e , can only be successful in times of cris is i f  the 
economy is less well develope d .  In more advan ced economies 
it is either necessary to destroy the b asis of the economic 
elite or  initiate a process which forces a consensus on 
behaviour p atterns . This b ecomes more obvious if  the agri­
cultural sector is examined as well as the impact of  an 
ab sence o f  an innovation-oriented , generally accepted behaviour 
pattern on the availability of technical know-how , together 
with the necessary financial resources . 
Of p articular importance for Taiwan ' s  agricultural 
development during the colonial period was the b reeding o f  
ponlai rice , which - together with increased fert ilizer 
inputs - led to a s izeab le improvement in land p ro ductivity 
(Ho 1968 : 313ff . ) .  But the int roduct ion o f  the new breed o f  
rice did not only mean that output per hectare was increased; 
it also caused  the rice producers to become quite dependent 
upon an un interrupted supply of artificial fertilizers . To 
be specific , if artifical fertilizer usage in 1935-36 is 
taken as a base , the normal rice strains produced higher 
yields per area than ponlai . A reduction o f  the artificial 
fert ilizer usage on such t raditional rices by 50 per cent 
reduced y ields by only 1 . 5  per cent and without any artificial 
fert ilizer the normal rice s trains pro duced yields 25 per 
cent above ponlai . In order to induce significantly greater 
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yields ( 3 0  per cent ) with the ponlai rice it was necessary 
to increase the use o f  artificial fert ilizers by 2 00 p er 
cent (see Table 7 ) . 
As can b e  seen in Table 8 there was hardly any artificial 
fert ilizer in the years immediately following the war and 
the adminis trat ion was incapable of having the required 
amount s import ed.  Owing to the lack of capital equipment as 
well as the social conflict s in the large industries , domestic 
product ion was increased only s lowly . On top of these 
problems the farmers only had ponlai seedlings and the agri­
cultural research stat ions were not in a pos it ion to shift 
product ion quickly to t raditional rice varieties . Further­
more , the per cap ita consumpt ion of rice on the farms 
increased ( see Tab le 9 ) . All these factors meant that a 
reduced supply of marketed rice was available , and at the 
same t ime demand was not iceab ly increas ing b ecause of the 
in-migrat ion of mainland Chinese . 
Financial resources . As already ment ioned there was a 
definite incent ive in colonial t imes for the large landown ers 
to int roduce the new rice s train - namely to increase land 
rent s .  Consequently they would also have to expect that the 
reduced supplies of ar tificial fert ilizers would reduce land 
productivity and cause a sharp decrease in land rents . As 
it turned out , however , the large landowners were ab le to 
gain con siderable influence in the co-operatives , that is , 
in th ose organ izat ions responsib le for looking aft er the 
exis ting rent cont racts , and were thus able to have the land 
contracts chan ged so as to shift the burden of the lack of  
fert ilizer to the farmers .  In Table 10 the corresponding 
change in the factor prices can b e  seen . 
Before the war , in the agricult ural sector the need for 
loans existed part icularly to finance investments , production , 
sales and - innnediat ely b efore harvests - the op erat ing costs 
as well . In some cases the farmers received interest-free 
long-term loans from the banks and co-operatives , but in 
other cases they had to pay no more than 10 per cent interest . 
Product ion and sales loans , however , generally had a durat ion 
of 2 -6 months and carried interes t  rates of 10-15 per cent 
a month , a rat e exceeded only by con sumer loans . The loans 
were usually financed by landowners , merchants , industries 
and private p ersons . 
Tab le 7 
Development of land productivity under the influence 
of artificial fertilizers , compared to 19 35-36 · 
Normal rice Ponlai Yield Quant ity of  
artificial 
fert ilizer kg/ha Increase kg/ha Increase Ponlai/No�mal 
None 2 , 696 
50% of 19 35-36 2 , 9 74  
100% of  1935-36 3 , 015 
150% of 1935-36 2 , 9 10 
300% of 1935-36 2 , 846 
Source : Kawano (1937 : 7 6 ) . 
% 
2 , 025 75 . 1  
2 7 8 2 . 2 39 214 75 . 3 
319 2 , 633 608 87 . 3  
2 14 3 , 124  1 , 099  107 . 4  
150 3 , 6 79 1 , 654 12 9 . 3  
rice 
w 
0 
Tab le 8 
Consumpt ion of art ificial fertilizer in Taiwanese 
agriculture , 1946-48 ( ' OOO tonnes ) 
Production 
Imports 
194 6  
1 . 6 
0 . 1 
194 7 
9 . 2  
72 . 6  
194 8 
2 8 . 3  
15 8 . 7  
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Source : DGBAS (1955 : 70-1) ; Taiwanese Provincial Government 
( 1949 : 9 6- 7 ) . 
Tab le 9 
The sub s t itut ion of rice for sweet potatoes , 
1936-51 (per capita consumption per day in g) 
Rice 
19 36-37 1950-51 
Landholders 
Labourer-tenants 
Tenant s 
So urce : Lee ( 196 8 : 2 11) . 
4 32 
42 4 
Table 10 
518 
503 
5 04 
Sweet pot atoes 
19 36-j7 19 50-51 
340 
4 7 0  
2 42 
32 6 
1 84 
The share of  factor costs in agricultural output , 
1941-49 ( % )  
Period Labour Land Capital Other income rent costs  input s 
1941-44 49 . 83 3 1 . 2 1  7 . 22 11 . 7 4  
1946-49 30 . 30 4 7 . 66 7 . 65 14 . 39 
Source : J CRR (19 72 ) . 
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After World War I I  agricult ural loan financing was sub­
j ected to a maj or change . Owing to the lower soil product­
ivity , the high land rents  and the increased self-consumpt ion 
in the agricult ural secto r ,  farm money income dropped . In 
some cases this l ed the farmers to sell some of  their grain 
as seed between harvest s and to finance a larger share o f  
their consumpt ion expenditures with loans . This situat ion , 
as well as the no rmal high degree o f  indeb tedness after 
harvest s , caused the s hare of  loans to finance sales and 
product ion to increase at the expense of investment loans . 
Th e changes in the structure of  loans  can be seen in Table 11 . 
Table 11 
Use of credit s in Taiwanese agriculture , 1933 to 1949-50 (%)  
Use 19 3 3  1949-50 
Purchase of machinery and equipment 41 1 8  
Working cap ital 6 2 2  
Trade credit s 2 5  2 9  
Consumer credit s 18 2 6  
Other 10 5 
Source : JCRR ( 1952 ) . 
Parallel to this rise in short-term loans there was also 
an increase in the rate of interest .  While in 19 33 only 4 
per cent of  all loans carried int erest  rates above 2 0  per 
cent per annum , in 1949 40 per cent of the loans outstanding 
had interest rates of 39 per cen t  per month (Yeh 1955 : 7 4ff . ;  
also JCRR 1952 : 12 9-30) . 
As a result of  the war , the importance of the b anks and 
co-op erat ives in extending loans decreased . During the c ivil 
war large sums of money flowed f rom the mainland to the island 
and agri culture was almost the only sector in which money 
could be pro fitably invested . Thus it is quite probab le 
that mainland Chinese - in addit ion to local money lenders -
were will ing to extend credit to farmers , for whom land was 
the b asic form o f  security . If this assumption is correct 
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then mainlan d Chinese and large landowners can be as sumed as 
having a collllllon interest in not wan ting refo rms to endanger 
the ability of the deb t ors ( in the agricultural sector) to  
meet their financial ob ligat ions . The change in the credit­
ors ' structure of  loans for product ion can be seen in Tab le 
12 . 
Tab le 12 
Share of selected sources in financing product ion and 
investment in Taiwanese agriculture , 1933 and 1949 ( % )  
Source 1933 1949 
Land Bank 16 4 
Connnercial Bank 4 1 
Farmers ' Associat ion 13  6 
Co-operative Bank 4 
Landlords 3 4 
Dealers 6 5 
Indust ry 7 2 
Private money lenders 49 7 3  
Others 2 1 
Source : The Survey Report on Agricultural Credit, 19 3 3 , 
1949 , Provincial Dept  of  Agriculture , Credit , and 
Fo rest ry ,  Taipei . 
Crisis management prob lems con front ing the elites 
As explained above , in 1880 the innovat ion-oriented , 
polit ical decision-makers were confron ted in economic issues 
with elit es exhib iting the same b ehavioural patterns , as well 
with groups orien ted towards nonmonetary act ivit ies . The 
latter were not affected by s tructural changes in the monet ized 
sectors of the economy . The lack o f  effective controls over 
( i . e . penetration int o )  this sector had an impact during the 
reform effo rts  only to the extent that not all resources 
were available to overcome the crisis . 
The situat ion after 1945 was different , as Taiwan farmers 
and blue and white-collar workers ,  who were attempt ing to 
improve their status and income pos it ions , were con fronted 
with political decision-makers who were orien ted towards 
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traditional , preindust rial , behavioural pat terns . Under 
such condit ions the minimal effect ive governmental con t rol  
over these populat ion groups led to a rej ection of the 
government by many Taiwanese . The penetration problem was 
worsened by a growing identity prob lem.  
The United Stat es , through its reconst ruct ion pol icies , 
was able tempo rarily to assist the Taiwanese in their effo rts 
to increase income l evels , but they were not able to prevent 
the entrepreneurs from subst itut ing income for pres t ige , 
while at the same t ime the blue and whit e-collar wo rkers and 
polit ical elites kept their behavioural patterns . If 
communi cators are defined as being individuals or groups 
which trans fer st imuli in order to change the behaviour o f  
o thers , then during this period the Chinese commun ist s on 
the mainland can b e  considered as being the mos t  success ful 
communicators . In the light of bot tlenecks in the service 
utilit ies sector in Taiwan as well as the demonstrat ion 
effects of the Chinese civil war , the cris is was int erpret ed 
as being a dist ribut ion problem that seemed to be solved on 
the mainland by a revolut ion . 
Threats to a power st ructure from ab road allow those 
elites who pay more attent ion to innovat ion prob lems to gain 
power within a polit ical system. In this respect , there 
seems to be a correlation between the level of industrial­
iz ation ( as well as the degree o f  urbanizat ion b efore the 
crisis ) and the impo rtance of ant i-innovat ion elites limit ing 
the polit ical opinion-making process . Whether or not (and 
to what extent ) this leads to the development of  a domest ic 
entrepreneurial system depen ds on the solut ion to the communi­
cation s ,  ident ity and legit imat ion problems (Naschold 19 7 1 : 
88 ; Verba 19 7 3 : 196ff . ) .  
Should the communication problem be cons idered part o f  
the penet ration problem, then the suc ces s  with whi ch the 
t radit ional sectors o f  the economy are integrated into the 
flow of communicat ions is of crucial impo rtance . 
In the case of  the identity problem,  if it is assumed 
that a desirable rapid st ructural change of the economy 
should be effected with the support o f  foreign investors , 
then the quest ion arises as to whether (and to what ext ent ) 
these communicators give consideration to the problem o f  a 
possible divergence between the changing p ro duct ion condit ions 
and the development level of  the labour force . 
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Should it also be realised that political decision­
makers under specific his torical condit ions wan t to play a 
legit imat e role as economic elit es , then the quest ion must 
be raised,  if (and how) they can assume the funct ion as a 
communicator both in the politi cal as well as in the economic 
sphere . 
Chapter 3 
OVERCOMING SYSTEMATIC POL IT ICAL CRISES 
The trans fer to Taiwan of Japanese decis ion-makers ' 
experience in economic development 
Japan ' s  development experience in the eight eenth century 
Social mediat ion in overcoming systematic pol it ical 
crises . As could be seen in the cas e of Taiwan , the inter­
act ion be tween foreign and domestic influences can lead to 
a situation con sidered by the elit e to b e  a threat to the 
power st ruct ure . In commenting on such a power constellat ion 
Janicke not es that crises do not necessarily have to result 
in st ructural changes beyond a mere technocrat ic reform. 
The pos s ib ility of overcoming a status quo in a society on 
the one hand is opposed by the danger o f  producing a status 
quo minus the endangered ruling class on the other (Janicke 
19 7 3 : 15 ) . 
In the l ight of  the fact that prestige att ainment 
motivate s  human behaviour , there exis ts  during a cris is a 
close correlat ion b etween the extent to which the prestige 
hierarchy is threat ened and the willingness of the elite to 
ins titut ionalize new behaviour patterns . Japan is a prime 
example in this respect and since the t ransfer of  Japan ' s  
experience to Taiwan in the form o f  know-how was a crucial 
aspect in Taiwan ' s  economic development ,  it is only appro­
priate that this subj ect be briefly reviewed for Japan . 
As a result o f  the st rengthening of  the bourgeois ie 
during the first half of the nineteenth century , social con­
flicts generally characterized internal development s in 
Japan . The crisis cons ciousness o f  the economic and polit ical 
decision-makers which was thereby generated , was shaped even 
further by their interpreting the in creased influence o f  
European empires in Asia to  be a threat . The fear of  los ing 
the exist ing fotmdat ions of their economic well-being , as 
well as their social status , caused the polit ical decision-
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makers t o  feel that Japan should pattern the development o f  
i t s  economy after western col.lllt ries , but with a minimum o f  
fo reign intervention (Umetani 19 6 7 : esp . 3ff . ) .  Thus the 
des ire to maintain given power const ellat ions , plus the 
concern about los ing them as a res ul t  of polit ical p res sures 
from within as well as abroad , and the expectation that it 
was possible to s tab ilize power s t ructures by intro ducing 
changes in the economic system, all caused the polit ical 
elit e to prefer chan ges rather than attempt  to maintain the 
given system. 
Outs ide of the government secto r (with it s own st atus 
symbols) land ownership belon ged to the generally accepted 
pres t i ge symbols . As a result o f  the above-mentioned dynamic 
interplay b etween desires , fears and expect at ions in the 
polit ical sphere , the pol itical decis ion-makers were ready 
to introduce changes in the agricultural sector whereby the 
interests of the existing economic elites would be neglected . 
So cial mediat ion in changing the economic syst em. In 
18 7 3  a land tax l aw was enacted in Japan which secured the 
ownership of land while eliminat ing the large landowners 
(mainly l iving in th e cities) . The new tax base was desig­
nated as being the est imat ed land product ivity rather than 
the actual yield . Thus an inefficient ut ilizat ion of arab le 
land could well mean that landowners could b ecome indebted 
to the s t ate and then lose their newly acquired st atus symbol -
land . It is there fore not surprising to note that such 
(negat ive)  incentives helped to ensure that incomes were 
increased via an expan sion o f  production . It also ensured 
that a growing population and an increased per capita demand 
for agricultural p roduct s  could be supplied by the agricul­
tural sector ,  at leas t up to 1890 ( Crawcour 19 69 : 22 ) . 
Unfort\.lllately , however ,  availab le stat ist ics do not allow 
two other relevant aspect s  to b e  more clo sely examined , 
namely : 
1 .  The extent t o  which the industrializat ion was financed 
by agriculture or tradit ional industries during the 
first decades of the Japanese modernizat ion , and 
( should a real t rans fer have taken pl ace between the 
agriculture and manufacturin g  sector) 
2 .  whether availab le o r  addit ional resources were allo­
cated via pro ductivity inc reases . To be sure , it 
s eems that the primary sector contrib uted s ignificant 
38 
amounts of capital to the economic development of 
Japan . 
One way o f  effecting the t ransfer out of  the agricultural 
sector was via taxes , as the tax burden in this sector (as 
a percent age of the value o f  product ion) was four t imes 
higher than in the rest of the economy . Another disadvantage 
for the primary sector result ed from the fact that governmen t  
subsidies were l imited t o  the secondary sector . And an 
addit ional means of ab sorb ing part of  the value added in the 
agricultural sector was via price policies , s ince low ( fixed) 
agricultural prices meant that a significan t share o f  increases 
in land product ivity was passed on to the consumer . 
The endowment wi th a stat us symbol accompanied at the 
same t ime by a certain risk of los ing this symbol in the 
case of economic failure led to a behavioural incongruency -
i . e . , b etween the profit mot ive and status con sciousness -
in the agricult ural sect o r .  Such factors provided the bas is 
for allowin g a sufficient amount of  goods t o  be produced and 
capital t o  be accumulated in the agricultural sector and 
then trans ferred to the  other sectors of the economy . This 
meant on the one han d that the demand for foo dstuffs coul d  
be satis fied to a large degree by domestic s ources , and on 
the other hand that the government could be more flexible in 
s tructurin g policies , part icularly incent ives or ass istance 
measures , fo r the secondary s ector ( Ogura 1968 : 62 3ff . ; Crawcour 
1969 : 21 ;  Ran is 1969 : 10 ,  48 ; al so Ohkawa 1957 : 2 1 ) . 
During the period 19 68-81 the de cision was made to 
estab lish a heavy industry in Japan ; a decision which was 
prompted both for military st rategy reason s! and by domest i c  
demand con siderat ions (Hirs chmeier 1971 : 2 4l ff . ) .  S in ce th ese 
indust ries were to be managed by the Japanese themselves , 
the problem arose as to how to create a consensus b etween 
western concept ions on incent ives and the t radit ional orient­
at ion on  the  t eachings of  Con fucius , where all behaviour was 
shaped by its  impact on the wellbeing of society as a whole .  
Thus , out o f  the neces s ity of cons idering ' profit incentives 
while denying an interest in material rewards , and in extolling 
1verbeck was adviser to the Japanese government at this t ime .  
His main argument for s imultaneous promot ion o f  indust rial­
izat ion and armaments  was the potential threat to the island 
kingdom by the European great powers . 
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private compet it ion while seeking government aid ' (Marshall 
19 67 : 94 ) , a Japanese bus iness community developed , which was 
able to assist in ensuring that the status consciousness of 
the relevant economic groups did not run cont rary to the 
profit mot ive . Thi s  can b e  shown by the following example . 
During the early stages of industrial development , the 
ent repreneurs at tempted to apply their concept of harmony 
between the profit mot ive and socie ty ' s  wellbeing to the 
relat ionship b etween employers and employees . One consequence 
of thi s was a paternalist ic att itude on the part of the 
employers and - on the part of the employees - the willingness 
not to allow merely higher wage demands to determine their 
economic behaviour . That is , the employees were willing to 
accept further training ' for the company ' and a lower pecuniary 
income so as to p ermit an increasing amount of int ernally 
financed cap ital ( Crawcour 19 69 : 20- 1 ;  Marshall 1967 : 112 ff . ) .  
Aspect s of  Taiwan ' s  locat ion in the Japanese empire 
In comparing the abovementioned reform att empt s one 
maj or di fference can b e  perceived : b oth the Chinese as well 
as the Americans limited their activit ies to the monetized 
areas of the economy . The legit imacy of the ir posit ion as 
de cision-makers was unquest ioned ,  as far as they were con­
cerned . They viewed each respect ive crisis partly as an 
internal (sys t ematic) power struggle - ergo an iden tity 
problem - and partly as a result of  a change in production 
condit ions - ergo a di st ribut ion prob lem. The Japanese , 
however , tried to in corporate the tradit ional sectors of the 
economy into the process of modernizat ion . It is thus not 
surpris ing that the striving to b ecome accept ed as the elite 
in these sectors b ecame an important determinant in the 
polit i cal decision-making process . 
In 1895 , following the int egrat ion of  Taiwan int o  the 
Japanese economy , Japan ' s  development effort s were centred 
on heavy industry .  This meant that - because o f  a lack of 
indigenous natural resources and the general level of  develop­
ment - large amounts of both raw materials and capital goods 
had to be imported ; and this occurred at a t ime when Japan ' s  
ab ility to produce all it s own agricultural product s was 
de creasing . Under such condit ions it is obvious that 
industrializ at ion led to balance of payment s deficit s ,  as 
can be seen in Table 13 .  
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Table 13 
Jap an ' s  balance of  paym.ents  and selected imports 
of  foodstuffs , 1891-1909 (mill . yen ) 
Period Balance o f  Rice import s Ealments 
1891-1896 + 8 . 1  10 . 8  
1896-1900 - 62 . 0  2 1 . 2  
1900-1909 - 52 . 7  21 . l  
Source : Bank of Japan ( 1 9 6 6 : 278 , 2 8 5 ) . 
Sugar import s 
4 . 4  
18 . 1  
37 . 9  
At this point the Japanese governmen t was of the opin ion 
that a mil d  dose o f  inflation could help to st imulate economic 
developmen t , but an accel erat ing in flationary process had to 
b e  avoided at all co sts . 2 About 1900 such an inflat ionary 
danger potent ially emanated part ly from increasin g  balance 
of  t rade deficits and partly f rom budgetary deficits which 
we re incurred in establishing an administrat ion in the 
territories acquired in 1895 . Taiwan , for instance , received 
about 7 per cent o f  the Japanese budget as direct ass istan ce . 
In light o f  such developments  it was the goal o f  Japan ' s  
economic policy to reduce the foreign trade and budgetary 
deficit s .  
Although ( as ment ioned above ) the importat ion of food­
stuffs  was no t the only factor  caus ing the t rade balance to 
rtm a deficit , it  would have b een sufficient to balance out 
foreign trade if domestic sub st itutes had been produced fo r 
rice and sugar - two goods fo r which the condit ions in Taiwan 
were parti cularly advant ageous . As can b e  seen in Table 14 
the co st s of rice product ion were definit ely lower than in 
other parts of the Japanese Empire . Thanks t o  the geographic 
lo cat ion of Taiwan it was even possible to harvest earlier 
than elsewhere in the empire . Thus an increase in the pro­
duction of these items would have saved currency reserves 
and at the same t ime - owing to lower product ion and storage 
cost - could have in creased domestic savings ( Taiwanese 
Provincial Government 192 7 ;  also Lee 196 8 : 15 5 ) . 
20n inflat ion financing , see Myrdal (1958 : 342 ) . 
Table 14 
Production cos ts for sixty kilograms of rice in Taiwan 
and in the rest of the Japanese Empire , 19 33 (yen )  
Fertilizer 
Labour 
Taiwan Other empire 
8 . 5 7 10 . 0 7 
9 . 99 2 1 . 07  
1 . 36 2 . 48 
0 . 52 2 . 06 
Animals 
Other 
Total 
���������������
Source : Kawano (19 3 7 : 3 7 ) . 
2 0 . 44 35 . 68 
A development of the agricultural sector in Taiwan 
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could be expected to induce - via forward and backward 
linkages - addit ional demand . To the extent that this could 
be met by indust ries in the Japanese homeland , it is possib le 
that a bet ter overall ut ilizat ion o f  capacit ies  could be 
achieved . However ,  a large po rtion of the domestic economy 
was supplied by small-scale industries , which had no experi­
ence in supplying b eyond lo cal market s ,  and thus were no t 
capable of supplying Taiwan with the n eces sary goods . On 
the other hand ,  sin ce Japanese administrators and banks had 
experience in setting up such industries and helping them 
adj ust to changing market condit ions , 3 it was theoretically 
poss ible to establish and promote indust ries in Taiwan , so 
the island could prof it from the additional demand created 
by such linkages ,  provided that large-s cale Japanese indus­
tries did not act as suppliers .  
3The flexib ility of Japanese ins t itut ions under changing 
market condit ion s can be  clarified by the following example : 
Init ially , a focal po in t  of village industry in Japan was 
text iles . After  the opening of the Japanese market for 
foreign products ,  Japanese weavers increas ingly refrained 
from using domestic yarns in favour of cheaper Brit ish pro­
ducts .  Under the direct ion of the banks and the bureaucracy , 
part of  small-s cale indust ry shifted over to s ilk production , 
at the cost of wool and cotton yarn production . On this 
see Hax ( 1961 : 19 0 f f . ) .  
42 
Japan was interes ted in such a modern izat ion of Taiwan ' s  
agricultural sector and an expansion o f  small-scale indus­
tries , but it was init ially confronted with the problem that 
the Taiwanese economic elit e  had not adj us ted to the Japanese 
behavioural pattern . Thus , the congruence of behavioural 
pat terns between polit ical and economic elite necessary t o  
induce a change in the product ion st ructure d i d  n o t  exist . 4 
Taiwan ' s  integrat ion into the Japanese Emp ire 
Polit ical int egrat ion . Arotm d  the turn of  the century 
Japan had any number of expert s who had gathered considerable 
experience with such prob lems o f  adj us tmen t during the era 
of Japanese reforms . It was only logical that this human 
capital reservoir be exploited ; the government thus enlist ed 
their support and along with yearly expendit ures of about 10 
million yen att empted to set up the needed institut ions in 
Taiwan (Tsuru 1963 : 139-40 ) . The number of experts  f irst 
sent to Taiwan amotmted to about 2 8 , 000 and (as can be seen 
in Table 15 ) in 1905 over 40  per cent o f  these were employed 
in the adminis t rat ion . 
Tab le 15 
Japanese employees in Taiwan , by sector , 1905 
Sector 
Agriculture , forestry 
Fisheries 
Mining 
Industry 
Trade 
Transpo rt at ion 
Adminis trat ion 
Other 
Tot al 
Source : Barclay ( 1954b : 71 ) . 
Persons 
( ' OOO) 
0 . 3 
0 . 2  
1 . 4  
5 . 7 
4 . 6 
3 . 9 
11 . 5  
0 . 3 
2 7 . 9  
Share 
- (% ) 
1 . 1  
0 . 7 
5 . 0  
20 . 4  
16 . 5  
14 . 0 
41 . 2  
1 . 1 
100 . 0 
40n the problem of the e conomic decis ion-makers in adj ust ing 
their behaviour pat t erns to new economic situat ions , see 
Haselberg ( 1962 : 16 ff . ) .  
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As was the cas e in the other part s o f  the Japanese Empire 
the administrat ion in Taiwan was set up with a strong vert ical 
hierarchy . The central adminis trat ive unit on the island , 
dealing with taxat ion , economics and educat ion , was headed 
by a provincial governor , who was granted the right to appoin t  
half of the memb ers of t he s ix regional parliaments . The 
same numb er of representat ives was delegated by the local 
councils . One o f  the main responsib ilit ies of the shukai in 
the six regions (Taihoku , Shinchiku , Ts ichu , Karenko , Taiwan 
and Tako ) was to set up budgets and regulat e tax and credit 
policies . 
The local councils were elected by registered voters in 
the respect ive connnun.it ies an d  con t rolled by the regional 
governor . Since all governorships were occupied by the 
Japanese and in most of the local coun cils the landowners 
were in the maj ority , this admin istrat ive struct ure ensured 
that the int erests  of these two groups were fairly well 
attended to . 
One crucial problem arose when the admin istrat ion attemp­
ted to extend its coverage to the nonmonetized sector of the 
economy - a sector in which most  of the Taiwan labour force 
was employed . Data on availab le resources necess ary for 
planning were lacking .  Only if information channels b etween 
the Japanese dominated administration and the non-monetized 
sector could b e  established could a development policy 
be instituted . And furthermore , only if the adminis tration 
could effectively transmit the government ' s policies to this 
sector would condit ions conducive to a modernization of the 
entire economy be created . 5 
As could be seen in the case of  the Chinese reform 
efforts in 1880 , traditional b ehaviour patterns can - via 
existing social structures - form the basis of a growth 
process . However , it is also possible that such an approach 
can hinder the optimal exploitat ion of all resources .  Should 
this lat ter point be t rue , that is should the long-establ ished , 
insti tut ionaliz ed social rigidit ies hinder an opt imal explo it­
at ion of all resources ,  the Japanese must  have been interested 
50n the peculiarit ies of  economic act ivit ies in the non­
monetary sector and the potent ial significance of this sector 
for economic development , see Fisk ( 19 7 1 ) . 
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in us ing the pat ronage funct ion of heads of families to 
change the so cial st ructure . 6 
In this respect it proved to b e  quit e useful within the 
pao-chiu sy stem to integrate the st rata-building factors , 
polit ical act ivities and family (Parsons 1954 : 2 10ff . ) .  This 
sy stem allowed the large Chinese family to remain intact as 
an interregional connnunicat ion system. It incorporated t en 
households (within a given region ) into a connnunit y ,  i . e .  a 
chia . Such an approach maintained the advan tages of an 
int erreg ional connnun icat ion sys teii and counteracted the trend 
towards an is olat ion of cert ain families , which was a bas ic 
caus e for the development of a dualist ic society after 1880 • .  
The local parliament appointed one of the heads o f  a household 
to be the leader of the chia ; ten such chia were j oined to 
form a pao . Out of this pao one person was delegated by the 
local parliament to become its spokesman , whereby the parlia­
men ts att empt ed t o  appoint tho se p ersons already accepted as 
l eaders . 
The head of a pao , who was subordinate t o  the local 
parliament , was responsible for seeing that laws and regu-· 
lations were obeyed by ' his ' connnunity.  He in turn further 
delegated his authority to the heads of the chia . It was 
therefore po ssible for the administration to ob tain inform:: _ 
ation and to ins t itute its plan s ;  this system proved it s 
wo rth during the gen eral stat istical survey carried out in 
1905 . 8 
Economic integrat ion . The b anking system in Japan was 
ins tituted in 1880 with the foundin g  of the Central Bank ; 
this was followed sixteen years later by the Hypothek Bank 
6A detailed present at ion of the role of  the family and it s 
head in tradit ional China is availab le in Solomon (19 7 1 : 
Parts I and II) . Bott cher ( 1961 : 4ff . ) shows a numb er of 
parallels to the Japanese family . 
7Boeke attributes social dualism exclusively to ' the clashing 
of  an impo rted social system with an indigenous social 
system of another style ' .  As the previous discuss ion shows , 
this dualism can also come about by the att empt of  the 
political elites to reform the economy while keeping t rad­
itional behaviour pat tern s . See Boeke ( 1964 : 5 3ff . ) .  
8 According t o  documents of the CIECD .  
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of  Japan ( t o  help to finan ce agricultural development)  and 
then in 1900 by the Indust rial Bank of Japan (to  help finance 
development of the manufacturing industry) . Based on this 
experience it was quite poss ible - innnediately after the 
integration of Taiwan int o  the Japanese economy - to establish 
a rudiment ary banking system there . This is documented by 
the exist ence of fourteen Taiwanese and two Japanese (branch) 
financial instit ut ions in 1900 , while there had been only 
one such institut ion five years earlier . 
Complementary to this development a registry off ice was 
set up in Taiwan dire ct ly after it was integrated into the 
empire and in 19 02 (after the spending of 3 b illion yen )  the 
amount of arable land was determined .  This was an important 
and necessary step in paving the way for modernizat ion (see 
Allen 1946 : 5 2 ,  Taiwanese Provincial Government 1946 : 1067-
1108 ; Myers and Ching 19 64 : 561) . 
In addit ion to these two inst itut ions , Japan also set 
up a number of organizat ions aiming specifically at the 
agricultural and manufacturing sector . For the industrial­
izat ion of Taiwan the Seito Kaisha Ltd (TSK) was of part icular 
importance , sin ce it s funct ion was to direct and allocate 
Taiwanese and Japanese savings . Its funct ion was thus s imilar 
to that o f  the Chue Sang-wu during the Liu Ming-ch ' uan era , 
but it s efforts were direc ted towards the sugar indus t ry 
rather than the infrastructure ( as was the case b efore ) . In 
order to demonstrate the efficiency of investments in Taiwan 
the TSK erected (with government financial ass ist ance ) a 
modern sugar refinery , which was able to achieve a 20 per 
cent return on capital after only four y ears ' operat ion . 
The act ivities of TSK were ass isted by those of  the 
Taiwan Bus iness Bureau ( TBB) , whos e task it was to dis seminat e  
know-how . To do so , it b uilt training cen tres for sugar 
engin eers , as well as res earch cen tres and experi·.mental . 
st ations . New companies had to be approved by the TBB and 
the approvals were dealt with in a way which granted each 
refinery monopoly rights in purchasing sugar in a given region . 
As far as agricultural development is concerned,  the 
Farmers Assoc iation - which was copied from s imilar German 
and Japanese organizat ions  - had a crucial impact . The first 
co-operat ive was founded in 1900 in Taipei and by 1927 most  
farmers b elonged to one of the  eight regionally organized 
co-operatives . In 19 38 the Taiwan Farmers ' Associat ion came 
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into exist ence to co-ordinate the act ivit ies of regional 
associat ions . 
Another inst itution set up by the Japanese was the 
Landlord-Tenan t Associat ion (1922 ) , whos e  fllllct ion it was t o  
improve communication between the large landowners an d  the 
tenant s .  One of the accomplishments  of this associat ion was 
the intro duct ion of a 5-year minimum for a lease and a com­
pulsory type of writ ing .  If differences of opinion arose 
b etween t enan ts and landlords this associat ion had to be  
referred t o . 9 
Initiation o f  the growth pro cess 
Agri cultural reforms . The development problems in 
Taiwan arotllld the turn of the century were s imilar to those 
in the Japanese homeland b efore the Meij i reforms . For 
ins tance , even in Taiwan , there was no indicat ion that the 
large landowners , who mainly lived in urban areas , were 
willing or even able to in creas e product ion with the inten tion 
of increas in g  pro fits . Thi s  can no doub t be exhibited by 
the decreasing propensity to inves t  in the years following 
1895 . 
One o f  the crucial events experienced by Japanese 
decis ion-makers was the success with which agricultural reform 
was carried out in the Japanese homeland . Based on this 
experience they came to the conclus ion that the intermediary 
landlords l iving in the rural areas of Taiwan could be mot i­
vat ed to be come more development orien ted if the government 
guaranteed them landownership and security . Therefore it was 
suggested t o  the large landowners that in the course of a 
land-tax reform they exchange the ir land right s for state 
b onds , which could be ut ilized as credit for non-farm invest­
ment , thereby paving the way for a redistribution of  the 
land . Thi s measure affected about 40 , 000 families , that is , 
about 8 per cen t  of the population and a much larger proportion 
of arable land . After the reform the large landowners were 
9 see Myers ( 1969 : 38ff . )  and documents of the CIECD ;  also  
Chang and Myers (1963 : 444-5) and Kwoh (1966 : 4 ££ . ) .  The 
attempt t o  ut ilize European experience was not  rest ricted 
to the colon ial period . Thus today , for example , German 
documentat ion with complement ary explanatory material in 
Chinese is used in craftsmen ' s  educat ion . See , e . g . Nat ional 
Committee of the Repub lic of China ( 19 71) . 
free to decide in what other sectors of the economy they 
wanted to invest ( e . g .  the sugar indust ry) . 
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The former intermediaries then b ecame the new landowners 
( the tenant s '  posit ion remained llllchanged) and they were 
ob liged to pay taxes in cash - a measure which induced them 
to promot e an increase in product ion . The act ual rate of 
taxat ion was lower than the trans portat ion costs  on deliveries 
to urban landowners and taxes incurred before the refo rm. 
Since the Registry Off ice had al ready surveyed the arab le 
land and determined that it covered 754 , 452 hect ares - as 
opposed to 350 , 5 75 registered b efo re the survey - land-tax 
receipts increased ( see Myers 1969 : 36 ;  Myers and Ching 1964 : 
39 , 561 ; Bank of Taiwan 1954 : 6 ff . ; Chang and Myers 19 6 3 : 441 ) . 
In addit ion to ' pushing out ' the large landowners and 
surveying the arab le land , there were new regulat ions regarding 
the purchase of  land , and these formed an integral part of 
the refo rm. This measure , which did not affect the right s 
of farmers to rent additional land so as to  adj ust to techno­
logical changes , forbade the purchase of land by Taiwanese . 
Sin ce one of the regulat ions inst ituted during the land 
refo rm required that changes in the ownership of land be 
regist ered , it was easy to ensure that this measure was 
ob served. One of the part ies profiting from this purchase 
res trict ion was the Japanese foo d  processing indust ry .  That 
is , sin ce these companies were not rest ricted in their 
dealings , they were able to purchase land for their own 
plantat ions  and thereby secure their sources of supply . 10 
Sett lement of modern industries . One of the largest 
Japanese companies in the food processing industry around 
the turn of the century was ownee by Suzuki Tasabura . Sin ce 
the foundin g  of the company he had exhib it ed his will ingnes s  
to act a s  a risk bearer in carrying out extens ive investment s  
a s  long a s  the welfare of  the Japanese connnunity profited 
from the import sub s t it ut ion (Marshall 19 6 7 : 36ff . ; Chan g  and 
Myers 19 63 : 444-5 ) . He was , however , less willing to accept 
such risks out side the Japanese society .  In the case of 
Taiwan , for instan ce ,  he expressed his willingness to invest  
only after the government guaranteed him a minimum return , 
provided the necessary skilled workers and ensured him of a 
10nocuments of the JCRR. On optimal plan sizes  and market 
opt imum see . in this connection , Gal (1963 : 5 8 ,  7 3) ; also 
Muller ( 1954 : 55ff . ) .  
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regional monopoly with respect to purchas ing foodstuffs .  
Thus at least in this case the use o f  prest ige incent ives 
to promote economic growth was l imited to those regions  in 
which the social condit ion s were favourable . 
One result of  the land tax reform was that the economic 
decis ion-makers in the agricultural sector generally had no 
formal e ducat ional background . 11 Furthermore , in their 
dealings as intermediaries they were guided by the bas ic 
principle of maximising short-term profit s .  S ince a mo dern­
iz at ion of the primary sector meant that long-term investments 
had to be  inst ituted , a change in this behavioural charact er­
istic was necessary . The Japanese administrat ion , however , 
fel t that such a chan ge had to b e  caut iously introduced so 
as to  avo id the impress ion that the right s of  the new land­
owners were b eing impinged upon ; an impingemen t ,  for inst an ce , 
might b e  compulsory improvement s . 
But it was not only the government that was interested 
in ample supplies of  high-quality foodstuffs ; the food pro­
ces sing industry shared the s ame interest s .  I t  i s  thus 
quite easy to understand that this indust ry played a key role  
in the adaptat ion process . The profit mot ive was reason 
enough for it to demonstrate the advantages of new seedgrains 
and extend loans so as t o  induce in creased planting of  these.  
Adaptat ion of Chinese and American 
cris is management experience 
Economic c ondit ions in post civil war Taiwan 
Public administrat ion and the economy of Taiwan . One 
consequence of  the armed conflict on the mainland was a high 
rate of inf lat ion . In order to preven t  this inflat ion from 
seriously affectin g  the Taiwan economy , the price controls 
introduced by the Japanese during World War II were maintained 
even after the end of the war . Other measures to help to 
s t abilize the pri ce level included the creation of a Taiwan 
currency and the introduct ion of a flexible exchange rate 
vis-a-vis the Chinese yuan (Liu 1970a : l09-10) . 
llin 1899 274 teachers at 7 4  schools in the 15 large commun­
ities of Taiwan taught 7 318 pupils from 8 to 14 years of 
age . This corresponds approximately to the number of male 
ta-tsu (large landowners )  family memb ers in this age bracket . 
See Myers and Ching ( 19 64 : 516-17 )  and Chan g  and Myers (1963 : 
443) . 
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In order to carry out these measures succes sfully it 
was obvious ly necessary that a dependable bureaucracy 
(administrat ion )  exist . However , as mentioned earlier , 
social ten sions developed within the government and these 
threatened to paralyse the bureaucracy . While the adminis­
t rat ion was busy trying to solve its own problems , the civil 
war was caus ing an increas ing inflow of capital and refugees 
from the mainland . Needless t o  say inflat ionary pressures 
developed as the demand for consumer goods rapidly increased -
a situat ion which was worsened by large budget ary deficit s 
induced by military expendit ures . 
Partly owing to the internal conflicts in the adminis­
trat ion and partly to these pres sures , the system of agri­
cult ural product ion controls collaps ed in 1947 . In 1949 
the shipping and trans-shipping of  the Chinese army from the 
mainland put the transportat ion and connnunicat ion system to 
a real test - a test that the badly organ iz ed administration 
was no t abl e  to master .  At the same t ime the high rate of 
inflat ion meant that nominally fixed peclllliary incent ives 
lost their impact (Mendel 1 9 7 0 : 3lf f . ; Chou 1963 : 22 ,  32-3 , 87 ; 
Liu 19 7 0a : l0 ,  12 ) . 
The large landowners adj usted to the changing market 
condit ions by speculat ing.  The farmers at first tried to 
subst itut e  labour for capital in order t o  count er the rap idly 
climb ing capital cost s ;  labour input in the agricultural 
sector increased 5 7  per cent between 1946 and 1948 . Since 
it was mainly the key crop , rice , which exhib ited part icularly 
rapid price increas es, rice product ion was expanded at the 
expense of export crops like bananas and cane sugar . 
The fact that the populat ion in the urban areas was 
particularly hard hit mean t  that the risk of  renewed violence 
was quite definite . Acco rding to Mendel the United States 
even feared the threaten ing social conflict could result in 
a s ituat ion in Taiwan similar to that on the mainland (Wang 
19 68a : esp . 13-14 , 16-17 ; Mendel 19 7 0 : 41 ) . 
The mot ivat ion structure of  p olit ical decision-makers .  
The foreign policies of the United S tates were long shaped 
to a great degree by the intent ion of ensuring the prof it­
oriented interest s of American companies . In 1949-50 there 
was hardly any American b us iness connnun ity in Taiwan nor 
did Taiwan possess valuable natural resources . On the other 
hand the hegemonial pos it ion of the US in the following years 
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seemed threatened . Thus the US government , on the advice of 
General MacArthur , began to view the Chinese Nat ional Army 
as a possible means of reducing this ( real or perceived) 
threat . In the light of the experien ce on the mainland the 
US realiz ed that this s trategy could be implemented only i f  
internal matters on the island had b een s ettled . I t  was 
thus not the inst itutionalizat ion of the existing power 
st ructure , but rather it s change , whi ch was a precondit ion 
for the willingness of the Unit ed States to support the 12 modernizat ion process with f inancial and technical ass ist ance . 
The condit ions under which American development aid is 
granted are shaped to a large degree by the Appropriat ion s  
Committee o f  the House o f  Representat ives ; in particular its  
chairman and the chairmen of  the respect ive sub commit tees . 
Clarence Cannon , for ins tance , the chairman of the Appropri­
ations Committee at this time was of the op inion that every 
budget could be trimmed and frugality was one of the mos t  
honourab le t rait s .  An d  Otto Passmann , the Chairman of the 
Sub commit tee for Development Aid to Southeast Asian Countries , 
was guided by the princ iple that all fore ign and development 
aid i s  hogwash and a waste of  money ( Steffani 1964 : 43ff . ) .  
Desp it e such opinions , these  two influent ial polit icians 
were supporters of Nat ionalist China , and their efforts were 
given addit ional backing by the China Lobby . Oppos it ion was 
not forthcoming , as , at this t ime , there were essentially no 
other pressure groups of dis senting opinion . This constell­
at ion of advantageous factors , however , made Taiwan an 
except ion among the developing count ries . 13 
Ex po st b udget control in the United States ( about 1950 )  
was carried out by the General Account ing Office purely along 
economic l ines (b ased on the 192 1 Budget and Accounting Act ) . 
Discrepanc ies and wron g-doings llll.covered durin g  such invest i­
gations usually meant that new appropriat ion s  would encounter 
difficult ies (Pelny 1969 : esp . 65 ff . , 144ff . ) .  
12 see Landauer ( 196 7 : 34lff . ; also Riggs ( 19 7 2 : 16-17 , 48££ . ) .  
Schneider , among others , posits that , as a rule , development 
aid is granted to stab ilize t radit ional power structures . 
At least in the initial post-revolut ionary y ears , this 
assumpt ion does not apply to Taiwan . See S chneider (19 7 1 : 
102 ff . ) .  
130n the prob lem of  the China Lobby in the USA see Greene 
(1964 : esp .  43ff . ) .  
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Towards the end of the 1950s the budget system in the 
United S tat es began to be subj e cted to an in creasing amount 
of  criticism; that is it was con sidered to be a less than 
efficient  way to dist ribut e available ftmds . Although an 
actual b udgetary reform did not o ccur tmt il 1965 , 14 the 
con stant discuss ions forced Taiwan to present  evidence of 
the po lit ical necess ity and the economic effect iveness of 
American aid . As far as the economic effect ivenes s  was con­
cerned , i t  could be shown that the stat is t ical information 
system was improved and that the development aid was being 
concent rated on promis ing proj e cts  with short gestat ion 
periods . 
The Chinese Nat ionalist Government was thus tmder 
pressure to produce result s ;  and these results could only be 
achieved if the maj ority of the populat ion dropped it s 
resis tance to the Chinese Nat ionalis ts  - resistance which 
had been dramatically revealed by the 1948 civil disorders . 
The opinion of those political elites who emigrat ed 
from the mainland in the course of the civil war on the 
prob lems in Taiwan was initially shaped by the reform dis­
cuss ion on the mainland as well as by the prest ige orient at ion 
stennning from the teachings of Confucius . As ment ioned above 
the discus sion about reforms began in the late 1800s and 
was in duced by the successes the Japanese had b een able to 
achieve . However , attemp ts to copy t he Japanese approach on 
the mainland failed . 
In the light of such failures Soviet exp erience began 
to assume an increas ingly import ant role in the development 
140ne result of thi s dis cuss ion was the introduct ion of the 
Planning-Programming-Budget ing Sys t em (PPBS)  in 1965 . 
American capital ass istan ce to Taiwan ended in that y ear . 
According to Bohret the following b asic quest ions are to 
b e  cleared with the help of PPBS : 
1 .  What are the goals o f  the government ? What does  the 
government wan t to achieve ? 
2 .  What are the various ways of reaching these goals ? 
3 .  How high are the costs of each alt ernat ive , in the 
present as well as in the future ? 
4 .  Which alternat ive appears mos t  suitab le to b est  achieve 
the goals at a given cost ? 
5 .  What is the result of comparing the costs  with the bene­
fit s , or efficiency , of  a pro gram? 
(Bohret 19 70 : esp . 1 7 9 ) . 
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of a reform concept of  the largest polit ical party in China , 
the Kuomintang (KMT) . In Domes ' opinion it was this influence 
which led in 1922 t o  demands for a redistrib ut ion of land 
to be included in the party ' s  pro gram. To be specific , the 
pro gram called for the land to be owned by those who worked 
it . But already b efore the end of  the armed confl ict on the 
mainland this concept was revi sed . The land law of 1930 , 
for inst an ce , only in cluded a limit o f  3 7 . 5  per cent of the 
main harvest which could be demanded as rent . In the follow­
ing years no further wat ering down of  the re form concept 
occurred , so that the Kuomintang had it s own reform con cept 
in 1949 . However,  by no means did it come up t o  the expect­
at ions of the farmers from the mainland who were influen ced 
by the Communis t Party reforms (see Domes 1969 : 75 f f . , 12 3ff . , 
559 ; Sun Yat-sen 195 3 : esp.  151 f f . ; Gasster 1969 : lff . ; 
S churmann 19 7 3 : 414ff . ; Solomon 19 71 : 333ff . ) .  
But even the realizat ion of  such weak reforms (at least 
in comparison t o  the dramat ic changes which took place on 
the mainland aft er the communist takeover)  was not easy . It 
was hindered furthermore by the civil servants who immigrated 
in 1948-49 and who lacked the necessary qualificat ion s , 
aside from being adherents of  Confuc ian tradit ions  (Parson s  
19 75 : 114ff . ) .  Gran ted , they commanded the abilit y to write  
the  Chinese characters and were versed in the ' wisdom of  the 
elders ' ,  but they neither fulfilled the j ob requirements  nor 
the language requirements ne cessary to solve Taiwan ' s  economic 
problems . 15 On the other hand one immigrat ing group did have 
the o rganizat ional ab ilit ies necessary to help solve the 
supply problems - namely the military . 
All members of the immigrat ing elite had one thin g  in 
common - the need to maintain, on the island o f  Taiwan , the ir 
prior st atus . In the light of the internal confl icts , the 
perceived or real threat from Communist China and the pressure 
from the United S tates , this status quo could only be achieved 
if the innnigran ts coul d establish themselves as economic 
elites . In such a process the ruling party ( the Kuomintang) 
was of  prime importance in influencing opinions and serving 
as a medium. But the Kuomintang then con s isted of numerous , 
equally st rong fact ions  with conservative as well as reform­
oriented ideas . It was thus the accomplishment of Chiang 
lSA h .  . h T . k t l  J t l  t t i s  t ime , t e aiwanese s p o  e par y apanese , par y 
their own language , related to the Fukien dialect . See 
Mendel (1970 : 46-7 ) .  
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Kai-shek , who first  let these fact ions bat tle i t  out among 
themselves before he took over the reins of the party . He 
thus b ecame indispensab le to the party at the expense o f  
b ecoming dependent upon conservat ive party memb ers . I t  i s  
obvious that under these condit ions the party could not 
assume the above-ment ioned functions by an evolut ionary 
process . 
This realizat ion as well as the necessity to establish 
themselves as an economic elit e led to the format ion of  a 
reform committee in 1950 . Based on various party resolutions  
thereafter it  was po ssible to rest ructure the party in such 
a way that conservative elements - at least temporarily -
could not exert a dominat ing influence on the opin ion-making 
process in the Kuomintang.  These structural shifts within 
the polit ical elites are reflected in the September 1950 
refo rm plan , which basically covered the following points : 
1 .  Support of private industry and ( concurrently) con trol 
of monopolies . 
2 .  Workers ' participat ion in running companies and their 
sharing of  the asset s .  
3 .  Promot ion o f  foreign direct investments and inter­
national technical co-operation . 
4 .  Promo tion of reform and modernization measures in 
agriculture . 
5 .  Development o f  self-adminis t rat ing institut ions at 
a local level ( Riggs 1972 : 36 ff . ) . 
Init iat ion o f  the growth process 
Institut ion-building . Following this adj us tment by 
politi cal decision-makers to the new societal and economic 
parameters the next step con si sted of creating the con dit ions 
necessary to permit a realiz at ion of the polit ical goals . 
In the course o f  this pro ces s  it b ecame the task of the 
inst itut ions to communicate a feelin g  of security to those 
affected as well as to ensure that the adj ustment process in 
all areas corresponded t o  changed parameters and accorded 
with the intentions  of the political decis ion-makers 
(Pons i-0nen 1962 : 6 2ff . ) . It is t hus necessary to differentiate 
between specific strata and integrat ing institut ions . In my 
references t o  this t ime ( around 1950) the central government ,  
the provincial administ rat ion , the lo cal governmen t s  and the 
co-operat ives b elong to the specific strata organizat ions . 
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The central government con sist s of five bran ches - called 
Yilan s - pres ided over by a president . The task of  the exec­
ut ive �ilan - the most  powerful of the five b ranches - is  t o  
s e t  an d  admin ister policies . The legislative Yilan passed 
laws and also con trols the execut ive Ytian . The j udicial 
Yilan is the highest court for civil and criminal proceedings . 
The cont rol Yilan has the right to pro secute and reprimand 
civil servants , and also serves as a type of account ing office . 
The fifth institut ion - the examinat ion Ylian - is responsible 
for personnel matters as well as fo r the examinat ion of  
applican t s  fo r civil servi ce posit ions  and for profess ional/ 
techni cal qualif icat ions in the private sector of  the economy . 
The st ructure of  the provin cial adminis trat ion corresponds 
to that of the central government .  
One of the consequences of the above-mentioned internal 
conflicts - as ide from being a measure int roduced with possible 
US aid in mind - was the deci sion ( in 194 8 )  to allow the 
part icipation of Taiwanes e in the government . Thi s  con cess ion , 
however ,  did not mean that their influence in policy matters 
substant ially increased ; as a mat ter of fact in 1950 both 
the central and the provincial governmen t s  were essent ially 
inst itut ions of the mainland Chinese (Wegge! n . d . : 3 96ff . ; 
Riggs 19 72 : 48ff . ) .  
As was the case in mos t  former colon ies , there was also 
an attempt made in Taiwan to retain the colonial administrative 
st ructure . Since the fifth step of the former Japanese 
administrat ion - in connection with the pao-chia system -
exclus ively employed Taiwanese , no personnel changes took 
place at this level after 1945 . On the o ther hand , it became 
ne cessary to fill those posit ion s vacated by the Japanese in 
other areas of t he administ rat ion with mainland Chines e .  In 
the provincial administ rat ion about 1950 their share amotmted 
to 70-84 per cent . 
In the local parliaments the large landowners , self­
employed farmers and bus ines smen exerted a dominat ing influ­
ence up to 1950 . As a result of the 19 50 elections the 
composit ion of  these inst itutions changed : the share o f  
large landowners fell to 7 p e r  cent of  the representat ives 
while sel f-employed farmers accounted for 32 per cen t , tenant 
farmers for 19 per cent and non-agriculturally employed 
persons for 42 per cent (Myers 1969 : 44 ;  Raper , Chuan and 
Chen 1954 : 2 83) . This development set the st age b oth at the 
adminis trative as well as at the legislat ive control level 
for reforms , including those that would have an impact on 
the large landowners . 
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Before 1945 the existen ce o f  the Bank of Taiwan had led 
to a credit system which fun ct ioned independently of the 
Japanese private b anks and was well informed about the 
economic s ituation in Taiwan . Although the Bank of Taiwan 
also  suffe red from a lack of qualified personnel after 1945 , 
it was fo rt unate enough t o  have a widespread network of 
b ranch offices in which any numb er of employees were acquainted 
with the goveTilment ' s  s it uation an d  had knowledge of  poten t ial 
savers and investors . This financial sys tem was complement ed 
in 1946 by the reopening of the Land Bank and the Coop erat ive 
Bank , two ins t itut ions which were quite knowledgeable in 
agricultural mat ters . Furthermore , s ince the agricultural 
co-operat ives were part-owners of the Cooperat ive Bank , the 
exchange o f  info rmation b etween the banking system and the 
farmers was ensured . 
Due to the key role of the Farmers '  As sociat ions in 
supplying the agricultural sector with inputs  and credits 
and the populat ion with agricultural product s ,  there was a 
considerab le amount of out s ide interest in b ecoming involved 
in the co-operat ives for business reasons . Following the 
release from Japanese control , the outside int eres ts  not only 
became memb ers of the co-op eratives , but also by 1950 the 
businessmen and large landowners had maj ority control in 
almost all co-operatives . 
This situat ion was subj ected to a change after the 
passage of the Provis ional Bylaw Governing the Improvement 
of Farmers ' Associations of  Differen t  Levels in Taiwan 
(August 19 52 ) , which restricted full memb ership in co­
operatives to farmers over 50 per cen t  of whose income was 
derived from agricultural activit ies . Only af ter fulfilling 
such condi tions were memb ers allowed to vote and assume 
office . Other memb ers , that is those who did not meet these 
condit ions for full memb ership , could b ecome associate 
memb ers with the same right s (excepting the above limitation s )  
as full memb ers (Pan 196 8 : 4 88ff . ) .  
Of particular importance fo r the reconst ruct ion policies 
were the special t raining programs for managers which b egan 
in 1951 and were inst itut ed with Amer ican assistance . In 
195 1 ,  for instance , a crash program was carried out in which 
fifty univers ity s tudents (who responded to a pub lic not ice) 
were given eight weeks of training in Taiwan for management 
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pos itions in those government bureaux clo sely conne cted t o  
the agricultural sector . At the same t ime forty o ther 
Chinese received 12 months of theoretical and pract ical 
training in the United States . Of these forty un iversity 
graduates fifteen were trained fo r agriculture , ten for 
technology and five each for the natural sciences , social 
services and the health system (Kwoh 1966 : 9 3 ff . ) .  
Als o  in 1951 an 11-man educat ion commit tee was connnis­
sioned to plan educat ional and trainin g cen t res in Taiwan . 
Based on their report a training program for 340 managers 
from local co-operatives was carried out in the summer of  
1952  (JCRR 1952 : esp . 152 -3 , 2 17ff . , 2 2 4 ff . ; JCRR 195 3 : 12 3-4) . 
In 1930 on the mainland the KMT tried to have the land 
rents limited to 3 7 . 5  per cent of  the main harvest . In the 
light of the t ime const raints under which Taiwan had to 
effect policy changes after the civil war , this ' proven ' 
reform concept was inst ituted on the island as the S tatute  
for Reduc tion of Farm Rent to  3 7 . 5  per cent on  7 June 1951 . 
It should not be forgot ten , however , tha t this law was also 
intended to ensure that deb tors of immigrated Chines e did 
no t become insolvent . 
In order to implemen t this law, connniss ions were set up 
cons ist ing of large landowners , tenan t farmers and farmers 
without rented land . It was thus necess ary for the tenant 
farmers or the large landowners to solicit the support of 
farmers without rented land so as to  achieve a maj orit y .  
Landownership a t  this time was , however ,  not only an invest­
ment , but also a generally accept ed stat us symb ol as well . 
It is therefore hardly surpris ing to find out that the farmers 
with the ir own land usually s ided with the large landowners . 16 
At the same t ime the reluctance of the tenant farmers to 
agree to a reform increased . That is , the proposed reform, 
although promi s ing higher earnings (by sett ing an upper limit 
to the rent ) , also made it difficult to procure the status 
symbol , land .  Under such condit ion s  the att empt t o  use the 
commission as a means of  appealing to the connnon sense and 
knowledge of the large landowners and at the same t ime 
absorb ing possible so cial tmres t in rural areas , failed . 
1 6see Raper (1953 : 6 1ff . , 69 ) : also Central Government (196 2 : 
2 1 3ff . , 2 9 1 ff . ) . 
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These commis sions were nonetheless of definite us e in 
establishing the land tenure con dit ions . Thus , while up t o  
1 9 4 7  only the local land tenure conditions  were known -
whereby recent chan ges in ownership were merely sporadically 
registered - a central registry had now b een s et up in which 
even the soil class ificat ion was included . The at tempt to 
limit land rents  proved t o  be b eneficial , although in another 
way - namely by revealing weaknesses in the adminis trat ion 
which could then be eradicated before the next reform was 
carried out . The land refo rm was thus not burdened by the 
learning process of the mainland Chinese who had immigrated 
after 1949 and been integrat ed into the administ rat ion . It 
was perhaps this aspect - in addit ion to the improvemen t in 
the stat is t ical informat ion - that can b e  considered as being 
the maj or contribut ion of the 1951 reform to the economic 
development of Taiwan . 
The realizat ion that reforms in the agricultural sector 
were of  crucial polit ical and economic importance had already 
led to the creat ion of a j oint Chinese-American agricultural 
commission in 1945 . The informat ion which was collec ted and 
produced by this commi ssion provided the bas is for the Joint 
CollDilission on Rural Recon struction ( JCRR) founded in 1948 
and put into act ion in the following year . This commiss ion 
was ent rus ted with the task of reforming agriculture together 
with its various inst itution s , thereby ensuring that the 
ent ire agricultural sector was b et ter integrat ed into the 
economy (JCRR 196 8 : lff . , Tang 1 9 5 7 : 5 7 ;  Chen 1961 : 2 9 ff . , 12-13 ; 
Kao 196 8 : 317-18) . 
One of the first steps taken by this commis sion was the 
establishment of a specially st ructured and well qualif ied 
staff . It was of eminent importance for the success of the 
JCRR that they neither be viewed as out siders by the Taiwanese 
farmers nor antagonize the mainland Chinese in the government . 
It was therefore decided to employ mainly mainland Chinese 
( 81)  for the administ rative position s (on a full-t ime basis ) , 
while Taiwanese ( 1 7 9 )  - who were well acquainted with the 
regional idiosyncras ies - were used primarily (on a part-time 
basis ) for carrying out the fieldwork and establishing con tact 
with the farmers and farm organ iz at ions . Sin ce the JCRR was 
finan ced by US funds as well as by the farmers and farm 
organizat ion s , thirteen Americans were also employed as 
managers or techni cians in distribut ing or controlling the 
funds and in carrying out negotiat ions on addit ional funds 
( JCRR 195 1 : 1 7 f f . ; Raper 195 3 : 6lf f . , 69 ) . 
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Agricult ural reforms . In the opinion of the mainland 
Chinese the land refo rm was to serve a mult iple purpose . 
First of all it was expected that product ivity in the agri­
cultural sector would increase . Second , it was hoped that -
after the defeat on the mainland and the rather unsuccessful 
land rent refo rm - the reform would help establish the main­
land Chinese as the economic and po lit ical elit e .  Since a 
rudimen t ary type of land reform was already incorporated 
into the writ ings of one of the earlier ( foremost ) memb ers 
of the KMI' ,  Sun Yat-sen , such statement s  coul d  be used to 
help t o  portray the KMT as a re form party . It was thus 
possible to contend that the ' Land-to-the-Tiller Program' 
was not a result of Amer ican in fluence and had nothing to do 
with the unsucces sful land rent reform, but rather was 
actually a long-s tandin g demand of the KMI' ,  the realizat ion 
of which had been delayed by the civil war and the armed 
con fl ict with Japan . 
It is difficult to analyse whether and to what ext ent 
the Taiwanese farmers were convinced and actually mot ivated 
by such con tent ions . To be sure , such st atement s  no doub t 
improved the sel f-con fidence and development enthus iasm of 
the mainland Chinese working for the government and they might 
we ll help to explain why the government administration 
fun ct ioned so well in the following years . 
The condi tions described above and the general desire 
to initiat e  a change led to a land reform in the spring of  
195 3 .  As far as  the farmers were concerne d ,  this would be  
success ful only if they could realize an increased income 
over t ime ,  regardless of changes in farm size or of  a reorgan­
iz ation of product ion and sales methods . Under such conditions 
it is probab le that t he reform should not have excluded fut ure 
changes in farm size from taking place . 
The economically relevant aspect , however ,  was outweighed 
by the intent ion of convincing the farmers that the land 
redist ribut ion was no t j ust a temporary measure . They were 
to b elieve that land ownership was secured in the long run 
and a renewed concentration of the land in the hands of the 
few was impossible . Thus the land reform allowed future 
changes in land ownership only to take place when estates 
were being divided ; new purchases of land were prohib it ed . 
Those areas in which raw materials or foods tuf fs were 
produced for export were exempted from these measures 
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res trict ing land ownership . Here the l an d  remained in the 
hands of the large companies or was owned by small farmers 
willing to allow t he food process ing industries to dictate  
the product ion structure in exchange for  purchase and price 
guaran tees . 
In the areas affected by the land reform, the s ize of 
each farm was determined so that - given the family siz e ,  
soil quality an d  assuming the s ize suited t o  labour-intensive 
production techniques - the farmers could achieve an increase 
in income over a numb er of years . Thus ab out two-thirds of  
all farmers received 1 . 5 hectares . Furthermore , as lon g  as 
lab our-intensive product ion methods prevailed as the means 
of in creasing income level s ,  it was necessary to init iate 
the very t ime-consuming and expens ive process of land 
improvemen t / consolidat ion . 17 
In contrast to the land rent reform, the land reform 
also aimed at utiliz ing the ent repreneurial ab ilit ies of the 
large landown ers . Therefore they were not fo rced out of  
agriculture regardless of  the price , but rather were allowed 
to retain part of their land , provided that they were willing 
to farm it . The economi c wellbeing of this group was thus 
secured after the reform. 
For the land that the large landowners had to part with 
they rece ived first of all twenty semiannual ( equal) instal­
ments  of bonds which could also be  traded on the market . 
Second , they received s tock in compan ies formerly owned by 
the Japanes e .  The farmers were required to pay their compen­
sation ( also as in stalment s )  in kind , which meant that -
s in ce the amount was fixed - it was independent of price 
fluctuat ions . The large lan downers were hence given the 
chance to prof it from investments in both the agricultural 
as well as the industrial sector , whereby the bonds provided 
the necessary financial security ( Tang 1957 : 9 6-7 ) . 
Estab lishing government enterprises . Within Chinese 
society , ent repreneurial activit ies were viewed as having 
low social prest i ge ,  whereas government activit ies were 
class ifie d  as being of high social prest ige .  S in ce the few 
progressive Chinese entrepreneurs had left the mainland by 
17 see Central Government (1960 : esp . 330ff . ,  344ff . ;  Tang 
( 1957 : 9 ££ . ) ;  also Heimpel (1967 : 3£ £ . ) . 
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1948-49 and emigrated to Southeast Asia or Hong Kong , Taiwan 
did not have enough qualified , top-level managers . Obviously , 
the government was tempted to repeat the approach t aken before 
1895 , when the support of  overseas Chinese was enlisted; 
accordingly the Statute  for Investment by Foreign Nationals 
(1954 ) and Revised Statut e for Investment by Overseas Chinese 
(1955) were introduced . In these statutes , restrictions , 
which had kept foreigners from invest ing in services and real 
estate , were lifted and overseas Chinese were guaranteed a 
retransfer of  the ir invest ed capital as well as the right to 
remit their profit s (Hs ing 19 71 : 2 1 7-18) . However ,  this alone 
did not settle the problem conne·cted with f inding qualified 
managers for the fo rmer Japanese companies . A pos s ible 
solut ion nevertheless was beginn ing. to  be  perceived in the 
s t ructure of the immigrant populat ion from mainland China . 
After the Chinese Nat ionalist government had left the 
mainland and sett led on the small island of  Taiwan , there 
were so many officials with administrat ive experience that 
not all of them could be given j obs in the bureaucracy . 
Instead they t ook over management pos it ion s  in state-owned 
companies - despite their lack of experience in such areas . 
In the light o f  the above-mentioned social prest ige hierarchy , 
it is quite understandable that these former government 
officials and their famil ies did not want to view this as � 
step down the social ladder . Ergo the init ial step had been 
taken to ensure that en trep reneurial as well as government 
pos itions  would not b e  con sidered as not being socially 
tmequal . 
In addition to the short supply of  managers after 1945 , 
the supply of skilled workers was also a problem after the 
Japanese had left . The state-owned indust ries had fairly 
well mastered this prob lem by 194 7 , at which t ime United 
S tates aid for heavy indust ries was init iated . These companies 
received modern , labour-saving equipment whi ch should have 
meant that labour would be released ; but the Chinese clans 
actually forced the companies to hire even more employees . 
After the defeat o f  the Chinese Nationalists on the 
mainland , part i cular stress was placed on reforms in Taiwan . 
In the course o f  discus sions not even the above-ment ioned 
' cronyism ' was left out . In the s tate-owned companies , for 
instance , s uch discussions led to an adj ustment of the employ­
ment s tructure to the actual needs (see Table 16) . 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
Table 16 
Employment in s tat e enterprises in Taiwan , 
by nat ional origin , 1946-52 (thousand person s )  
Year Taiwanese Mainland Foreigners Chinese 
8 . 3 2 . 7  0 . 4 
10 . 2  4 . 3 0 . 1 
10 . 5  5 . 8 0 . 1 
10 . 1  5 . 8 0 . 0 
7 . 8 3 . 8 0 . 0 
7 o 7 3 . 8 o . o 
7 . 4 3 . 7 o . o 
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Source : DGBAS , Taiwan S tatis tical Abs trac t No . 1 6 ,  Provincial 
Government of Taiwan , Tab le 12 . 
The possible risk of  being fired because of  low product­
ivity induced an increased demand f rom s t aff in state-owned 
companies for addit ional t raining and it was essen tially this 
response that helped to overcome the shortage of  qual if ied 
workers . 
In addition to the workers los ing their j obs , in 1950 
managers as well were released , enabling those who remained 
to be given additional b enefit s  such as a passport . While 
most of tho se who remained had a degree from an .American 
tm.iversity , they realised from overseas experience that they 
would hardly have the chance anywhere else to be a director 
of  a s tate-owned company . Thus the threat of  losing social 
prestige and income b ecause of  an inept performan ce st imulated 
such groups to improve their efforts . 
Conmn.micat ion problems of  the elites 
The reforms analysed in this  chapter were based on the 
assumpt ion that within the political and economic realm the 
elites aimed at struct urin g  the systemic variab les in accord­
ance with their income and prest ige goals . As was shown , 
this may lead to conflicts between the various de cision­
makers . It was the goal of the Japanese to l imit poss ible 
con flicts  by establishing a Japanese business connnllllity in 
Taiwan . The ' push-out ' policy followed in the course of a 
redist ribut ion of land can also b e  con sidered within this 
frame of  referen ce .  This policy , whi ch paved the way for 
the establishment of Japanese enterprises , was complemented 
by measures to exploit resources in the tradit ional sectors 
of the economy .  In choosing this approach the Japanese felt 
that the penet rat ion and ident ity problem could be solved if 
(and to the extent that ) the channels of commllllicat ion 
encompas sed exist ing b ehavioural patterns . This  h elped t o  
develop those sys tems which depended on an inst itutional­
ization of tradit ional behaviour pat t ern s , as well as modern 
info rmation sys tems . Integrat ing institut ion s , such as the 
co-operat ives or the pao-chia system ,  fllllct ioned as co­
ordinators of the various informat ion channels . 
The starting po int of  the Chinese an d  Americans in 
1949-50 differed in two maj or respects from that o f  the 
Japanese . As far as the Taiwanese were concerned the cris is 
was basically a distribution problem, the solut ion to which 
they did not b elieve the polit ical elite could accomplish . 
Therefo re the decision-makers fo\llld it necessary not only to 
use Japanese experience but to enact measures that would 
estab lish themselves as the economic elite . Thus they did 
not merely limit themselves to a redist r ibut ion of the stat us 
symbo l ,  land , but rather structured the reform in such a way 
that the former large landowners received a definite chance 
to erect a new foundat ion in the manufacturing sector from 
which income and prestige could be achieved . 
At the same t ime , former civil servants were given the 
opport tmity to prove themselves in st ate-owned enterprises . 
This ensured f irst of all that there was a consensus in the 
behavioural pat terns b etween the polit ical and the economic 
elit e .  Second , since the employment in a stat e-owned company 
was no t per ceived by those directly and indirectly affect ed 
as a step down the social ladder from civil service employ­
men t , this measure initiat ed a pro cess in which init ially 
en trepreneurial activit ies in state-owned companies - and 
later on in companies in general - were viewed as being the 
equal in status to a civil service pos ition . 
Thi s  socio-polit i cal transformation pro cess  encompasses , 
however , only one aspect in the development o f  domest ic 
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innovators and adaptors . The societal status must be  sub­
stantiated by economic success . A necessary precondit ion 
for this is the ability t o  sense with a fair amount of cer­
tainty which product s are likely to be successful in the 
market .  For such a lon g-term learning pro cess only the 
init ial condit ion s can be set up in crisis management . The 
quest ion i s  thus raised if (and to what ext ent ) the estab­
lishing of  foreign companies is an adequate way to transmit 
en trep reneurial know-how to lo cal economic decision-makers . 
Chapter 4 
ECONOMIC ELITES AS DECIS ION-MAKERS 
IN ADAPT ING ENTREPRENEURIAL KNOW-HOW 
Transmit ting ent repreneurial know-how 
via tradit ional s truct ures 
Ut ilization of exist ing social structures and behaviour 
pat terns 
The tradit ional p res tige hierarchy in Taiwan . Myrdal 
took the pos it ion that it was senseles s to en gage upon a 
program of  nat ional development as long as the population 
of a collllt ry was illit erate . On the other hand , he noted 
that it was b eneficial to  the pro cess of modernizat ion not 
to dest roy a people ' s  historical roots , but to adapt the 
t radit ion al st ructures to the new circtllllstances . He over­
looked the fact that this pro cess of adaptation can proceed 
in a form which makes po ssib le the introduct ion of processes 
of modernization even in s it uat ions where the level o f  lit eracy 
is low . To be sure , in the course of such an initial process 
of growth there exist s  the risk that the same problems which 
appeared to b e  solved by reforms may surface anew . The course 
of  the crisis that b egan in 1945 shows this quite clearly . 
A developing co\lllt ry can therefore not limit it self solely 
to changing the exist ing hierarchy of authority . It must 
also influence the t radit ional hierarchy of  prestige . 
Tinbergen introduced the propos it ion that the process 
of growth in economies - originally having diss imilar 
structures - showed an increas ing tendency toward development 
of similar inst itut ions , methods , practices and att itudes . 
In presenting thi s thesis of convergence , Tinbergen relies 
upon posited or actual t rends of development in capit alist 
industrial count ries ( Tinb ergen 1961 : 3 33ff . ) .  The quest ion 
to b e  analysed here is whether at t itudes based on a hierarchy 
of prestige can b e  affected in the sense of Tinbergen ' s  thesis 
of convergen ce , or whether such a change , as suggested by 
Myrdal , leads to an order in develop in g  cotmtries which differs 
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from that existing in industrial countries (Myrdal 195 8 : 
2 20-1 ,  2 34-5 ) . This quest ion is discussed b elow through 
the example o f  processes of innovation and adaptat ion in 
agriculture under colonial conditions . 
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The first problem encountered in the modernization of  
agriculture under colonial condit ions  was the transmiss ion 
of innovat ions to a farm population which was largely 
ignorant of modern syst ems of communicat ion . Based upon 
their experiences in the heart land of Japan and bearing in 
mind the organiz at ion of the Taiwanese administration , 
Japanes e colonial officials endeavoured to reform the trad­
it ional st ructures in such a way that changes in market 
condition s  could be made understandable to the farmer . This 
dual administration st ructure was also to be supported by a 
dual in format ion sys tem, which was t o  make pos s ible the 
in troduction and adaptat ion of innovat ion s in the agricultural 
sector - a sector belonging to the traditional branch of the 
nat ional economy ( Opp 19 7 4 : 63ff . ) .  
The problem which developed from this strategy can 
best  be understood through an analys is of the processes of 
innovation and adaptat ion in Taiwanese agriculture which 
existed j ust b efore the introduct ion of the agrarian reforms 
dis cussed above . Rogers '  and Shoemaker ' s  method is a suit­
ab le one here . 
These authors class ify entrep reneurs into five categories 
ranging from innovators to laggards and show that the t ime 
gap between acquiring knowledge and applying it  lengthen s  
a s  one moves down the scale (Fig . 5 ) . The innovators t end 
to possess above average social status , educat ion and capit al ,  
and are also quicker to acquire knowledge in the first place 
(Rogers and Shoemaker 19 7 1 : 107-8) . The hierarchical structure 
is made clear by the fact that the process of adoption only 
occurs between neighbouring categories of entrepreneurial 
groups . For example , the behaviour of  the entrepreneurs 
excludes the possib ility of the adopt ion of innovations by 
the ' early maj ority ' as long as the ' early entrepreneurs ' 
have not completed the adoption process . The p eriods of 
adopt ion are a product of  the recognit ion of  the hierarchical 
order by the entrepreneurs (Rogers and Shoemaker 197 1 : 12 8ff . ; 
Kiefer 19 6 7 : 5 7 ff . ) .  
About 1900 and also after 1945 , the innovators in 
agriculture on Taiwan were non-Taiwan ese , while the large 
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Catego r ies 
I n novato r 
E a r l y  adopte r 
E a r l y  major ity 
Late major i ty 
Late comer 
2 3 4 
Yea rs 
Fig . 5  Gap b etween acquiring knowledge of and adopting 
innovation in agriculture by category of adoption . 
Source : Dervied from Rogers and Shoemaker (19 7 1 : 1 3 1 ) . 
6 7  
landholders were ident ical with the category o f  ' early 
entrepreneurs ' and endeavoured to delay the adopt ion o f  
innovat ions b y  other groups in order t o  secure their own 
social posit ion through the resulting advantage . ! The period 
of t ime required for other groups of  ent repreneurs to adopt 
the respective innovation s was thus ext ended ( see also 
Schonherr 19 7 5 : 246) . 
Af ter both 1895 and 19 45 the ' early entrepreneurs ' 
initially demonstrated a declin ing propen s ity to invest and 
a rising tendency to speculate . This behaviour was also 
adopted , and in ever decreasing int ervals of time . 
Accordingly , the behaviour of Taiwanese en trepreneurs 
at this time did not reflect at all S chumpeter ' s  concept of  
the risk-loving p ioneer ( Schumpeter 1939 : 103 ff . ,  130ff . ) .  
Quit e to the con trary , this striving for income and prestige 
made the spread of innovat ion more di ffi cult , whereas their 
quick reaction to opporttmities for speculat ive profit s 
accelerated downward trends in times of cris is . 
The polit i cal decis ion-makers in Taiwan at that t ime 
pro ceeded from the view that the patterns of behaviour of 
entrepreneurs were socio-economic in nature and a product 
of the adaptation proces s .  Thus downward trends shown 
above were at first cotmtered through ' push-out ' policies 
by a change of social con dit ions and through sub stantial 
short-term infrastructure and other state investmen t which 
created new economic condit ions . Such s tructural po licies 
were supplemented by measures for adaptat ion of innovat ions 
in agriculture and in the spat ial diffusion of  indust ry . 2 
The following discuss ion contain s  an analys is of these 
processes of innovat ion during the colonial period . 
Adj ustment of the prest ige hierarchy to the demands of  
the innovat ion and adaptat ion processes . In the years 
innnediately following the land-tax reform ,  the Japanese 
st ate endeavoured to introduce , with the aid of  sub s idies , 
1see Jelonek (1961 : 39 ff . ) for a general t reatment of  this 
problem. 
2 A general presen tation of the w illingness of  ent repreneurs 
to assume risks with the spat ial diffusion of available 
improvement s  is offered by Nab seth and Ray ( 19 74 : 302-3) , 
and also by Parker (1974 : 81££ . ) .  
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innovat ions availab le in the Japanese homeland . However , 
because of  the differences in climate b etween the two areas , 
it was not poss ible to use Japanese seed-corn successfully 
in Taiwan , that is , s imply by adopting the technology as 
available . Accordingly , research ins t itutes  establ ished in 
Taiwan us ing knowledge available from the Japanese homeland 
and abro ad began to develop hybrids o f  sugar b eets which 
could be cult ivat ed by machine and hyb rids of rice which 
would give a greater yield,  thus adapt ing available inno­
vat ions  t o  the new environment .  Accordin gly , adaptation 
replaced simply adopt ion of  innovat ions . Foreign know-how 
was adapted and further developed to suit local needs . This 
process of  adaptat ion o ccurred primarily in st ate or  co­
op erative research inst itutes , while the individual farmer 
s t ill limited himsel f to the adopt ion of innovat ions b e ing 
developed in Taiwan . 
At the same t ime as these developmen ts , the irrigation 
system was also extended . Moreover , the state made larger 
subs idies available for the in troduct ion of these inno­
vat ions . Table 17 illust rates the chan ge in Japanese policy 
which began about 192 0 .  This change indicated that a 
port ion of  the costs of innovat ion had been assumed by the 
state . Addit ionally , the change also included the estab­
lishment of  an economic func t ional elite , whose actions were 
not only guided by thoughts of prest ige but also by the 
desire to maximize income . This process  is an alysed sub se­
quently , using the in troduct ion of ponlai rice as an example . 
Every economy has t raders and merchan ts who are inte­
rested in quick turnover and in large , but short-term, risks . 
Long-term investments  likely to produce low profits in the 
short term are outs ide the field of their thinkin g .  In 
Taiwan this group was largely made up of farmers who had 
formerly been tenan ts . Through the Reform of 1902 these 
farmers acquired the status symbol of land ownership and 
thereby also the funct ion of ' prest ige leaders ' accordin g  
to Kiefer ' s  label ( Jelonek 1971 : 39f f . ; Zimmermann 19 69 : 59 f f . ; 
Kiefer 1 9 6 7 : 59ff . ) .  Now came the t ask o f  interestin g  this 
group in the planting of rice . A start ing point for this 
obj ect ive arose out of the advan tageous locat ion o ccupied 
by Taiwan within the Japanese Emp ire . 
Because of its geographic pos it ion , Taiwan had the 
seasonally earliest  rice harvests within t he emp ire . At the 
Table 17  
Government expendit ures for research and innovat ion , 
1902-37  ( T$ thousand) 
1902 
1907 
1912 
1917 
192 1 
1926 
19 30 
1935 
1937 
Year Research and development 
9 82 
686 
1 , 35 7  
1 , 15 1  
2 , 6 87  
Source : Huang ,  Chang and Lee (1951 : 86 ) . 
Subs idies for 
innovations 
646 
783 
1 , 032 
1 , 315 
3 , 6 88 
4 , 756 
7 , 933 
5 , 931 
8 , 2 99 
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time of the first harvest  in Taiwan , this product was gener­
ally in short supply in Japan and therefore expensive . 
Moreover , as dis cussed previously , Taiwan had an absolute 
cost  advantage in rice product ion against the other regions 
of the Japanese Empire . 
Japan then allowed the large landowners to collect 
rents at their di scret ion , either in crops or money and in 
the season of their choice .  The landowners , who were not 
llllaware o f  t he fluctuations on the ri ce market , knew that 
the highest  pro fit could be achieved if they demanded payment 
of  ren t  in rice at the t ime of the first harvest . The 
development of the transportat ion sys t em allowed the large 
landowners to realize their profit opportunit ies throughout 
the ent ire empire . The previous tenan t farmers were thus 
principally interested in rice production . This indicated 
the readiness to become familiar with the details of nonlo cal 
market s ,  that is , to  include differing consumer hab it s ,  
storage and freight  cost s ,  a s  well as t ransport s chedules in 
their cost  an d  income calculations . Knowledge gained in this 
manner increased their readiness to make medium-term 
investmen t s . 3 
3This , together with decreas ing s torage cos t s , led to an 
adequate supplying of the Japanese Empire with rice , the 
bas ic foo d . 
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The addit ional inves tment s required to introduce ponlai 
rice were limit ed in the agricultural sector to the area o f  
working capital , that is , to medium-term investment s .  These 
involved primarily fertilize r and seed-grain and thus were 
means of  investment which were familiar to the farmers and 
were easy to obtain .  As a resul t , the pro cess of  adopt ion 
was limi ted by and large to the full real izat ion of exist ing 
skills . This innovat ion consequently took into account the 
at t it udes of the ' prest ige leaders ' as well as the low edu­
cat ional level of the adopters . Table 18 shows clearly that 
the demand for working capital differed acco rding to whether 
one cult ivated tradit ional or ponlai rice . Nevertheless , 
the farmers showed avers ion towards the new variety . The 
con sequences of the land-tax reform proved to be of assistance 
in overcoming the farmers ' posit ion in this regard . In the 
scope of the reform, a close co rrelat ion was found between 
the level o f  ren ts and the product ivity of the land . The 
landowne rs , who were able to in crease the ir rent income by 
nearly 2 0  per cent through the cult ivat ion o f  ponlai rice , 
thus supported the use of the new grain by advis ing it s use . 
An addit ional push t o  those who used it was given by the 
issue of credit with lower rates of int erest .  
In so do ing they were suppo rted by the credit and sub­
s idy policies of the banks and of th e s tate . Fig . 6 shows 
two stages of development .  Up t o  the period 192 1-25 agri­
culture was the focus of the innovations introduced . During 
this period the enterpri ses int erested in agricultural pro­
duction , especially the sugar industry , assumed a part of  
the credit financing o f  agricultural needs for working 
capital . The s tat e and the banks , on the other hand,  con­
centrated on support of fixed capital investment . Accord­
ingly , the trend for curves I and II was rather s imilar 
init ially . Aft er 1925 the state also supported the le�din g  
of workin g  capital necessary for the int roduct ion o f  ponlai 
ri ce . Around 1930 the focus of the state ' s  sub s idy poli cy 
shifted t o  measures necessary to br idge the con sequences of  
nat ural catastrophes and the  world economic cris is ,  that is , 
to the securing of agricultural income to cover the cost o f  
working capital . In this policy the s tate was suppo rted b y  
the acceptan ce o f  an acconnnodat ing credit policy on the part 
of t he b anks and co-operat ives . 4 
4Based on informat ion from the Bank o f  Taiwan . 
Table 18 
Cos t-returns st ructure for selected types 
of rice , Taiwan , 192 7 -2 8 (T$ /ha) 
Co sts 
Seed-grain 
Fert ilizer 
Natural 
Artificial 
Wages 
Family memb ers 
Others 
Wat er and equipment 
Taxes 
Rent 
Total 
Returns 
Market ed rice 
By-product s  
Retained out put 
Total 
Balan ce 
Other data 
Yield/ha 
Production cos t s /  
tonne 
Price /tonne 
Ponlai 
rice 
8 . 12 
1 . 96 
49 . 30 
7 3 . 80 
39 . 08 
6 .  22 
1 . 41 
147 . 20 
32 7 .  09 
366 . 00 
16 . 04 
7 3 . 81 
455 . 85 
12 8 . 7 5 
4 , 5 75 . 00 
6 8 . 69 
80 . 00 
Tradit ion­
al rice-
3 . 9 7  
7 . 9 1 
17 . 59 
55 . 07 
39 . 2 9 
5 . 2 5 
1 .  66 
12 1 .  70 
2 51 . 94  
2 66 . 7 6 
18 . 55 
5 5 . 0 7 
340 . 38 
88 . 44 
4 , 24 3 . 00 
5 5 . 55  
62 . 87 
Difference 
4 . 15 
5 . 9 5 
31 . 71 
18 . 7 3 
0 . 2 1 
0 . 9 7 
0 . 2 5 
2 5 . 50 
75 . 15 
9 9 . 2 4 
2 . 51 
18 . 74 
115 . 4 7 
40 . 31 
332 . 00 
13 . 14 
1 7  . 13 
Source : Taiwan Governor General ' s  Off ice , Product ion Cost 
Survey of Rice , Taipei , 192 8 .  
7 1  
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2 0 0  
1 7 5 
1 5 0 
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- · - ·  - Ca pita l i nvestment 
- - - -- Loa n s/ S u bs i d ies 
--- Work i n g  ca p i ta l  
1 9 2 1  / 2 5  1 92 6 / 3 0 
Yea r 
1 9 3 1  / 3 5  
Fig . 6  Capital accumulat ion and i t s  financing through 
sub s idies and loans , 19 1 1-40 . 
Source : DGBAS 
1 9 3 6/40 
73 
Ut ilizat ion of tradit ional information structures 
Inclusion of opinion leaders in the informat ion system. 
As is shown by the comparat ive st ructure of co sts and income 
for the int roduction of ponlai rice , the farmers planting 
ponlai rice were able to achieve increases in income through 
increases in the labour factor . In this connect ion , Z inunerman , 
for example , po ints out that the supply of  labour can drop 
under conditions where income rises above a certain in come 
level , that is , the labour factor shows an inverse elast icity 
in its behaviour . Epstein , in writ ing about New Britain ,  
report s that such inverse-elas tic behaviour can even appear 
at low levels of monetary income ( Z innnermann 1969 : 4 8ff . ; also 
Epstein 19 6 8 : 2 6 ff . ) .  Such possible behaviour represent s a 
definite risk s ince the pro ces s of adaptation could b e  limit ed 
to levels en forcab le by the large lan downers - which appears 
to b e  j ust  the situation that existed in Taiwan . 
As previously noted,  these large landowners were opposed 
by the innovators , i . e .  the new landholders and the research 
inst itut es established on Taiwan by the Japanese . Neverthe­
less , these funct ional elit es were not ab le to accelerate 
the adoption process beyond the point of influencing the 
pat terns of consumption of the farmers .  A star t ing po int for 
overcoming this barrier in conununicat ion was shown by Hagen . 
He points out that there are also persons in tradit ion-bound 
so ciet ies whose devian t b ehaviour from the generally accept ed 
norms is expressed in different consumption pat terns . In 
Taiwan these persons included the former large landowners o 
Moreover , Hagen shows that the inhomogeneity of tradit ional 
societies is manifest ed through the existence of p ersons who 
are more or less creat ive (Hagen 19 7 1 : 12 7 ff . , 134ff . ) .  
These creative persons were pot ential adopters of innovat ions . 
The patterns of consumpt ion of the Japanese inunigrants 
also deviated from the general norms . As compared to the 
Taiwanese , they had enj oyed a higher standard of living in 
the Japanese homeland .  Because of  a favourab le ratio between 
income and expenditure , they were able to raise it further on 
the island of Taiwan . Although it is true that most  of the 
Japanese sett led in the larger cit ies , many were at the same 
t ime also  employed by the lo cal government s or by the state 
railway . This gave the Taiwanese an opport unity to see the 
comforts which could b e  ob tained through higher income levels . 
Nevertheless , the Japanese value system was different from 
that of the Taiwanes e .  Accordingly , demonstrat ion effects 
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could only be expected if the ' leaders of opinion ' of the 
respect ive groups were successfully induced to imit ate the 
Japanese (Barclay 1954b : 6 7 ;  Kaas 19 7 3 : 44ff . ) .  
The inst itutional prerequis ites for the solut ion of 
the diffusion prob lem were o ffered by the pao-chia system.  
Here there were contacts  be tween the Japanese and those 
Taiwanese who , on the basis of their posit ion as ' leaders of 
opinion ' and as a creat ive minority of their referen ce group , 
were held in a certain est eem by the local populat ion . These 
Taiwanese had the tendency to secure their pres t ige by 
adopt ing patt erns of consumpt ion which approximated tho se 
of the leisure class , the Japanes e .  For their part , the 
Japanese had shown , through the development of the pao-chia 
sys tem, that a certain amount of social integration was of 
concern to them. Accordingly , they explained to the ' leaders 
of opinion ' not only that the standard of living shown to 
them by the Japanese was obt ainab le by the Taiwanese through 
more work, but also how it could be obt ained . Moreover , 
Japanese and Taiwanes e represented in these bodies were able 
together to suggest which of  the local small entrepreneurs 
were to produce the most  des ired goods . 
These efforts were suppo rted by the former large land­
owners . They had not b een ab le to invest in the sugar 
indus try all of the money paid to them as compensat ion . They 
therefore increasingly t urned to private lending of their 
cash . In so do ing they came into compet it ion with the clans , 
who ,  as a general rule , acquired the necessary capital for 
their memb ers . The decision of  the clan to provide cap ital , 
however , was always made on the basis of given demand as 
det ermined by the memb ers o f  the clan . S ince the exis t ing 
market was therefore closed to the large landowners , they 
created n ew market s by persuading individual small entre­
preneurs to produce increased amount s of goods which eithe r  
served a s  labour-saving devices o r  which imit at ed goods 
con sumed by the Japanese on Taiwan . 
The large landowners benef ited in this resp ect from 
the fac t  that they had generally lived in the cit ies or in 
the larger connnunit ies before agrarian reform. As a result , 
they were trusted by small bus inesses and retained their 
pos ition as ' leaders of opinion ' .  They thus did not have t o  
r un  the risk of  either having sanctions brought against them 
or even b eing i solated from the community for their deviant 
behaviour (Hagen 19 7 1 : 88ff . points to this risk) . 
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Substitution of in come for prest ige with the aid of 
opinion leaders . If the previously discussed pro cess of  
adaptat ion of the social inst itut ions is examined as  a 
s upplement t o  the strategy of  heavy short-term state  invest­
ment , then two aspects acquire a maj or significance : 
1 .  The process of adaptation was based on a solut ion 
of the cost prob lem arising in the course of the 
pro cesses of innovat ion , adaptat ion , and adopt ion . 
This  solution con s isted o f  the following :  
(a) the state assumed the bulk o f  cost s  o f  develop­
ment for innovations ; 
(b ) the state als o  as sumed the cos t of  securing 
minimum farm incomes in cases where income 
reductions  were exogenous , e . g .  during the 
Great Depression ;  
( c) the landowners an d  farmers assumed the remaining 
market risks . 
2 .  The process of adaptation led to the expans ion of 
modern economic institut ions , as discussed earlier 
in this chapter . Since the group described as 
' leaders of opinion ' were accepted by the Taiwanese 
as ' pres t igious ' and by the Japanese as part of the 
economic funct ional elit e ,  it was possible with 
their help to increase inves tment through the modern 
economic ins t itut ions to such a degree that economic 
act ivit ies in tradit ional areas were affected . The 
development of t he Taiwanese industry shown in 
Table 19 can in large part be  traced back to the 
success ful co-operat ion of modern and tradit ional 
economic inst itut ions . 
This domestic product ion was supplemented by the import 
of  s uch goods that could not profitably be  produced in Taiwan 
because of l imited domest ic demand and the lack of export 
market s . 5 
The increased supply of goods and the knowledge that 
a higher st andard of living , as demonstrated , could be 
obtained through more work and implemen tat ion of technical 
innovat ions led to a higher propensity to inves t  in 
5see Taiwanese Provincial Government (1946 : 659ff . ) . 
"""" 
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Tab le 19 
Indus trial ;eroduct ion in Taiwan 2 192 1-42 
Period Tot al Agricultural Textiles 
Metal Machinery/ Chemical s Other processing products equipment 
Mill . yen 
19 21-2 4 165 122 3 3 4 13 2 0  
19 25-2 9 2 1 7  15 3 3 4 5 20  32 
19 30-34 2 2 8  16 7 3 6 5 18 29 
19 35- 39 387  269 6 1 7  12 38 45 
19 40-42 664 406 11 46  30 80 9 1  
Per cent 
192 1-2 4 100 . 0  7 3 . 9 1 .  7 1 .  9 2 . 1  7 . 9  11 . 9  
1925-29  100 . 0 7 0 . 3 1 .  5 2 . 0 2 . 2  9 . 3  14 . 7  
19 30-34 100 . 0  7 3 . 3 1 . 1 2 . 5  2 . 3  7 . 8  12 . 9  
19 35-39 100 . 0 69 . 4  1 . 5 4 . 5 3 . 1  9 . 9  11 . 6  
1940-42 100 . 0 61 . 0  1 .  7 7 . 0  4 . 5  12 . 1  1 3 . 7 
Source : Taiwanese Provincial Government (1946 : 788 f f . ) .  
Table 2 0  
The development of  market ed product ion in Taiwanese 
agriculture , 1895-19 40 (agricultural output 1895  = 100) 
Period Total output 
1895-19 00 100 
19 11-15 2 16 
1916-20 418 
1921-2 5 5 39 
192 6- 30 659 
19 31-35 646 
19 36-40 1 , 12 8  
Source : Lee (19 72 : 415-16) . 
Market 
output 
30 
122 
2 34 
354 
434 
4 6 3  
806 
Taxes 
and dut ies 
30 
7 7  
159 
2 31 
2 9 3  
2 85 
4 6 8  
7 7  
agriculture . As demonstrated by Table 2 0 , around 1 9 0 0  the 
cash value of a product corresponded to the burdens placed 
upon agriculture by rent , tax and interest payments . Later 
the farmers no longer limit ed product ion to that required for 
their own needs and for payments of all levies . At the 
beginnin g of the century only one-third of total agricultural 
product ion found its way to the marketplace . This figure 
had risen to 60 per cent in the period j ust preceding World 
War II . Moreover , in the period 19 35-40 only about one-half 
of the s ales revenue went t o  payment of rents , taxes and 
interest ( Table 2 1) . This development was t ied to an increase 
of per capit a  income in agriculture . 
This  chan ge in income levels led at first to a dispro­
port ionat e increase in the effect ive demand for agricultural 
products . This was caused on the one hand by a growing 
supply of agricultural investment goods as produced by 
increased specializat ion , and on the other by the desire for 
better nutrit ion . As a result , for example , the share of 
cit rus and other fruit s in agricultural product ion doub led 
during this perio d ,  while the share of vegetab les and meats 
increased 2 0  per cent b etween 1910 and 192 0 .  Only after this 
cat ch-up demand had been met did the demand for nonagrarian 
products increase in import ance . 
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Tab le 2 1  
Development of income and consump t ion expenditures of farm 
households , 19 11-35 ( in T$ : constant prices of  1 9 35-37 )  
Consumpt ion expenditures ( 2 )  Period Income for nonagri cult ural goods 
( 1 )  
1911-15 45 
1916-2 0 5 5  
1921-25 65 
1926-30 6 8  
19 31-35 7 6  
Source : Lee (1968 : 2 0 7 ) . 
( 2 )  
19 
2 1  
2 9  
34 
42 
The trans fer of  entrepreneurial know-how 
via the market me chanism 
Transfer of ent repreneurial know-how to Taiwan 
of 
as % 
( 1 )  
42  
38  
45  
50  
5 5  
Wage cos ts  as a determinant of the t ran s fer.  During 
the colonial period a characterist ic feature of the Japanese 
economy was the dominan t  role of  four families in polit ics 
and economy . These four so-called Zai batsu con trolled the 
largest enterpris e in each o f  the twenty-five most important 
economic b ranches and thereby nearly one-half of  the Japanese 
market . 
An examinat ion of Table 2 2  shows clearly that the 
development on Taiwan of a system of t ransportat ion - based 
primarily on the railway - as well as the int roduct ion of  
ponlai rice , which required intens ive fert ilization , was in 
the interest s of Japanese large indust ry .  In bo th cases 
Taiwan was viewed as an addit ional market (Hirs chmeier 19 71 : 
2 41ff . ; Myers and Ching 1964 : 559 , 566ff . ) .  Moreover,  because 
of it s insular location , part of Japanese shipp ing capacity 
had to be employed for the t ransport of goods between Taiwan 
and the Japanese mainlan d .  
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Table 22 
Market shares of largest comEanies in JaEan 
in selected indust ries in twentl-five market s ,  19 37 ( % )  
Indust ries Largest 3 largest 5 largest company companies companies 
Railway 
carriages 41 78  95  
Railway engines 29  72 95  
Aimnonium 
sulphate 2 3  61 7 8  
Calcium 
phosphate 24 46 60 
Construction 
glas s 7 3  100 
Cement 2 3  40 54 
Paper 72 8 3  90  
S ource : Yamamura (1964 : Table 12 , p . 551) . 
Table 2 3  
10 largest 
companies 
87 
79 
99  
Capital Eart icipat ion o f  the four Zaibatsu in JaEan , 1942 
To tal Capitala of  the Indust ry . la four Zaibatsu capit a 
Banking and 
ins urance 1 , 2 16 604 
Heavy indust ry 17 , 501 5 , 669 
Light industry 4 , 588  493  
Services 9 , 07 4  1 , 175 
Total 32 , 379  7 , 941 
a Million yen . 
Source : Yamamura (1964 : Tab le 14 , Table 15) . 
Share of the 
four Zai batsu 
( % )  
50  
32 
11 
13 
25  
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Tab le 23 shows the four Zaibatsu had over 70  per cent 
of their cap it al invested in heavy industry .  Because Japan 
is poor in natural resources , a lar ge shipping capacity was 
required to supply this industry with raw materials . This 
demand for shipping capacity was raised even further by the 
success ful export po licy of Japan and by the need to provide 
military supplies to the Japanese armies fighting in 
Manchuria and North China in 19 30-31 . By 1936-37 the 
r-esul t in g  s carcity in shipping capacity had driven shipping 
rates upwards .  
As already noted , low prices for b as ic foodstuffs 
created the bas is for lowe r indust rial wages and resul t ing 
highe r pro fits  for  Japanese indus t ry .  Therefore , as  long as 
artificial fert ilizer was impo rted into Taiwan from central 
Japan , ris ing shipping rates led to higher prices for art i­
ficial fert ilizers and therefore also to higher prices for 
rice in Taiwan . As a result , the wage-price s tructure in 
cent ral Japan was in danger of changing to the det riment o f  
the Zai batsu . Thes e Japanese entrepreneurs were thus con­
fron ted with the problem o f  securing their exist ing pro fit 
margin s .  That wages were only one determinant of  the sub­
sequent decision to invest  in Taiwan is demonst rated by the 
following example . 
Twenty years earlier , in the course of  World War I ,  a 
surplus demand for labour had developed in cen tral Japan . 
Taiwan , on the other hand , had adequate labour reserves at 
this t ime .  The wage different ial resul ting from this market 
situat ion led to no significant investments by Japanese 
ent repreneurs . Rather ( Tab le 2 4 ) , it contributed to the 
development of  Taiwanese indust ry . The addit ional employees 
were recruited primarily from rural areas and were dismissed 
after the boom had pas sed . The income of  farm households 
from nonagrarian activities thus followed a comparable 
development ( Table 2 5 ) . 
Capi tal cos ts  as a det erminant of the t ransfer . Unl ike 
the period from 1916 to 192 5 , the Japanese government after 
19 35- 36 was in terested to ensure that domest ic production 
met the b ulk of the island ' s  deman d fo r capit al goods for 
industrial investment in order to minimize the excess demand 
for shipping capacity . An appropriate instrument for 
influencing the Japanese ent repreneurs ' tendency to investment 
appeared to the state in 19 37  to  be the approximat ion o f  the 
Taiwanese tax sys tem to that of Japan (Huan g ,  Chang and Lee 
195l : esp . 5 8 ff . ) .  
Inves ted 
Year capital 
(T$  mill . ) 
1914 60  
1917  7 3  
1920 2 06 
1925 2 15 
Source : Azuma (1955 : 30) . 
Table 24 
Indust rial expans ion in Taiwan , 
Number of  Number of 
establishmen ts employees 
( 'OOO) ( 'OOO) 
1 . 3 2 2  
1 . 5 2 8  
2 . 7  48 
4 . 0  49 
1914-2 5 
Inves ted Inves ted 
capital per capit al 
est ablishment per employee 
(T$  mill . )  (T$ mill . )  
45 . 5  2 . 7  
49 . 1  2 . 6  
76 . 3 4 . 2  
53 . 7  4 . 4  
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Table 25 
Income of farm households from nonagricultural 
act ivities , 1911-40 (T$ ' 000 in 1935-37 price s )  
Period 
1911-15 
1915-2 0 
192 1-25 
1925-30 
19 31035 
19 36-40 
Source : Lee (19 7 1 ) . 
Income per annum 
2 , 400 
7 , 71 3  
11 , 840  
5 , 225  
9 , 142 
25 , 546 
Up to 19 36 the Taiwanese tax system was limited to  
easily con trollable economic act ivit ies and goods . Income 
taxes distinguished only b etween temporary and permanent 
income streams . Levies on s ugar consumption , cult ivated 
land ,  as well as a general poll t ax ,  accotmted for more than 
one-half of all tax revenues . In 1937 taxes on hous ing ,  
capital and dividends , among others , were also int roduced .  
Deduct ions were allowed for intere st payments and depreciat ion 
arising out of investment . Table 2 6  shows the structural 
changes in the tax sys tem brought about by the reform .  
Tax reform occurred a t  the same t ime that the supply 
of energy on Taiwan was increasing and the s carcity of labour 
in cent ral Japan was decreasing.  This was supplemen ted by 
the reduct ion of  the interest rate on investment credit to 
6 per cent . 6 As a result , and unlike the period from 1917 
to 1920 , when a s carcity o f  labour in central Japan led to 
the first boom on Taiwan , condit ions now existed on the 
island which permitt ed the adoption of capital intensive 
pro duct ion (Fig .  7) . The greater supply of energy , the t ight 
labour market in Japan , the t ransport problems des cribed and 
tax and c redit policies led to increased investment of  the 
Zai batsu in Taiwan . 
6Based on in fo rmat ion from the Bank of  Taiwan . 
Table 2 6  
St ructure of Taiwan ' s  t ax s�stem,  1936-44 
(% of tax receipt s )  
Tax 19 36 19 3 8  1940 1942 1944 
Land 2 3 .  2 17 . 0  10 . 2  6 . 1 4 . 8 
S tamp 2 1 .  8 15 . 6  10 . 6  6 . 4 3 . 5  
Transpo rtat ion 9 . 9 3 . 7 3 . 2 1 .  8 0 . 4 
Central income 2 1 .  7 2 6 . 6  3 0 . 2 31 . 4  2 3 . 6 
Income sur t ax 4 . 1  10 . 2  18 . 7  18 . 6  9 . 5  
Wealth 0 . 3 1 . 1 1 . 0  1 . 2 
Dividend 2 . 7  3 . 7 2 . 3  
Building 1.  8 0 . 9 0 . 9 
Turnover 6 . 7 6 . 1 4 . 5 3 . 4 
Consumption / Rice 10 . 1  14 . 7  11 . 8  22 . 4  43 . 7 
Other 9 . 2 5 . 2  3 . 6 3 . 2 5 . 7 
To tal 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0  100 . 0 
Source : Huang , Chang and Lee ( 1951 : 15 3 ) . 
KW ( ' OOO )  E m ployed ( 'OOO)  
40 0 
3 50 
3 0 0  
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Fig . 7  Development of ins talled electrical power and 
employment in the manufacturing industry , 19 1 0-45 . 
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Source : Off ice of Population Research , Princeton University , 
Princeton , N . J . 
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Development of ent repreneurial know-how d ifferen tials 
Crowding out nat ive ent repreneurs .  About 1900 small 
industry began to develop in Taiwan , clus tered in or around 
local sugar product ion . In addit ion to the great number of 
small firms which were engaged in the processing of sugar , 
there were also about thirty shops for the manufacture of  
locally used machines and tools . Owners of the local sugar 
firms were the former large landowners . The land-tax reform 
dis cussed previously did not affect the property relat ions 
exi s t ing in this indust ry .  Because of the inadequate t rans­
portation network of the is land , the firms produced chiefly 
for regional market s .  Acco rdingly , ent repreneurial experience 
was limited to the operat ion of  small bus inesses and the 
dist rib ution of goods within regions of manageable s iz e  
(Hsieh 1964 : 17 7 ) . For all pract ical purposes the entrepreneurs 
had regional monopolies over the acquis it ion and market ing 
of natural resources . 
With Taiwan ' s  inclusion in the Japanese market , an 
ext raregional demand developed for the product ion of food­
stuffs . As a result , 18 per cent of Taiwanese exports in 
1897 already con sisted of  processed agricultural products 
( Table 2 7 ) . 
Table 2 7  
Taiwan ' s  export s�ructure , total and share to Japan ( % )  
1897 1937 Export s Total Japan a Total Japan 
Rice 9 . 9  45 . 0  2 8 . 6  99 o 9  
Other unprocessed 
agricult ural products  48 . 0  0 . 2  9 . 6 6 6 . 1  
Sugar 18 . 0  44 . 2  43 . 5  9 8 . 7  
Other processed agri-
cultural products 3 . 8 8 7 . 5  
Other products 2 4 . 1 14 . 5  82 . 5  
Total 100 . 0 12 . 5  100 . 0 9 3 . 2  
a % o f  each commodity group lis ted which is exported to 
Japan . 
Source : Calculat ed from Taiwanese Provincial Government 
( 1946 : 82 1 ff . , 1949 , 2-3) . 
a 
Be cause of its advant ageous climate , Taiwan offered 
good condit ion s  for the expans ion of the sugar indust ry ,  
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thus helping to meet the needs of Japan . Since sugar loses 
a large percentage of  it s volume in the process of  refinin g ,  
the establishment o f  sugar refineries on the island also 
promised cost advantages to the Zai batsu . The ir monopolist ic 
posit ion on the Japanese market reduced market ing risks . 
Nevertheless , the Zai batsu were init ially llllwilling to invest 
in Taiwan in spit e of the opportunity for higher profit s . 
This att itude changed only aft er the state had demonst rated 
the profitability of such investmen t . 
A comparison of  the b ehaviour of tradit ional agriculture 
and mo dern ent repreneurship (bus ines s )  shows that the oppor­
tunity for pro fit is an ins trumen t of only limited effect ive­
ness in in fluencing ent repreneurial behaviour . At t imes a 
demonstrat ion of the pro fit ab ility of  new investment s  is 
required in order to convince farmers and large entrepreneurs 
to exercise the ir market oppo rtun it ies . Profit expectat ions  
based on past experience , as  in the form of demonstrat ion 
ef fect s ,  are apparently a basis for the decision to invest . 
As a result of  the compensatory payments made to large 
landowners in the course of the land-tax reform, Taiwanese 
ent repreneurs , like their Japanese compet itors , had sufficient 
capit al at their disposal to expand their capacity . They also 
recognized the sales potential arising out of their inclus ion 
in a large market . Nevertheless , they were not in a posit ion 
to b reak the exis ting market monopoly on the Japanese mainland . 
Moreover , b ecaus e of limited knowledge o f  the Japanese language 
they also had difficulty in recruit ing from Japan the skilled 
workers then available and ne cessary to service modern machin­
ery .  7 Las t ly ,  they were hindered from securing the necessary 
7This s ituat ion was t otally different from West Germany ' s  
after World War II , as Germany could init ially sat is fy it s 
demand for more qualified workers through migrants from the 
east . Later on , the demand for these qualified workers was 
met by importin g  ' guest workers '  from abroad - a t ask carried 
out by official (or semi-o fficial )  organizat ions . In the 
third st age ,  workers from abroad learned about j ob opportllll­
ities via f amily , friends , et c .  already in the FRG .  Income 
differen t ials ( incent ives ) thus had an impact only after 
. being transmit ted through middlemen - an ins t itution no t 
availab le to the Taiwanese ent repreneurs . 
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supply of raw materials from their own f:arms as they were 
legally rest ricted from buying land in Taiwan . 
In addit ion to the provis ion of  capital goods , raw 
materials , skilled workers , and access to market s ,  the st atus 
of Japanese and Taiwanese ent repreneurs differed init ially 
also in so far as their tax burden was concerned.  The lat ter 
was derived from the differing t axation o f  agricultural and 
indust rial income adopted in connect ion with the prohib it ion 
of purchase o f  land by Taiwanese . As shown in Tab le 2 8 ,  agri­
cultural income was taxed at a higher rate than indust rial 
income . Accordingly , Japanese entrepreneurs set low accountin g  
prices f o r  the product s rais ed on their own farms and guaran-, 
teed a minimum income to farmers who shifted from rice to 
the production o f  raw sugar . Under these conditions the 
sugar farmers were increas ingly willing to sign purchase 
contracts with Japanese concerns . As a result , the price of  
availab le raw sugar generally rose . 8 The tax advantages o f  
Japanese entrep reneurs were thus enhanced by the higher price 
of raw materials facing Taiwanese producers . 
In spite of  these adverse condit ions , the Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs att empted to realize the market opportunit ie s  
presented t o  them on the domestic market b y  modern iz ing their 
sugar factories . However ,  even if they succeeded in sur­
motmting language barriers and in hiring Japanese technicians 
to service their  plant s ,  their capacity was st ill too small 
to apply the available modern technology pro fit ably .  There­
fore , by 1920 most  of  the Taiwanese entrepreneurs in sugar 
had been driven from the market ( Table 2 9 ) . 
Tolerating native entrepreneurs . Guided by the pro­
duction development s in the sugar indust ry and in agriculture , 
further p roduct ion capacity developed which can be traced 
b ack to the Hirs chman ' linkage effect ' .  This increased 
capacity was owned partly by the co-operatives and partly by 
the Taiwanese small ent repreneurs (Hirs chman 195 8 : 95 ff . ) .  
As a result , spurred on by the co-operat ives , agri cul ture 
not only shifted to raw sugar but also to o ther farm resources 
whose pro ces s in g  was sub sequently taken over by co-operat ive 
ent reprise s . Between 1913 and 1920 the co-operat ives increased 
their fixed capit al ten-fold in this area to T$9 . 5  million . 
At the s ame t ime , the volume o f  credit given to finance 
busines ses connected with agri culture and to secure the 
8Based on info rmat ion from the Bank of Taiwan . 
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Table 2 8  
S tructure of Taiwan ' s  t ax sys tem (T$) , 19 33 
Tax burden for income from 
Yearly income Agri cultural Nonagri cultural Average (T$)  act ivit ies act ivities 
(1)  (2 ) 
up to : 400 18 . 51 4 7 . 01 47 . 76 
800 113 . 39 86 . 63 100 . 01 
1 , 200 15 7 . 2 7 15 7 . 63 15 7 .  4 7 
2 , 000 333 . 01 2 33 . 96  2 83 . 49 
3 , 000 522 . 07 412 . 43 467 . 25 
5 , 000 922 . 80 62 4 . 04 7 7 3 .  42 
7 , 000 1 , 417 . 38 832 . 80 1 , 125 . 09 
10 , 000 2 , 018 . 33 1, 661 . 2 8  1 , 839 . 7 6 
Source : Bank of Taiwan (n . d . : 16 1 ) . 
Table 2 9  
Expansion and restructuring of Taiwan ' s  
sugar indus try , 19 01-21 
1901-02 
Number of modern es t ab lishment s 1 
Capacity/daya 0 . 3 
Yearly product ion a 18 . 5  
Numb er of modernized 
es t ab lishmen t s 
Number of old establishment s 1 , 117 . 0  
Capacity/daya 11 . 2  
Yearly production a 890 . 0  
a ' OOO Brit ish ton s . 
Source : Bank of Taiwan (1954 : 2 2 ) . 
19 10-11 
2 1  
16 . 5  
3 , 2 37 . 5  
6 79 
499 
5 . 0  
5 88 . 9  
1920-2 1  
42 
31 . 9  
4 , 019 . 5  
8 7  
171 
1.  7 
105 . 8 
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product ion of raw materials rose from T$0 . 7 million to 
T$ 1 6 . 4  million . Output rose sharply ( Table 30) . 
Food 
Table 30 
Product ion of selected indust ries in Taiwan , 
1912-35 (T$ mill . )  
Indust ries 1912 1915 192 0 1925 1 9 30 
pro duct s 
1935 
Sugar 3 7 . 5  5 6 . 9  135 . 1  117 . 1  15 3 . 6  164 . 1  
Pineapple 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 3 · i . 7 3 . 4 8 . 0 
Veget ab le oil 0 . 6 0 . 6 1 . 1 1 .  7 1 . 3 1 .  7 
Fruit j ui ce 0 . 1 0 . 3 0 . 5 0 . 7 
Related indust ries 
Sugar by-products 0 . 7 0 . 7 2 . 8 2 . 5  3 . 1 6 . 7 
Sugar pro cess ing 
equipment 0 . 4 0 . 4 3 . 6 2 . 2 4 . 1  4 . 4  
Tin for t in cans 0 . 1 0 . 5 0 . 8 2 . 2  
Glas s 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 5 0 . 1 
Source : Taiwanese Provincial Government ( 1946 : 788ff . ) .  
The exis t ing small indus t ry profited from the develop­
ments  in the food industry .  The forme r increas ingly manu­
factured for the latter goods of generally low quality , such 
as machines , sheet metal and glas s . Nevertheless , the food 
indus try remained dominant , account ing for 70 per cent of all 
indust rial product ion ( Taiwanese Provincial Government 1946 : 
1108-9 ; Barclay 1954b : 38-9 ) . 
This general investment act ivity raised the demand fo r 
con st ruct ion materials . This deman d ,  in turn , was st rengthened 
by measures taken with respect to the infrast ructure . Japanese 
ent repreneurs at firs t  satis fied their demand for cement 
through impo rt s .  By 192 0 the domest ic demand in Taiwan had 
reached such a level that local cement product ion could be  
developed through the use of indigenous natural resources .  
Since the local ent repreneurs were forb idden by the land tax 
reform from buying land in Taiwan , neither could they obtain 
the required mineral rights . Cement product ion was thus 
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carried on exclusively by Japanese entrepreneurs . 
Comparable problems did not arise in brick product ion . 
The land required fo r such product ion had already been in 
the hands of Taiwanese b efore the reform. In the sub sequent 
period mainly the small brickyards were expanded to sat is fy 
regional demand . Table 31 provides an overview of  the 
development of cement product ion and brickmaking in Taiwan . 
Tab le 31 
Cement and brick product ion in Taiwan , 
1912-40 ( T$ ndl l . ) 
Year Cement Bricks 
19 12 
1915 
19 20 
1925 
1 9 30 
1 9 35 
1940 
2 . 4  
3 . 0 
3 . 3 
3 . 8 
4 . 8  
1 . 1 
0 . 8 
3 . 1 
1 . 7 
2 . 5  
3 . 1 
4 . 5 
Source : Taiwanese Provincial Government (1946 : 788ff . ) .  
Addit ional incen t ives for the indust rializ ation of 
Taiwan emanat ed from agriculture . A central role in this 
regard was assumed by the demand for art ificial fert iliz er 
and agricultural machines and tools . Table 32 shows the 
development of  this demand.  As can be seen , a cont inuous 
development of the Taiwanese machine indust ry occurred during 
the ent ire colonial perio d ,  without its ever achieving a 
dominant role in supplying the agricultural sector .  The 
development of  these local small firms was hindered in the 
early years by the lack of a sufficient number of skilled 
Taiwanese workers (Harb ison 19 71 : 22 1 ) . By the t ime this 
prob lem had b een solved through an improved educat ional 
system, there was pract ically no chance left to break the 
commanding pos it ion held by Japanese exporters . In principle , 
Table 32 
DeveloEment of apparent  consumEt ion and Eroduct ion of  art ificial fertilizers 
and farm equiEment , 1912-40 ( T$ mill . )  
Art ifi cial fertilizers Farm equipment 
Year Consumpt ion Production ( 2 )  % o f  (1)  Consumption Product ion (4 )  a s  % o f  as 
( 1)  (2 ) ( 3) (4)  
1912 3 . 8 o . o 0 . 2  o . o 5 . 0 
1915 7 . 5  0 . 2  2 . 7  0 . 4  o . o 2 . 5  
192 0  11 . 0  2 . 9  2 6 . 4 0 . 7 o . o 5 . 7 
1925 17 . 9  4 . 6  2 5 . 7  11 . 6  0 . 7  6 . 0  
19 30 2 3 .  4 3 . 3 14 . 1  30 . 9  1 . 0  3 . 2  
19 35 37 . 2  4 . 4  11 . 9  2 8 . 7 1 . 1  3 . 8 
1940 4 8 . 8 15 . 1  30 . 9  31 . 3  1 . 6 5 . 1  
Source : Taiwanese Provincial Government (1946 : 788ff . ) .  
(3)  
\0 
0 
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therefo re , these Taiwanese entrepreneurs were faced with the 
same probl ems as those in the Taiwanese sugar indust ry .  
Nevertheles s ,  tmlike the sugar producers , they had the 
opporttmity to specialize in the manufacture of s imple tools 
whose mass produ ction was tmprof itab le.  
Unl ike the domestic machine product ion , by 1920  the 
art ificial fert ilizer indus try in Taiwan already played a 
s ignificant role in s at is fying domestic demand . In sub sequent 
years , however ,  the Japanese art ificial fert iliz er industry 
succeeded in meeting additional Taiwanese deman d by export 
from Japan . In 1935 Japanese ent repreneurs controlled nearly 
19 per cent of the Taiwanese market for art ificial fert iliz er . 
As shown in Table 32 , a s t ronger development of plant s for 
production of art ificial fert ilizer began in Taiwan 
sub sequently . 
Transmitt ing entrepreneurial know-how via 
feedbacks and opinion leaders 
The forego ing dis cus sion makes clear that foreign invest­
ment can influence the development of  lo cal enterprise as 
long as lo cal entrepreneurs ret ain the opportun ity to expand 
their capacity when compet ing local ent repreneurs are ousted . 
Whether and to what degree such st ructural changes occur , 
however ,  is not only dependent on the intent ions of  foreign 
inve stors but also on the deci sion made by the polit ical 
elites in the developing cotmtry .  
The example o f  the investment decis ions o f  Japanese 
ent repreneurs showed clearly that the risk of a pro fit squeeze 
especially caused large concerns to raise the quest ion of  the 
locat ion of  new investments ( Drys dale 19 72 : 2 ff . ) .  The 
quest ion o f  location dominates the investment decisions of  
ent repreneurs from indust rializ ed countries . If a pro fit 
squeeze is foreseen in the long t erm at the exis t ing locat ion , 
then the condit ions at the prospective location in the 
developing country are examined .  The foreign enterprise then 
takes these into accotmt ,  t ogether with the natural prere­
quisites and the economic policy of the developing cotmtry ,  
in making it s choice of location . 
Prob lems of development in indus trialized Japan ros e  
out of  cos t s  for raw materials  and wages . The Japanese con­
cerns thus attempt ed to monopolize the markets for raw 
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mat erials in the less developed land of Taiwan . The workers 
were paid partly in money , dependent upon their basic necess­
it ies , and part ly in the grant ing of  s tatus symbols such as 
land ownership or the ' honour ' of being a memb er of the 
family of  a given firm. 
These in cent ives , however ,  were not sufficient to prompt 
the wo rkers to work more hours or to produce agricultural 
goods of b et ter quality . Accordingly , in order t o  achieve 
the aim of expanding and improving the product ion of raw 
materials , the ent erprises att emp ted to increase or awaken 
the want s  of the workers in the hope that this would induce 
them to do more work (Klatt 1959 : 102 ff . ) .  
Operat ing within the in stitut ionalized and tradit ional 
patterns of behaviour , the Japanese were succes sful in 
inducing the Taiwanese ' leaders of opinion ' to  imit ate the 
Japanese standard of living.  These in turn , partly through 
family ins t it ut ion s and partly through the co-operatives , 
commtmicated to the farmers that this higher standard of  
living was attainable through great er product ion of  higher 
quality raw materials . Together with the state they also 
made the know-how and financing ne cessary for an expansion 
of product ion available . Technological input s , such as the 
dist ribution of water and art ificial fert ilizer , accelerat ed 
this pro ces s (Lee 19 6 8 : 39ff . ) .  
Tradit ional ins t it ut ions als o  served as transmitters of 
informat ion to small indust ry .  With their help the ' leaders 
of opinion ' were ab le to induce small indust ry to produce 
s imple investment and indust rial consumer goods , and also  to 
obtain the necessary financing through the clans ( the former 
large landowners ) .  
This supply of goods as well as the demonst rat ion of a 
higher s t an dard o f  living led the farmers to  produce more . 
An increas ing supply of indus trial consumer goods was there­
fore supplemented by a more varied supply of agricultural 
con sumer goods . 
The change in the political system ,  manifested by the 
es tablishment of the pao-ahia system ,  was thus a prerequisite 
for the change in the economic system. Both of these changes 
were characterized by the adaptat ion of t radit ional and modern 
pat t erns of behaviour . In this process the social commtmi­
cat ion b etween both systems through the inclusion of 
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nonmonet ary incentives played a significant role . Tradit ional 
structures in the economic sys t em contributed to the mob il­
izat ion of resources otherwise not availab le for the growth 
pro cess . 
Chapter 5 
LEGITIMIZATION OF THE POLITI CAL DECISION-MAKERS 
AS ECONOMIC ELITES 
Precondit ions fo r accelerat ing adaptat ion pro cesses 
Extension of market-widening inst itut ions 
The contribut ion of US development aid . After 1945 the 
Taiwanese property formerly owned by Japanese came into the 
hands of the Chinese government . This included not only 
land but factories as well.  The Chinese who had previous ly 
b een officials t ook over management funct ions in the fac·tories . 
The workers in the factories expected these former officials 
to carry out their dut ies with entrepreneurial efficien cy 
comparable to that demons trated by the Japanese . On their 
part , the new managers await ed support from the st ate for 
solut ions  of problems which were new to them. The ' push-out 
policy ' des cribed previous ly con tribu ted to the fact that 
state ent erprises regarded the desire for status and income 
as complemen tary mot ivesl and , on this basis , were prepared 
to make use o f  opportunities for further development . 
The know-how necessary to acquire raw materials and 
unf inished manuf actured products  on the world market was no t 
obtainab le in the normal training program. In the early 
years followin g the civil war , Taiwanese off icials were so  
occupied with themselves and with the execut ion of  agrarian 
reform that no help from them in this respect could be 
1Every government that wan ts to develop domestic ent re­
preneurship is confronted with this  prob lem. Wilczynski 
( 1972 : esp . 96ff . ) present s this using t he example of the 
connnunist states . Rit s chl (193l : esp . 38ff . )  had already 
pointed out this problem of connnunal ent repreneurs in non­
colIDillln ist  societ ies . 
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expected . 2 Accordingly , help was sought from the USA. 
95  
As already no ted , the US Congress pas sed a series of 
assistance measures for Taiwan . This did not involve a 
definite program but con s isted rather of a numb er of separate 
measures having their own obj ectives and f inancing (Wester­
field 19 63 : 68 ) . These covered primarily the period from 
195 1 to 1965 . Investment aid was gran ted on various repayment 
terms ( Tab le 33)  dependent on the specific product to which 
it was directed . 
Table 33 
Condit ions  under which US foreign aid 
was given to Taiwan 
Condit ions 
Non repayable 
Repayab le in NT$ 
Repayab le in US $a 
US$  mill . 
1 , 2 09 
164 
92 
a Interest  of max . 3 . 5% applicab le .  
Source : Jacoby ( 1966 : 2 66 ) . 
Amount 
% 
82 . 4  
11 . l  
6 . 5 
Deci sive for the development of local entrepreneurship 
and especially of state in dust ry was the structure of imports 
financed with American assistance . Table 34 indicates that 
import s of raw materials predominated . According to Liang ,  
the imports o f  capital goo ds and raw materials were insuf­
ficient up to 1959-60 to sat isfy the demands of large-scale 
indus try (Liang 1972 : 2 lff ) . 
However , it was not only the Chinese but the Americans 
as well who comb ined their development aid with certain 
expectations . This was manifested , for example , by the fact 
that approximately two-thirds of American aid was earmarked 
2Parsons ( 195 4 : 54ff . ) had already men t ioned the relevance o f  
group memb ers normat ive expectat ions  for their behaviour . 
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Tab le 34 
Structure of the imports financed by US 
financial ass istance ( % )  
Capital Raw Consumer 
equipment materials  goods 
14 . 0  81 . 8 4 . 2  
2 7 . 7  64 . 8  7 . 5  
2 0 . 9 72  . 1  7 . 0  
2 1 . 0 7 2 . 7 6 . 3 
Source : Lin ( 19 6 7 : 2 7 ) . 
fo r mil itary proj ect s .  America conducted it s dealings under 
the influence of the Korean War and hoped that the modern­
izat ion of Taiwan would strengthen it s own military poten tial . 
About 195 8  a change in the evaluat ion of ' communism' as 
a foreign enemy occurred at the init iative of the USA. The 
conception that the supremacy of a given social system was 
best proven by it s economic su ccess now became one of the 
central de terminant s of American foreign policy . At this 
time, Taiwan was the most highly developed country in the 
third world� Nevertheless , private enterprise had played 
only a small role in the proces s of modernizat ion up to this 
period . Hence forth , the USA as a hegemon ial power expected 
Taiwan to pay mo re attent ion to the development of modern 
private enterpris e ,  and thus to contribute to proving , through 
high rates of growth , the ' supremacy of t he Western system '  
over les s developed nat ional economies ( S chreib er 197 0 : 14 ;  
Jacoby 19 66 : 5 ff . ) .  
The contribut ion of the military admin ist rat ion . Entre­
preneurial act ivity here was understood not only as ' capitalist 
oriented behaviour ' in private indus try .  It also included 
the public sector involved with processes of innovat ion and 
adaptat ion . In Taiwan , this applied part icularly to the 
army , to the admin ist rat ion and to the political decis ion­
makers . 
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As previous ly indicat ed , a large part of the Nat ional 
Chinese Army migrated to Taiwan . After their discharge , 
these soldiers often lacked the family contacts necessary 
for integration into society . They waited , therefore , for 
assistance from the polit ical dec ision-makers . Their wishes 
were complement ed by the hope of the polit ical decision-makers 
that the di scharged soldiers would be  especially loyal to 
the state . 
The state  fulfilled the expectations of memb ers of the 
army in so far as it guaranteed a dwelling,  st arting capital 
and j ob train ing to every discharged soldier . The dwelling 
was allotted and could not b e  sold . It had to be  returned 
as soon as the family no lon ger occupied it . 
As a general rule , the army at a given t ime did not 
discharge individual soldiers but en t ire tm.it s .  These received 
training which made it possib le for them to engage in their 
profes sion s after their dis charge tm.der circumstances which 
preserved the exis t ing group relat ionship and it s hierarchy . 
The dwellings of the members of these tm it s  were generally 
located in the same neighbourhood .  
Some o f  these tm it s  t ook up pos itions in existing state 
enterprises , thus helping to reduce staf f  shortages . Further­
more,  the e ffects of the learning process undergone by these 
trained personnel increased general labour product ivity .  
Other tm. i t s  established farms in the militarily strategic 
highlands . Still other tm. it s ,  with the techn ical as s istance 
of special state  officials , estab lished new en terprises in 
branches where the product s manufactured up t o  that t ime 
were regarded as insufficient or tm.sat isfactory . This  arrange­
ment contributed to the spat ial diffus ion of innovat ions . 
A lar ge percentage of the dis charged soldiers b ecame 
merchants . Accordin gly , members of units which were seen as 
being particularly dependab le politically were allotted 
dwellings in the polit ical and economi c centres of the island.  
These groups also retained the pre-existing milit ary organiz­
at ional st ructure . In this  manner a polit ically integrated 
and well trained merchan t class with sufficient start ing 
capital developed . The connnon military background b ecame the 
fotm.dat ion for the sys tem of connnunication among the merchants 
on the is lands . It was therefore natural that these merchant s 
support those ent erpris es in which former memb ers of the 
military worked . 3 
3According t o  document s of the DGBAS . 
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Table 35 demonstrates that the state enterprises fulfilled 
the awaited expectat ions . In all branches in which state and 
private ent repreneurs were act ive , the state entrepreneurs 
succeeded in an economic ut ilizat ion of the s carce factor 
o f  product ion capit al . 
Tab le 35 
Average rates of return in selected indust ries 
in Taiwan , 19 5 3-6 7 ( % )  
Industry 
Food processing 
Chemicals 
Metal pro ducts 
Pet rochemicals 
All non-food products 
( a"'1erage) 
Source : Data from DGBAS . 
State-owned Privat ely-owned 
companies companies 
14 . 3  8 . 8 
11 . 6 9 . 8  
11 . 3 4 . 3  
2 2 . 4  
1 3 . 6 6 . 4  
The con tribution of government adminis tration and 
commerce . In the course of  agrarian reform the Chinese 
government had already begun to compile s tructural economic 
dat a and t o  t rain stat ist icians . The Coun cil for International 
Economic Cooperat ion and Development which was founded in 
1953 took over the responsib il ity of evaluat ing the available 
informat ion and of draft ing a planned framework for general 
orientat ion in the nonagricultural sector (K . Chang 1969 : Wang 
1968b : l46) . 
The first Four-Year Plan ( 19 5 3-5 6 )  did not meet the 
expected goals . It served more as a basis of orientation 
for the es t ablishment of official stat is t ics and for the 
development of useful methods for the acquisit ion and compil­
at ion of data.  In the course of  the sub sequent Four-Year 
Plan it was possible to produce the f irst input-output tables .  
At about the t ime o f  the initiat ion of the third Four-Year 
Plan in 1960 the availab le informat ion was sufficient to allow 
t imely recogni tion of expected bottlenecks , such as in the 
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area of infrastructure . The available knowledge concern ing 
economic interrelat ionships and the mos t  important variables 
of the growth process was now sufficient to direct foreign 
capital int o  areas des irable from the economic and polit ical 
point of  view. 
The China Development Corporat ion was est abl ished in 
1959 to execute the plan . Its responsib ility was granting 
middle and long-term credits to private indust ry .  The Bank 
of Taiwan and the Cooperat ive Bank thus lost the ir leading 
posit ion s  in industrial financin g .  At the same t ime , foreign 
banks ob t ained the right to establish b ranches in Taiwan in 
order to support foreign trade . Up to 1965 the Nippon Kongyo 
Bank , the Firs t Nat ional City Bank , the Bangkok Bank and the 
Bank of America ut ilized this oppo rtunity (Yeh 1968 : 6 79ff . ; 
Pan 196 8 : 484ff . ) .  
More than a thousand firms in Taiwan were engaged solely 
in trade . In so far as they distributed foreign goods , they 
were required to be regist ered by the Board of Foreign Trade . 
Foreign firms were required to trans fer exclus ive right s for 
the di stribut ion of  their product s to a merchant . 
Difficult ies often developed b ecause of  the limited 
qualificat ions of the Taiwanese pers onnel working for commer­
cial firms . Frequently the capit al equity needed to guarantee 
customers minimal services or to accept short-term inter­
mediate finan cing of impo rt s was also lackin g .  Accordingly , 
foreign f irms were permit ted to establ ish local or supra­
regional trade offices , in the lat ter case , for example , in 
Hong Kong or Tokyo , in order to supervise the protect ion of  
their int erest s . 
A large number of special offices were con cerned with 
the communication of  ent repreneurial know-how , in order to 
bring middle level industry into a pos it ion where it could 
realize exist ing market oppo rtun ities . These included , for 
example, the China Productivity and Trade Centre .  The Union 
Industrial Research Institute  car ried on applied research in 
the areas of organic , inorganic , pet roleum and agricultural 
chemistry ,  as well as in the fields of metallurgy and 
buildin g materials . The Metal Indust ries Development Centre 
had the responsib ility of t raining managers and technicians 
in the metal industry , to enable plann ing and execut ion of 
new investment proj ect s  by means of demonstration proj ect s  
an d  to provide technical ass ist ance t o  interested Taiwanese 
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entrepreneurs . The Machine and Small S cale Ent erprise 
Ass i stan ce Group endeavoured to pro cure credit s for small­
s cale indus tries and to facilit ate the ir acces s  to new tech­
nology (W. P .  Chang 19 68 : 2 69 ) . 
One attempt to create new investment financing for large 
enterprises was the opening of a stock exchange . After the 
failure of ini tial att empt s ,  new stock exchange regulat ions 
in 1959 made it po ssible for a numb er of  corporat ion s to 
finance a port ion of their capital needs here . Table 36  
provides a gene ral overview of the s ignificance o f  the stock 
exchange for inve stment financing in 1962 . 
Table 36 
Selected indicators of  the stock market 
and finan cial market in Taiwan , 1962 
S to ck market 
Numb er of registered companies 
of which traded in the market 
Capital of regist ered companies 
of which t raded in the market 
Finan cial marke t 
New issues - total 
of which : Government 
Indust ries 
Traded issues - total 
o f  which : Government 
Indust ries 
Source : Pan ( 196 8 : 505-7) . 
4 , 0 81 
16 
11 , 596  
5 , 2 99 
510 
500 
10 
1 , 22 9  
1 , 12 3  
106 
% 
100 . 0 
0 . 4 
100 . 0  
4 5 . 7  
100 . 0 
9 8 . 0 
2 . 0 
100 . 0  
9 1 . 4 
8 . 6  
The contribution of agricultural organizat ions . The 
obj ect ive of  the economic policy of the Nat ionalist Chinese 
government was to assist lo cal private enterprises to reach 
a posit ion where some of them would be  able t o  produce inter­
nat ion ally competitive goods . After 1951 it attempted to 
achieve this goal by means of its tax poli cy and through 
limitat ion o f  the numb er of new entran t s . Spe cial tax 
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deduct ions were granted fo r the import of chemi cal raw 
materials from Japan , in so far as these were necessary for 
the product ion for export . In 1954 this sytem was expanded 
to incl ude all export goo ds . Tax reduct ions in 1955 and 
1960 were directed toward supplement ing this rebate system 
( Chin and Wang 1968 : 12 ) . 
This tax pol icy led nominally to a reduction of the tax 
rate from 32 . 5  per cen t  to 18 per cent on an annual income 
of 100 , 000 NT$ . On a practi cal level , these incent ives had 
only limited s ignificance . Kuo ( 1 9 7 0 : 103-4)  indicates that , 
in spite o f  progress ive taxat ion , the elasticity of income 
taxes for farm in come was 1 . 2  as opposed t o  0 . 9 6 for other 
activit ies . This can be traced b ack to the limited efficiency 
of t ax colle ct ion .  Equally unsucces sful was the at tempt to 
utilize the capacity of exist ing enterp rises by fo rbidding 
the establishment of new firms . This resulted in a large 
numb er of 1.IDregistered small ent erprises which paid no taxes 
and thus were able to produce goods more cheaply than their 
registered cotmterpart s . 4 
Relying on its experience in agriculture , the government 
after 1958 turned to another control system.  Firms now had 
to prove to the stat e  their worthiness for promot ion . Domest ic 
demand and export act ivity s erved as criteria . Support from 
special offices , supply of eas ily cont rolled import goods 
and provision of el ectric power were assured only for the 
enterprises which met these crit eria. Fo r example , product ion 
cont rols were init iated in a short period of t ime in the 
pharmaceut ical and electrical engineering industries . Enter­
prises whose efficiency rose were to cont inue to receive 
concess ions such as cheaper credits  and technical assistance 
in the opening of new market s .  Becaus e of the limited quali­
ficat ions of the controllers , this system ftmct ioned with 
only limited success . 5 
The readiness of Chinese elites to adapt their behaviour 
to the new demands of hegemonial power are demonstrated 
part icularly well by the origin and content of the N inet een­
Point Reform Pro gram. This program was st imulated by and 
init iated in co-operat ion with the US-AID mi ssion in Taipei .  
It attempted to tmite all inst itut ions relevant for 
4Accordin g  to doctllllent s  of the Bank of Taiwan . 
5A survey of the individual con trol measures by sector is  
available in Lin ( 19 7 3 : 2 19 ) . 
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industrializat ion through the inst rument of the interlocking 
directorat e .  This was to create an administration in the 
indus trial area which could play a role comparable to that 
of the JCRR in agriculture . An example of this policy might 
be seen in the person of K . Y .  Yin , who was at the s ame t ime 
the Director of the Foreign Exchange and Trade Connnission , 
Chairman Pro-Tern of the Coun cil for US-AID and member of the 
board of directors of the Bank of Taiwan . 
A part of this program consisted of amendment of the 
regulat ion s for incorporat ion of new firms . Pursuan t to 
these new regulat ions , local ent repreneurs could establish 
new firms only if a certain share of product ion was directed 
towards foreign market s .  The quotas for the individual 
economic branches var ied . For example , the quota for new 
cement ent erprises was 100 per cent in 1964 but only 50 per 
cent three years later . The goal of this measure was the 
limit ation of further overcapacit ies . 6 
In subsequent years the import of capital goods was 
generally made eas ier .  As a result , in 1964 enterprises 
whose impo rt s  did not exceed US $30 , 000 ( in 1968 = US $50 , 000) 
were exempted from all import restriction s .  Otherwise import 
res trict ions for the protect ion of local industry were applied . 
An enterprise was regarded to b e  worthy of promot ion if it 
fulfilled the following criteria : 
a .  The final product s had to conform to nat ional or 
internat ional standards . The nat ional st andard was 
init ially no t pre cisely defined but generally came 
to  approach internat ional standards b ecause of  
systematic foreign investment in Taiwan o 
b .  Import content could not exceed 70  per cent of  the 
value of the final product , 
c .  The final product in 1960 could not be more than 25 
per cent more expensive than comparable imports ; in 
19 64 15 per cent more cost ly , and in 19 68  10 per cen t . 
Import co st s here in cluded tariffs , fees and levies , 
so  that an addit ional control instrument existed 
(Lin 19 7 1 : 114ff . ) .  
6According to document s of the DGBAS ; see also Lin ( 1 9 7 3 : 
83ff . and Hsing (1971 : 202££ . ) .  
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Es tablishment of  foreign. enterprise 
Taiwan as a locat ion for foreign investment . Before 
19 60 the government had b een success ful in developing the 
product ion of consumer goo ds to such a degree that the import 
of  consumer goods could be financed by the export proceeds 
of t he respective branch . Table 37  shows that the export 
surplus ob tained in this manner was not large enough , however , 
to finance the import demand fo r tmf inished raw materials 
necessary for the development of industry .  
Table 37  
Degree of sel f-sufficiency and exports of 
select ed industries , 19 60-61 
Food 
.Domestic produc­
tion as % of domes­
tic consumpt ion 
9 8 . 8 
Industrial consumpt ion 
goods 93 . 7 
Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 
Capital goods 
80 . 6 
5 3 . 0 
Exports as % of 
domest ic 
production 
31 . 5  
11 . 1  
4 . 2  
3 . 3 
Source : DGBAS and Chinese Maritime Cus toms . 
The necessary imports were financed by one-third through 
American foreign aid and by one- fourth through exports of  
s ugar and rice . The export o f  these agricultural products  
could hardly be increased and they s uffered from stron g demand 
shift s on the world market . Taiwan was therefo re forced to 
export more industrial product s  if , at an import coefficient 
of inves tment of 0 . 3 ,  it wanted to reach a level of development 
which would allow economic growth without .American capital 
ass istance . 7 Sin ce the necessary know-how and capital as 
well as an internat ional distribution network for the priority 
7 Document s of  the Central Bank of China , Economic Research 
Dept . See also  Liang and Lee (19 72 ) . 
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development of the export indust ry were lackin g ,  Taiwan was 
not satis fied simply with the contribution o f  foreign exchange 
by foreign enterpreneurs . 
During the colonial period , it was assumed in the case 
of the estab lishment of foreign enterprises in Taiwan , that 
at least Japanese enterpreneurs would not engage in foreign 
inves tment primarily on the ground of  expect ed extra profit s , 
but on the b as is of domest ic Japanese problems and in order 
to insure the exist ing profit margins of the enterprises . 8 
A j umping-off point for the realization of  the policy based 
on this knowledge was offered by the dif ferent development 
of  wages an d  labour pro ductivity in Japan and Taiwan . This 
is shown particularly clearly by the following info rmat ion 
from the Bank of Taiwan . In 1960 an indust rial worker in 
Taiwan received about one-half the wages paid to his Japanese 
counterpart for comparab le work . The labour product ivity o f  
the Taiwanes e indus trial worker , however , was only about 3 0  
per cent lower than that in Japan . Because of the divergent 
wage development in both countries , the wage different ial 
in creased in the following decade . In 196 9  the comparable 
wage in Taiwan was only 40 per  cent of that earned by Japanese 
industrial workers . At the same t ime labour product ivity in 
Taiwan ros e  faster than in Japan . In 1969 it was only 2 0  
per cent lower than in Japan (Hamada 19 71 : 1 7 1-2 ) . 
The wage differential b etween Taiwan and the USA was 
probab ly greater than that between Taiwan and Japan . 
Addit ional incent ives for American inves tment in Taiwan 
resulted from the changes made in the American tax law in 
1962 . According to these , in order to avoid the shift o f  
profit s t o  tax shelters , those  American enterprises held 
partially or solely by US cit izens were subj ected to US t ax 
laws . Americans who held at least 10 per cent of  the capit al 
of  a forei gn firm now had to pay US taxes on pro f it s attribut­
able to such holdings . Tax deduct ions were allowed for 
inves tment s in developing countries , to which , pursuant to 
this law ,  Taiwan al so b elonged .  The polit ical risks entailed 
by such investments  were insured for twenty years through the 
AID Inves tment Guarant ee Pro gram ( S chreiber 19 70 : 22 ff . ) .  
8rn this connect ion ,  Drysdale states that generally foreign 
investment is mo re a consequence of  the perceived dome s t ic 
market s ituation in the donor count ry than of  the expected 
profits resulting from relocat ing product ion . See Drysdale 
( 19 72 : 22 ff . ) . 
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Addit ional pro fit oppo rtunit ies for the Japanese result ed 
from the following circumstances : In most of the count ries 
of Southeast As ia as well as in certain S tates of the USA, 
overseas Chinese play a role in domestic trade . These showed 
their t ies to Taiwan part ially through direct inves tment on 
the is land and part ially through pre ference of market goods 
having the label ' Made in Taiwan ' .  Part s produced in Japan 
and assembled in Taiwan also carried this label . Japanese 
entrepreneurs thus had the opportun ity of indirect use of 
the Chinese t rade network in order to get around the ret icence 
of the peoples of Southeast As ia toward buying Japanese 
products ( see Skinner 1961 : 1 7 lff . , 19 5 7 : 345ff . ; Power and 
Sicat 19 7l : esp . 70ff . ) .  
Moreover , the conditions for the provision of American 
foreign aid and the Japanese payment of reparations to As ian 
count ries cont ributed t o  the fact that American and Japanese 
enterprises in Southeast Asia were in a pos it ion to develop 
dis t ribut ion organizat ions . However , both count ries could 
generally deliver on ly costly goo ds of  high quality .  At the 
same t ime , however , there existed a market for goods of lower 
standard , which b ecause o f  the high cost of wages could not 
be produced in Japan an d the USA at acceptable prices . 
Investments  in Taiwan thus also  se rved to sat isfy this demand 
through existing trade organizat ions ( Jacoby 1966 : 33ff . , also 
Schreib er 19 70 : 2 9 ff . ) .  
Government-induced chan ges in locat ional condit ions . A 
maj or problem during the f irst years of postwar development 
was in flat ion . For example ,  be fore 1961 the average annual 
increase in prices of consumer goods was about 10 per cent . 
Moreove r ,  up to this t ime re gular changes in the mult iple 
exchange rate system had to b e  made . The exchange rate on 
the black market deviated accordingly from the official dollar 
rate . It was po ssible , nevertheless , to stab ilize exchange 
rat es and consumer pri ces by 195 8-60 . In 19 59 , after prices 
and exchange rates had been stab iliz ed , the system of mult iple 
exchange rat es was simplified and fore ign trade credit s were 
made availab le (Liang 19 68 : 365-6 ) . Furt hermore , the re­
transfer of invested capital in fo reign currency was guaranteed 
by the 1959  Stat ute  for Investment by Foreign Nat ionals and 
the 19 60 Statute  for Investment by Overseas Chinese ( see 
Tab le 38) . 
These laws were s upplemented by specific import relief 
for those foreign investors who cont ributed to the creat ion 
Tab le 38 
Development of exchange rates and cost of living in Taiwan , 1948-70 
Year Official exchange rate Black market rate % difference between Annual % rise in ( 1) ( 2 )  (2 ) and ( 1 )  cost of l iving 
1948 19 , 2 08 2 1 , 666 13  520  
1949a 80 , 000 2 35 , OOO 194 3 , 400 
1949b 5 . 0  5 . 87 1 7  7 6  
1950 10 . 3 11 . 82 15 306 
1951 10 . 35 - 15 . 65 2 7 .  00 73- 1 6 1  6 6  
1952 15 . 6 5 2 3 . 11 4 8  2 3  
1953  15 . 65 - 1 8 . 7 8  26 . 49 41- 69  8 . 8 
1954 18 . 78 30 . 31 61 2 . 4  
1955-5 7 2 4 . 78 - 35 . 38 38 . 53 9- 55 11 . 2  
1958 36 . 2 8 - 38 . 38 46 . 4 8 2 1- 2 8  1 . 4  
1959 38 . 38 - 40 . 06 45 . 2 6 13- 18 11 . 0  
1960-62 39 . 60 - 40 . 05 43 . 89 10- 11 7 . 0  
1963-70 40 . 10 41 . 60 4 3 . 2  
a Before monetary reform. b After monetary reform. 
Source : Dat a  from Bank of Taiwan and Central Bank of China.  
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of  the desired product ion struct ure through their capital 
investment . They were allowed to bring in all necessary 
machines and equipment pract ically duty free . The August 
1962 Stat ut e  for Technical Cooperation regulat ed the insurance 
of patent right s as a precondit ion for the implemen tat ion o f  
new technologi cal metho ds . 9 
The Kaohsitm.g Export Pro cessing Zone const ituted an 
att empt , through a comb ination of free trade zones and 
indust rial areas , to achieve the following obj ectives : 
1 .  to int erest foreign inves tors in Taiwan , 
2 .  to expand export s ,  
3 .  to create new j obs , and 
4 .  to impo rt mode rn technology . 
Foreign investors could make inves tments  in such zones 
if they fulfilled the following condit ions : 
1 .  they had to produce solely for export , 
2 .  the ir product s could not compete with Taiwanese 
exports , 
3 .  the world market had to be capable of ab sorb ing their 
products , and 
4 .  the import requirement s for f inishe d products could 
not exceed a ratio o f  0 . 8 .  
Investors who sat isfied these condit ions were provided 
with the following advant ages : 
9 
1 .  factory buildings were furnished at low rental rates 
and with leases running not less than ten y ears > 
2 .  a five-y ear exempt ion from payment of taxes and 
customs tariffs was grante d ,  
3 .  the t ransfer o f  capital and profit s was guaran teed 
See Stat ute for Inves tment by Foreign Nat ionals , Statut e  for 
for Investment by Overseas Chinese , Measures fo r Instalment 
Payments of Import Duty and Dues on Machinery and Equipment 
Imported by Product ive Enterprises , Statut e  for Technical 
Cooperation in Central Government (1962 : 1 28ff . , 1 37ff . ,  
1 2 l ff . ' 1 45ff� . 
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(KEPZA 19 68 ; Bank of  Amer ica 1968 : 16-17 ; Hs ing 19 71 : 
2 32 ff . ) .  Japanese entrepreneurs especially saw an 
opportunity here , through explo it at ion of cheaper 
Taiwanese labour , to prevent a decline in the profit 
margin for their expo rts - resul ting from the declin­
in g wage di fferential b etween Japan and the USA. 
Since the maj ority of the goods f inished in Taiwan by 
Japanese entrepreneurs were exported to the USA and since 
Japanese import rest rict ions did not permit a comparable 
pol icy on the part of Ameri can entrepreneurs , the Taiwanese 
zonal balance of t rade was negat ive with Japan and posit ive 
with the USA and other count ries taken as a group (Table 39 ) . 
Imports 
Exports 
Tab le 39  
Import s and export s o f  Taiwan Export 
Processing Zones , 1965-72 (US$mill . )  
Japan USA 
Trade balance 
2 37 
46 
191 
3 7  
2 5 9  
2 2 2  
Others 
102 
137  
35  
Source : Data from Kaohsiung Export Pro cessing Zone 
Administ rat ion . 
Shortening of adaptat ion period in industry and agriculture 
Private indus try 
Problems of private ent erprise about 19 60 . Three diff­
erent gro ups can be ident ified in Taiwanese privat e industry : 
1)  large in dustry , 2 )  middle-s cale indus try ,  and 3 )  cot tage 
industry .  Large indust ry was significant fo r the generat ion 
of the gro s s  nat ional product . As shown in Tab le 40 , large 
indus try operated at higher energy cos t s  and with a lower 
deman d for intermediate inputs . One can presume that this 
was the consequence of the use of modern machin ery , mo re 
integrated plant s , trained workers and a better product ion 
planning basis . 
Table 40 
Relat ive importance of Taiwan ' s  co tt age and medium-size indust ries , 1961 
Value or production 
Mate rial input s 
Fuel cons umed 
Electricity used 
Value added 
All companies 
NT $ mill . 
37 , 74 3 
16 , 5 32 
1 , 132 
7 76 
19 , 303 
Source : Cens us Report 1961 , pp . 362 
Companies with 
- 100 employees 
NT $ mill . 
1 3 , 389 
6 , 691 
402 
2 66 
6 , 2 31 
ff . 
As % of  all 
companies 
35 . 5  
40 . 5  
35 . 5  
34 . 3  
32 . 3 
Compan ies with 
100 employees 
NT $ mill . 
2 4 , 354 
9 , 841 
731 
510 
13 , 071 
As % of all 
companies 
64 . 5  
59 . 5  
64 . 5  
65 . 7 
6 7 . 7  
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Nevertheless , more than a third of industrial production 
was accoun ted for by other than large industry .  In so far 
as cott age indus try is concerned ,  the peculiarit ies of pro­
duct ion f inan cing and the high intersecto ral mob ility o f  
entrepreneurs are more essen tial for an understanding of  
Taiwanese development than their quantitative contribut ion 
to the gro ss nat ional product . 
Cot t age industry was defined as employing up t o  ten 
workers . Most of these were family memb ers . These indus tries 
were usually located in the dwelling of their owner . In 9 0  
per cent o f  cases the sole purpose of such indust ries was 
generally to secure the min imum level of sub s isten ce for the 
family . These ent repreneurs invested even when the return 
on capital was near zero or even when it dropped temporarily 
below zero . They were prepared in the sho rt term to engage 
in new areas of  product ion . Acco rdingly , it was not tlllusual 
to f ind o ccupat ional shift s from tailor to cobb ler to b icycle 
repairman . 
The banking sys tem made almo st no capital availab le to 
these en trepreneurs .  However , because family bus inesses were 
involved , pet ty entrepreneurs could turn in local c it iz ens , 
who , out o f  mistrust of  the revenue o ffice and out of lack 
of faith in the credit system ,  did not repo rt their savin gs 
to out siders . Accordingly , cot tage indust ry could induce a 
portion o f  the populat ion to invest their cash savings or to 
forgo consumpt ion , and thus t ap a source which otherwise 
woul d no t ordinarily have made funds availab le .  In spit e o f  
def icien cies , these investment s  proved the mo st economic 
ut iliz at ion of  a portion of local savings tlllder the exist ing 
so cial con ditions . 
The assessmen t o f  levies or  quotas on import s tlllder the 
policy of import subst itut ion made i t  especially dif f icult 
for these entrepreneurs to employ s carce fo re ign exchange 
fo r the purchase of raw materials and investment goods . The 
following example gives a good idea o f  the burdens placed on 
import s whi ch were not es sent ial fo r producing finished 
expo rt product s . 
Tax reftlllds were made at the earliest after s ix months 
had elapsed . During this period ,  however ,  the tax refund 
claimed could be taken into account in the import of new pro­
duct s .  As a result , in the case o f  the use o f  import s for 
the produ ct ion of goods dest ined for the domest ic market ,  
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co sts were incurred in part through the high taxes and in 
part as a result of the high in terest on credit . Even when 
a small industry attempted to import unfin ished materials 
for the production of compet it ive export goods , the tax reft.m.d 
system and the cap ital market condit ions created such a heavy 
financial burden that every material incent ive disappeared . 
These entrepreneurs thus limi ted themselves to the purchase 
of us ed or local capital goods , and to the use of unfinished 
mat erials produced in Taiwan (see Tab le 41) . 
Tab le 41 
Tariff and tax burden (relief ) on imported 
raw materials and capital goods , 1959-60 
Burden ( Reli ef ) 
Tariff / Tax as % of tax b ase/ 
init ial value 
Import levy 30 
Tariff /Defence tax a 2 0-2 6 
Harbour tax a 3-4 
Excise tax a 30-39 
Tax rebate for 
export of man u-
f actured goods - 72 
a Taxes cumulative at each level . 
Source : Data from Bank of Taiwan . 
Total price 
in it ial value 
- 100 
130 
1 5 6- 1 64 
160- 1 70 
199-220 
1 2 7- 1 48 
The des ire to assure a minimum level of sub s is tence was 
also an important mot ive for running Taiwanese middle-scale 
industry . A number of the owners of  these firms , which con­
sisted of from 10 to 100 employees ,  nevertheless b egan to 
build up savings in order to invest in their own business on 
a profitab ility basis . According to est imates made by Warmelo , 
around 1960 approximately one-third of  thes e entrepreneurs 
began to keep books of accoun t . 
These business es were con t inuously in family ownership . 
An insurmountab le aversion existed against the inclusion of 
outside partners for purposes of raising the generally in­
sufficient equity capital base . This small equity capital 
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b ase and the frequent lack of books of account lowered the 
credit rel iability of these bus inesses . As a result , a 
portion of long-term investment was f inanced by short-term 
credit s .  Thes e credits were ob tained from private lenders 
at in teres t rates of  2 to  3 per cent per mon th . Large indus­
try , on the o ther han d ,  was able to ob tain bank credit s at 
an interest  rate of  about 1 per cent per mon th (Warmelo 196 7 : 
2 ff . ; Hsing 19 71 : 189 ; also Meng 19 7 0) . 
In addit ion to undercapitaliz at ion , st ill another prob lem 
arose  during 1958-59 for tho se entrepreneurs whose primary 
obj ective was not making pro fit s .  Up to this t ime their 
capital ut ilizat ion was no t even half of capacity . Table 42 
gives a good view of this situat ion , as it include s those 
branches in which middle- scale industry was predominan tly 
involved . 
Adopt ion of innovat ions with government as s istance . 
During the pro cess of  mo dernizat ion the state not only influ­
enced the development of private industry through the inst ru­
ments des cribed , but also through state ent erprises which at 
times as sumed the direct entrepreneurial funct ions of private 
industry , as is highlighted by th e followin g example . 
Tab le 42 
Degree of capacity utilizat ion in 
selected Taiwan indust ries , 1959 (% ) 
Indus try Capacity ut iliz at ion 
Paper 
Met al product s and household 
equipment 
Sewing machines 
Yarn 
Synthetic product s 
Plywood 
Fans 
Shoes (synthet ic mat erial) 
Source : Minis try for Economic Affairs (1960) . 
6 7  
65 
64 
53 
50 
47 
38 
2 3  
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The state sugar indus try and the privat e banana producers 
were dependen t  on the Japanes e market . In personal discus s ions 
the representatives of t he sugar industry pointed out t ime 
and again that the security of their own posit ion in society 
could not be made dependent on the pro fit mot ives of foreign 
merchan ts . They therefore built up a system of sales dist ri­
but ion which was more res istant to cris is situations but 
therefore also less profitab le in the short term. The private 
banana exporters , on the other hand , chose the greater short­
term pro fits arising from co-operation with Japanese merchants 
and thus waived set t ing up their own distribut ion sys tem.  
In 19 7 1-72 a new orientation took place in Japanese 
industry and with it also a change unfavourable to Taiwan in 
the attitudes of Japanese merchants . At the same t ime , Latin 
American banana export ers offered higher trade margins to 
Japanese mer chant s .  Addit ionally , thes e bananas were also 
sold illlder their own trademark . The result was that Taiwanese 
bananas were largely driven from the Japanes e market . 
Taiwan was not prepared to give up the foreign currency 
deriving from banana export s . Since the private banana 
exporters had no experience in the opening of Japanese 
market s ,  memb ers of the Taiwanese sugar in dust ry had to j ump 
in to fill the gap . They temporar ily took over banana exports 
and at the same time t ransmit ted to the private b anana ex­
porters the en trepreneurial know-how necessary for the open ing 
of foreign market s . 10 
In addit ion to this direct assistance , state industry 
also cont ribut ed to the developmen t of private industry by 
influencing the mot ivat ion structure , as the following 
example shows . 
Employment in a st ate enterpris e increas ingly became a 
status symbol , even for the ordinary workers . This strength­
ened their des ire to ob tain a pos it ion in a state enterpris e .  
They often began their act ivities as unskilled workers in 
the smallest industries . After a certain period of t ime they 
attempt ed t o  ob tain one of the scarce posit ions in middle 
s cale indus try , thereafter in pr ivate large indust ry ,  and 
finally in state industry . This led , on the one hand , to 
sharp labour fluctuations and to a worker select ion sys t em 
lOAccordin g  t o  documents  o f  the Taiwan Sugar Corporat ion . 
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adverse to small and middle-scale indus try ( CIECD 1967 ) . 
On the other hand , it st imulated some o f  the large private 
entrepreneurs to establish training centres for those p ersons 
who were t o  take pos it ions in their enterprises as apprentices 
or mast ers . 11 
The b ehavioural change of private Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
in the matt er of employee training was one of the first 
indi cat ions of the increasing preparedness on the part of 
private entrepreneurs to adapt to n ew circumstances (Parsons  
1954 : 137-8 ) . This was in part accounted for by  the increasing 
prest ige which was init ially attached to entrepreneurial 
activity in state enterpri ses and subs equently to ent re­
preneurial act ivity of all kinds . This transference of the 
high social status of state ent erprise had thus led to a 
change in the pres tige hierarchy of the society . 
As Mcclelland ( 1966 : 2 26ff . ) has shown , status is an 
incentive part icularly when it appears to individuals that 
such a higher st atus can in fact be obt ained . Aft er both 
fo reign and state entrepreneurs had demonstrated that suc­
cess ful en trepreneurial act ivity was possible in diverse 
economic b ranches tmder the exis t ing circumstances , the 
necessary condit ions fo r the exploitat ion of a class-specific 
s tatus men t al ity were established . 
The s t at e  thereby insured the diffusion of ent repreneurial 
ab ilit ies , partly through training,  through writ ten inform­
at ion and through advice concerning the state b anking system ,  
and part ly through the co-operat ion of  state and private 
ent erprises in certain industrial areas . 12 Moreover , the 
ins t itut ion s  des cribed insured the dif fus ion of innovat ions 
and the pro fitab ility of every investment that contributed 
t o  import subst itut ion (Nabs eth and Ray 197 4 : esp . 2 9 9 ff . ) .  
This policy is examined in greater detail in the following 
example with respect to selected product s .  As shown in Table 
43 , the price dif ferent ial b etween domest ic and foreign goods 
dropped in the period b etween 1960 and 1966 . Nevertheless , 
11Acco rdin g  to document s  of the Taiwan Provincial Governmen t , 
Department of Educat ion . 
12Law Revis ions Planning Group of the Execut ive Yuan , 
' Statute for Encouragement o f  Investment ' ,  Enforcement 
Rules of the Republic of China , Second Series , Taipei 1963 , 
pp . 3ff . 
Table 4 3  
Price comEarisons between selected dome s t ic and foreign product s ,  
1960 and 1966 (NT $ )  
1960 1966 Product Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic 
Rayon yam , 32 . 2  kg 5 , 460 11 , 000 5 ,  7 2 7  6 , 800 
Cot ton yam , 2 0  kg 6 , 384 8 , 900 6 , 4 84 7 , 500 
PVC , mill . tonnes 14 ' 960 2 1 , 100 10 , 145 1 3 , 165 
Refrigerators 5 ,  720 8 , 800 6 , 39 7  
Packing paper , mill . tonnes 10 , 2 08 12 , 540 9 , 880 
Sewing machines 660 800 52 9 
Source : Estimate d  from tmpublished stat ist ics of the Provincial Department of  
Reconst ruct ion and the Foreign Trade Bureau , Ministry of Economic Affairs . 
6 , 500 
9 , 9 30 
450 
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it was no t possible during this period for the domes t ic yarn 
industry , for example , to reduce it s cost s t o  such a level 
that it was competit ive with imports . 
The cost of imported yarn was therefore increased by 
cust oms tariffs and taxes . Refrigerators were also protected , 
s ince price competitiveness was in sufficient to assure their 
market . On the othe r han d ,  it was possible t o  decrease 
cos t s  in the domestic product ion of packaging paper and 
sewing machines . Here the state was even ab le to b egin 
s lowly to lift the protective tariffs on these products . 
The quest ion of protect ive tariffs did not play a role for 
the raw mat erial PVC .  Firms producing for the domestic market 
were required to use domest ic raw mat erials . Ent erprises 
producing for export , howeve r ,  were free to choose where 
they would buy their raw mat erials , so that domestic producers 
of  PVC seeking to supply export-oriented industry had to 
underb id their fore ign compet it ors in price and quality . 
Foreign trade and tax policies thus b ecame flexible 
instrumen ts for modernizat ion . The high burdens placed on 
impo rts init ially insured the profitab ility of domestic 
enterpris es . The con tinuous reduction of these pro tect ive 
measures increas ingly forced domestic entrepreneur s to 
modernize their bus inesses . 
After their in it ial successes in Taiwan , a number of 
the lo cal entrepreneurs did not limit their investmen t s  solely 
to their own country . Part ially to develop their own entre­
preneurial ab ilit ies and partially to open foreign markets 
or to ob tain raw materials from fo reign count ries , the Tai­
wanese entrepreneurs b egan in 1963-64 to develop foreign 
partnership firms . In doing so , Taiwan primarily made ent re­
preneurial know-how available to less developed As ian coun­
tries , while the greatest share of the necessary capital was 
provided by the respect ive developing country . In S ingapore , 
for example ,  the Taiwanese preferred investments in import­
replacing industries which also created market s for Taiwanese 
raw materials or semi-fin ished input s (Hughes and You 1969 : 
140ff . ) .  
Agricultural development 
Mechanizat ion of agriculture . In the postwar per iod , 
technological pre ssures to influence the entrepreneurial 
b ehaviour of the farmer , such as the distribut ion of water 
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and artifi cial fert iliz ers , were limited to rice product ion . 
For other product s ,  advice and demonstrat ion occupied the 
central posit ion in the diffus ion of innovat ions . The state 
was interes ted in transmitting to the farmer the knowledge 
availab le in various state institut ions . The banking system, 
the JCRR and the state indust rial enterprises , in addit ion 
to the co-operat ives , were of central importance in this 
respect . 
One of the basic experiences o f  the bank managers was 
land reform, in the pro cess of which two programs with 
separate obj ectives were carri ed out . In the course of exe­
cut ion of the first program ( rent control law) , deficien cies 
in adminis trat ion and goals could be identif ied and eliminated .  
Since the se cond program (redis tribut ion o f  land ) began before 
the weaken ing of the init ial elan which accompanied the st art 
of the reforms , its execut ion was lit t le hindered by the 
failures of the earl ier program.  
In 195 7  the  Cooperat ive Bank at tempt ed on the basis of  
these experiences to es tab lish an effective bond between 
advice and the granting of credit . It s Commodity Loans 
Program was supplemented one year lat er by the state-supervised 
Agricult ural Credit Pro gram. 
Following this , the Agri cultural Credit Planning Board 
was founded , and 300 million $NT from the US Aid Counterpart 
Fund were made availab le for it s use . The Unified Agricultural 
Credit Program, created by this institut ion , then replaced 
the measures des cribed above . The economic situat ion of the 
farmer was not treated in such a manner that the future 
harvest suff iced as security for farm credit s .  The contract ing 
partner o f  the farmer was always the  co-operat ive . Two-
thirds of the funds of the Agricultural Credit Fund were 
direct ly available to the co-operat ives . The co-operat ives 
obtained the remaining third through the Land Bank and the 
Cooperat ive Bank . The banks were required to make availab le 
from the ir own resources 2 0  per cent of  the credit s granted 
by them through the co-operat ives to the farmers .  The 
Farmers '  Associat ions had to make available to the Unified 
Agricultural Credit Pro gram 70 per cent of the depo sit s  
stemming from agriculture . 13 
13  
S ee ' Agricultural credit and cooperatives in Taiwan ' ;  also 
JCRR 1965 . 
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This system was supplemen ted in 1962 by a land consoli­
dat ion program sustained by the JCRR , but this did not prove 
very success ful . Through the consolidation of individual 
land parcels , this program was intended to lead to better 
ut ilizat ion of water , pest icides and art ificial fert iliz ers 
and to create the necessary condit ions for mechaniz ation o f  
agricult ure .  In the course o f  execut ion o f  this program, 
two problems relat ing to the status symbol of land ownership 
arose (Huang 19 6 7 : esp . 2 4 ff . ) .  First of  all ,  it contributed 
to the improvemen t of the soil . Each fanner now considered 
his own parcel to be the b est . Almos t no one was prepared 
to exchange land . In the second place , each farmer based 
his social prest ige on the land that he po ssessed . Fanners 
thus sought to prevent a decl ine in the social status of 
their sons by arranging for divis ion of the property amongst 
them whi ch threatened to make unpro fit able small fanns out 
o f  profit able enterprises . 
Unde r these circwnstances the lan d consolidat ion proj ect 
concentrated init ially on areas where the state could exercise 
direct in fluen ce ,  either as a lessor or as a partner of the 
Taiwan Sugar Corporat ion . Proj ects carried out in this 
manner served as demonstration examples for the remaining 
farmers . 14 
Modernizat ion was also promoted by the state from 1965 
when it began to include not on ly the Taiwan Sugar Corporat ion 
but also the Taiwan Power Comp any in it s fann ext ension 
training program.  The employees of these ent erprises were 
t rained in this pro gram to advise indust rial entrepreneurs 
and farm owners about the most  efficient use of energy . 
S in ce nearly all farms at this t ime were serviced by the 
elect ri cal power sys t em,  mo st fanners were included in this 
advisory sys tem through the receiving agents  o f  the Taiwan 
Power Company .  
These receiving agents generally came from farm back­
grounds themselves . They were familiar with the cost structure 
for elect rical energy and were thus in a posit ion to explain 
th e cost savings which could be made by the ut iliz at ion o f  
elect rical powe r.  They knew who in the Taiwan Power Company 
could provide further in formation and how ' the neighbours ' 
had decided on such mat ters . S ince these receiving agen t s  
were ac cepted as opinion leaders because of the ir pos it ion 
14Accordin g to do cuments of the JCRR. 
Period 
1913- 2 3  
192 3-37  
19 3 7-40 
1946-51 
195 1-60 
1960-6 8 
1968- 71 
Tab le 44 
Annual growth rates of agricultural imports  
1913-71 ( % )  
Working days Land Investment capital 
1 . 5  0 . 9  6 . 1  
1 . 3 0 . 8 6 . 2  
2 . 1  0 . 2  -1 . 6  
0 . 4 0 . 4  4 . 2  
3 . 5 0 . 3 2 . 4  
1 . 2  0 . 3 4 . 4  
-0 . 8 0 . 2  4 . 9 
Source : Chen and Lee (1972 ) . 
Working capital 
10 . 6  
5 . 8  
0 . 1 
2 3 . 5  
8 . 5  
9 . 4  
7 . 8  
· 1 20 
as employees of a state enterprise and as memb ers of farm 
familie s ,  they exe rcised an impo rtant function in the modern­
izat ion process . Together with the measures analysed above , 
they contribut ed to the st ructural changes in agricult ural 
input s ob servab le in Table 44 , which shows a shift of the 
input st ruct ure from lab our and land intens ive product ion 
to greater use o f  capi tal investment and cap it al goods . 15 
Income aspirat ion s and the mob ility of agricult ural 
labourers . During the land reform about two-thirds of  the 
Taiwanese labour fo rce was engaged in agriculture . The land­
to-labour rat io which resulted f rom this labour dist ribut ion 
became a determining factor for the size of ent erprises and 
the factor int ensity in the agricultural sector . The product­
ivity o f  t he labour factor changed in the years subsequent 
to lan d re form because o f  the import of  technical innovations . 
For families of unchanged size , the farm acreage had to be 
in creased by 50 per cent between 195 3 and 1960 , and in the 
two or three years following by st ill another 3 3  per cent , 
if the farm family were to maint ain the share o f  it s income 
derived f rom agr icul ture . 16 The exten s ive fragmentat ion and 
terrac ing of land proved to b e  a large hindrance to such a 
policy ,  as did the regulations  of the Agrarian Refo rm Law,  
whi ch limited addit ional purchases of l an d .  A reduct ion of 
the numb er o f  family memb ers working on the farms was thus 
suggested under these circumstances as an alt ernative 
solut ion to secure ris ing farm income per head . 
One incent ive for the migrat ion from agriculture can 
issue from a wage differential . In fact , there were several 
sectors in Taiwan in 1960 which paid higher wages than agri­
culture . These sectors , however ,  required either scarce 
highly-qualifie d employees , as in the pet rochemical industry ,  
or seasonal workers , as in the food industry .  As shown in 
Table 45 , wages for tmskilled workers were higher in agri­
culture than in th e bulk of indus t ry .  Moreover , the housing 
prob lems in the urban areas of Taiwan did little to att ract 
the rural populat ion . As a result , there was hardly any 
incent ive to leave agriculture . 
15According to document s of the Taiwan Power Company . On the 
issue of j o in t management training of the Taiwan Sugar 
Corporat ion and the Taiwan Power Company , see also Joslin 
( 19 7 1 : 24 ££ . ) .  
16see CIECn, raiwan Sta tis tical Data Boo k, 1972 , p . 8 ;  also 
Taiwanese Provinc ial Government ( 19 66 : 2 1 )  and Hsieh and 
Rut tan ( 1968 : 30 7 ff . ) . 
Table 45 
Relat ive income levels o f  employees ' households , 
1959 {Agricultural income = 100 ) 
12 1 
Industry Index number 
Petro chemicals 
Transport at ion equipment 
Food processing 
Rubber product s 
Agriculture 
Cement and marb le 
Woodworking 
Bas ic met als 
Chemical s  excluding pet rochemicals 
Nonelect rical machines 
Elect rical machines 
Paper and paper products 
Textiles 
Source : DGBAS (1964)  and CIECD (19 62 ) . 
199 
181 
� 3  
119 
100 
96 
90 
87 
85 
83 
80 
69 
54 
Furthermore , becaus e of the measures accompanying land 
reform, the prof it motive was well developed among the farmer s .  
I t  is t rue that tradit ional social mores cont ribut ed t o  the 
fact that the farmers , with the help of their families , were 
able to lay as ide some real savings . Nevertheles s , not all 
tmemployed memb ers o f  the labour force could b e  ab sorbed 
through such measures . As a result , the farmers themselves 
pressured some of their family memb ers to leave agriculture . 
A process b egan which fails to confo rm to the theory of 
Lewis ' s ,  which holds that wages have usually to be about 30 
per cent higher in the capitalist (modern ) sector to induce 
a flow of labour to leave agriculture ( 1954 : 15 0 ) . In Taiwan , 
in dust rial t e chnology was mainly l abour-intens ive at this 
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stage and wages were a decis ive cost factor in indust rial 
compet it iveness . Labour demand was st rong only for the 
techni cally t rained . Indust rial entrepreneurs were thus by 
no means forced to pay higher wages than those o f  agriculture . 
Table 46 shows that high tm.employment levels led to a suf­
ficient labour supply out s ide of  agriculture , in spite of 
low industrial wages . 
Between 1960 and 1970  the rat io b etween agricultural 
and industrial wages deteriorated . As shown by a comparison 
of  Tables 45 and 4 7 ,  agricult ural income of  unskilled workers 
in 19 60 was among the highest of in comes , while in 19 7 0  it 
was a100n g  the lowes t .  
Table 46 
Average unemployment in Taiwan , 1951- 70 ( % )  
Period 
19 51-55 
1956-60 
1 9 61-7 0  
Agriculture 
Males Females 
3 . 6 
3 . 7 
2 . 8 
54 . 8  
5 6 . 2  
5 3 . 2 
Source : Ho (1972 : 221) . 
Other areas 
Males Females 
11 . 4  
7 . 5  
4 . 9 
7 7 . 5  
75 . 8  
64 . 2  
During the same perio d ,  the increase in technology in 
agriculture led to a decreasing demand fo r labour in this 
sector , while indust rializ at ion led to an increas in g  demand 
for lab our in th e secondary secto r .  For example , a s  a result 
o f  the int ro duct ion of the single-axled tractor alone , the 
demand for labour was reduced by 10 per cent (Wu 1 9 72 : 18 ) . 
The rural populat ion , owing to these developments , declined 
for the first time in the period 19 6 8-71 ( Table 4 8 ) . 
The in come opportunit ies exist ing out side agricult ure 
we re of course ob served first by the farmers who were best 
educat ed e conomically .  It now became a problem to convince 
these to remain in farming and thus to prevent an outflow o f  
those workers most likely t o  promote agricult ural development . 
Tab le 47  
Structure of labour income in Taiwan , 197 0  
(Agriculture = 100)  
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Indus try Index number 
Agriculture , unskilled 
Food proces sing 
Combust ion engines 
Rubber product s 
Iron manufacturing 
Chemicals excluding pet rochemicals 
Cement and marble 
NF-metal manufacturing 
Woodworking 
Text iles 
Paper 
Electrical equipment 
Transportat ion equipment 
Pet rochemicals 
Average non-f arm labour in come 
Source : Based on data from DGBAS and CIECD . 
Tab le 48 
Migration out of agriculture , 1952 - 7 1  
Rural b irth Agricultural 
100 
12 5 
13 1 
13 9 
164 
166 
171  
193 
197 
2 03 
2 35 
2 39 
2 44 
350 
145 
Period ratea i . a out-m grat 1on Migrat ion rate 
( 1 )  {2 ) (2 ) : 
1952-55 2 . 8  0 . 7  0 . 3 
1956-59 2 . 5  2 . 2  0 . 9 
1960-63 2 . 8  2 . 1  0 . 7  
1964-67 3 . 7 2 . 8  0 . 7 
1968- 7 1  4 . 3 5 . 6  1 . 3 
a % of total populat ion . 
Source : Based on data from JCRR, Manpower Sect ion . 
( 1 )  
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Development of a new prest ige hierarchy . A feature o f  
Taiwanese development up t o  1964-65 was the fact that non­
agricultural workers as a general rul e  initially took a j ob 
located near their family ' s  farm. To be specific , the 
locat ion of employment for 64 per cent of the men and 83 per 
cen t  of the women was not more than 30 minutes from their 
home . Only 11 per cen t of the men lived more than an hour 
from their place of work , but after a certain lapse of t ime , 
this group usually moved t o  the c it ies . 
In addition to profit motives , non-economic mot ives 
were also  determining factors for a change of j obs  for those 
workers who sought cont inuous employmen t out side of agri­
culture . Thus , about one-third of these took posit ions as 
t eachers or  civil servant s .  Here the high social prest ige 
of being a state official probably had some influence in the 
choice of professions . Nearly half of the female labour 
force took positions in indust ry in order to save up for a 
dowry and thus to att ain a socially higher status through 
marriage . Primarily through family ass is tance , about 10 per 
cent of those who left agricult ure were able to establish 
their own small industrial firm. S ince a share of these 
small ent repreneurs played a si gnificant role in the modern­
izat ion of agriculture , this process of assistance will be 
analysed b elow (T siu and Lin 1964 : llff . ) .  
As already noted , through the co-operat ives the JCRR 
granted sub s idies otherwise no t available for the int roduct ion 
of new methods of cult ivat ion or hyb rid seed . The proj ects 
were divided regionally in such a manner that the largest 
po ssible demonstrat ion e ffect was achieved .  After such a 
proj ect had proved profitable , other farmers within a given 
period could ob tain credits from a Revolving Fund on condit ions 
more favourable than thos e available from the banks . It was 
now seen that a certain group of persons in each region were 
prepared in itially to carry out the proj ect s .  Moreover , it  
was clear that the t ime lag between the st art of  the pioneer 
proj ect and the application of other farmers for the provision 
of resources from the Revolving Fund was decreas ing . As a 
result , a hierarchy in agriculture based on performance and 
on ent repreneurial att itudes began . 
This credit policy was comb ined with intens ive consult­
ation , whi ch also included dis cus sion s concerning the purchase 
of  machines and equipment .  This led t o  further training of 
that group o f  persons which enj oyed increas ing social prest ige 
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in the previously noted hierarchy . In addit ion , because o f  
frequent consultations and the sub sequent economic success , 
a special trust relat ionship developed b etween the co­
operatives and this group . An addit ional result of this 
policy was an increase in mechaniz at ion , leading to the 
problem of servicing agricult ural machines and equipment 
(Wu 1972 : 2 ff . ) .  
At this t ime there was a s carcity of technicians in 
the cit ies as well as in rural areas . A trans fer of experts 
from the cit ies to agriculture would have been quite costly 
and would also have exacerbated the scarcity of experts in 
urban areas . It therefore appeared cheaper to train add­
it ional workers . This , however ,  result ed in financing 
difficult ies . It was also necessary that workers so trained 
should remain in agricultur e .  The problem involved was thus 
one o f  labour mob ility . 
Under these circumstances , the co-operatives - at the 
initiat ive of the JCRR - suggested to those farmers who were 
open to innovat ion s that  they allow certain family memb ers 
to be trained to service agricultural machines and equipment . 
This t raining was to b e  finan ced via their share of the 
inheritance , so that train ing support ive of technology would 
replace the division of inherited estates . One could expect 
these t rained technicians to tmdertake the servicing of 
agricultural machines and equipment with due cons ideration 
of their special respons ib ility . The inheritance right s 
remaining after finan cin g  of training were to b e  compensated 
by the t emporary provision of living quarters on the farms 
and by the provision of  start ing capit al . 
The technicians trained in this manner now carved out 
a market for their s ervices in the vicinity of the farms of  
their parents . Later , aft er they had left the farms , they 
were gen erally not interested in moving to the cit ies and 
los ing their customers . 1 7  
The newly developed prestige hierarchy in rural areas 
is particularly clear if on e takes in to accotmt the changes 
in the b ehaviour of seasonal workers and small farmers aft er 
1964-66 and the changing o f  educat ional st ructure in rural 
areas . Before 1965 , the p ercentage of those who left the 
agricult ural sector on a temporary basis was three t imes 
1 7According t o  document s  o f  the CIECD , Manpower Department . 
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larger than those who took up full-t ime j obs  out side o f  
agriculture . About one-half of these seasonal wo rkers came 
from small farms and worked as helpers in other areas of 
agriculture during the harvest season . The o ther half took 
up j obs  for one or two years in road construction , mining 
or other areas of the economy (Lin 19 7 3 : 2 06 ;  Tsui and Lin 
1964 : 14 ££ . ) .  After 1965 , the greatest trans fer o f  labour 
came from this circle of workers . Mos t  of the wo rkers under 
35 years of age had only an elementary school or j unior high 
school educat ion . Neve rtheles s ,  about one-half of those 
with a j unior high school education and about one-third of 
those with a high school educat ion remained in agricul ture . 
Agri cultural workers who had not completed educat ion - in 
19 64-65 st ill about 40 per cent of the rural populat ion -
hardly had a chance to find work out side o f  the agricultural 
sector . 
Because of th ese educat ional differences and also 
because of the emphasis on performan ce ,  a n ew hierarchy 
developed on the farms . The prest ige leaders were familiar 
with inter-sectoral income differences , but it was the neigh­
b ouring farm and the poorly educated farm worker that served 
as their b asis for income comparisons . They valued the status 
o f  a success ful landowning farmer higher than that of a well­
paid technician living anonymously in the city . This might 
explain why the sons of those farmers who carried out the 
pioneer proj ects , in sp it e o f  their educat ion , o ften took 
up a j ob in the local co-operat ive and did not as sume a 
pos it ion in industry . 18 
Governmen t-assisted shorten ing of the adaptat ion period 
The example of Taiwanese development in the colon ial 
and post-co lonial period indi cates that economic development 
requires ent repreneurial know-how in agriculture an{l indus t ry 
even in the initial st ages of  the modernizat ion process . 
Unlike the Japanese , however , the Chinese aft er 1945 did not 
have a modern entrepreneurial system at their disposal . The 
att empt to close this gap through overseas Chines e ,  as in 
the pre-colonial period , proved in the shadow of the Korean 
War to be of limited success , b ecause the pos sible expansion 
of this conflict to Taiwan could not b e  ignored . Under 
these circums t ances , the state did not limit it self to the 
18According to do cuments of  the JCRR. 
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shaping o f  local condit ions for foreign investment .  Rather , 
state entrepreneurs and ins t itut ions had to be placed in a 
pos ition where they could influence directly the process es 
of innovat ion and adap tation in the indus trial sector . 
As a result o f  the initial sp irit created by land 
reform, the domestic political pressure on polit ical decis ion­
makers was reduced .  With respect to strategi cally important 
Taiwan , the ' cold war ' affected pub lic opinion in the US to 
such a degree that nearly every desire for technical and 
capital ass istance was granted up to 195 8-60 . The polit ical 
decision-makers thus had available sufficient means and t ime 
in order to achieve the following obj ect ives : 
(a) to  build up a modern system of state enterprise ; 
(b ) t o  familiarize  part o f  the administ rat ion with 
economic prob lems and to ob tain informat ion about 
resources and economic relationships ;  
( c )  t o  establish special o ffices , research inst itut ions 
and credit inst itutions  for the transmiss ion of 
know-how; 
( d) to  ob t ain through the army a ' mobile reserve ' fo r 
the b ridging of bottlenecks . 
Between 195 8  and 1965 the political decision-makers 
in the USA pressured the Chinese to develop the industrial 
sector in such a · way that further growth would be possib le 
without development aid .  Moreover , it b ecame necessary to 
create  new j ob s  outside of the agri cultural secto r .  Under 
these circumstances , the polit ical elites changed local 
condit ions to such a degree that fo reign investment was 
possib le . At the same t ime , imports of goods were facilit ated . 
The resulting compet it ion and the risk that failures in 
economic performance could cause the loss of the income and 
prest ige base forced state  entrepreneurs init ially to adapt 
their ab ilities cont inuously to foreign compet it ion . 
Tax and credit policies with respect to private indust ry 
now b ecame instrument s  of state inst itut ions for the trans­
mission o f  entrepreneurial know-how . The system of demon­
strat ion , consultation and trainin g ,  as t ied to the credit 
policy , was now supplemented by co-operat ion b etween private 
and stat e  enterprises . The t ariff policy contributed 
init ially t o  the fact that private ent repreneurs could pro­
duce goods at a profit for the domest ic market . 
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The development o f  a new pres t ige hierarchy in urban 
and rural areas and the cont inuous reduct ion of  mat erial 
privileges for domestic private entrepreneurs led to an 
increasing sectoral mobility in private indus try .  The differ­
ential in know-how between Taiwanese and foreigners , as 
developed during th e co lonial period , became smaller . An 
increas ing percen tage o f  privat e entrepreneurs was in a 
pos it ion to export to and invest  ab ro ad , that is , to compet e 
with the entrepreneurs of indust rial countries . 
Chapt er 6 
The prest ige economy and aggressive evo lut ion 
The adaptation and adopt ion of entrepreneurial and 
technical know-how availab le in indust rial count ries is 
helpful for the development of private enterprise in a 
developin g country . Processes of adaptat ion and adopt ion 
are promo ted by foreign entrepreneurs in so far as they 
improve their own condit ions of product ion . The hindrance 
of such processes by foreign entrepreneurs cannot be excluded , 
however , i f  these fear impairmen t o f  local condit ion s by such 
processes ( Fig . 8) .  
The decis ion-makers relied on their experience in cris is 
s ituat ions in the shaping of mot ivat ional structure . Because 
of the significance of this experience for the format ion of 
the strategy which enab led Taiwan to develop a system of 
modern ent erprises a few aspects o f  power crises will once 
again be presented here . 
These crises developed at a period of declining per 
capita income , that is , at a t ime when the income necessary 
to guarantee a minimum level of existence was of increas ing 
importance . Relying on Arndt , we def ine the desire for 
security of existence as a form of express ion of  the actual 
income mot ivat ion . On the other hand ,  we define the desire 
for prest ige without income as actual prest ige mo t ivat ion . 
The des ire for monetary income with a prestige character we 
define as a pres tige income . 
Workers , farmers , soldiers and civil servants were com­
parat ively dependen t on an es tablished society s ince they 
lacked the prerequis ites for emigrat ion . The smaller their 
income , the more the ir b ehaviour was determined by actual 
income mot ivat ion at the cost  of the des ire for prest ige 
income in Veb len ' s  sense . This sub s t itut ional process went 
han d in hand with a process o f  development of the will , in 
the course of which the legitimat ion o f  decis ion-makers as an 
elite was increasingly p laced in question . The more strongly 
1 29 
1 30 
Categories 
I n novator 
Ada pter a nd 
early Ad o pter 
E a rly majority 
Late majority 
Lagga rds 
B 
2 3 
Years 
4 
----
5 6 
A Certain entreprene urs promo ted by foreign interes ts . 
B Other domes tic entrepreneurs promo ted by government. 
Fig . 8  Dissemination of application of modern-know how in a 
develop ing country. 
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the tradit ional sector o f  the populat ion was integrated in 
this  s ituat ion , that is , the further the process of sub s t i­
tut ion had developed at the cost of  tradit ional patterns of 
behaviour , the great er the appearance o f  danger to the ruling 
system aris ing out of t he change in the mot ivat ional struct ure . 
The pos it ion o f  power o f  t he decis ion-makers , along 
with the ir social status , was t ied to ab il ities and character­
ist ics related to the social system, such as a close knowledge 
of laws and regulat ions and affiliat ion with a given clan . 
Becaus e of the ir posit ion of  power , these elites were in a 
position ,  through cap it al trans fers abroad as well , to 
satisfy the requirements for the acquisit ion of prest ige 
income . Nevertheiess , they could hardly expect to achieve 
a status in a foreign polit ical sys tem,  such as that of the 
USA which satisfied their desire for prestige . The fact 
that these  elites remained in Taiwan is thus a result of the 
subst itution of prestige income for actual prest ige . 
The modern entrepreneurial know-how acquired in the 
modern sector of th e economy allowed the economic elite to 
exploit their profit opportun it ies in various lo cat ions . 
Their bus iness con tact s  and th e sy stem of clans also made it 
easier to make internat ional capital transfers . They were 
thus in a position , as were the polit ical elites , to satisfy 
the requirements  for acquisition of a prest ige income out s ide 
of Taiwan . However ,  contrary to the assumpt ions of the 
principle of individualism, the profits made by these entre­
preneurs were not their sole property . Rather , the family 
was much more instrumental in det ermining how these means 
would b e  used . This  dependence on tradit ional patterns of 
behaviour led to the sit uat ion that the act ual income mot i­
vat ion of the family memb ers had priority in t imes of cris is o 
Hence , through the vehicle of a status mentality , a part ial 
subst itut ion of the des ire for prest ige income through real 
income motivation o ccurred . 
On these grounds the poli cy for developmen t of domes t ic 
enterprise was based on the following elements : 
1 .  Limitat ions on the opport unities to obtain income 
and prest ige lead to changes in b ehaviour . Changes 
in behaviour arise out of the comb ined influence o f  
a prest ige mentality and social pressures . 
2 .  Pro cesses of sub s t itut ion at the cos t o f  prest ige 
income are concomitant with d is in tegrat ion of the 
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societ y .  A s imultaneous emergence o f  foreign threats 
to the exis t ing system of power touches upon the 
fo\llldat ions of the political de cis ion-makers ' striving 
fo r income and p res t ige . 
3 .  In such t imes of crisis a fllllct ional relat ionship 
exis ts between these subst itution processes in the 
economic area and the legit imation pro cesses in the 
po lit ical area . Resolut ion of such crises thus pre­
s upposes changes in both the po lit ical and economic 
areas . 
We define an economy whose developmen t is largely 
characterized by th e cons ideration of  these elements as a 
pres tige economy . This development in Taiwan began in each 
case during the reform pe riod with the at tempt , through 
social pressures , to force a correlation of prestige mentality 
with economic success . 
The approach followed in Taiwan was evolutionary , since 
it represented an at tempt to bring about a long-term change 
in all social groups through planned ac t ion . It was aggres­
sive , s in ce it ' pl.lll ished ' economic failure by a loss of 
prestige and thu s led in the short term to a change in the 
personnel make-up of the economic elites . The s tart of 
aggressive evolution is marked by that poin t  in t ime at which 
the elements no ted above became the bases o f  act ion for the 
polit ical elites and at which their reactive behaviour shifted 
to part ially planned ac t ion . 
The aggress ive measures init ially encompassed the system 
of  connnl.lllication within the economic and polit ical areas as 
well as b etween these areas . Through the inst itutionalization 
of tradit ional b ehavioural patterns and their j oint relations 
with modern institut ions , one as sured a consideration of the 
opin ions of every populat ion group not in a position to 
art iculate these in th e framework of modern inst itut ions . 
Opinion leaders acquired the funct ion o f  being communicators 
without being paid for their efforts . If their performance 
was unsatis factory , they lost  their func t ion within the pao­
chia system and thus also their status within the tradit ional 
society . 
Furthermore ,  the farmers and large landholders were 
in cluded in this aggres sive policy . The latter were separated 
from the previous status symbol of land ownership through 
the ' push out policy ' . Compensatory payments  con t ributed to 
insurance of their future income base . Addit ionally , it was 
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made pos s ible for them t o  ob tain pres t ige income through 
economic success outside of the agri cultural sector . As far 
as the farmers were concerned , al though it is true that , as 
new landowners , they faced the risk of the loss of their 
land through economic failure , their income base was assured 
in so far as they were able , if neces sary , to find work in 
the food industry or as indus trial workers . Obtain in g the 
status symbol of land ownersh ip , however,  was dependent on 
whether and to what degree they were succes s ful in increasing 
agricultural product ion in such a way that a growin g family 
could be fed in spite o f  the comp ensatory paymen ts made to 
the former large landowners .  The pres sure to b e  successful 
and the opportunity to rais e their income was increased by 
the import of plan ts requiring in tensive irrigation and 
fert ilizat ion , that is , through higher product ion costs pe r 
hectare . 
Las t ly ,  the aggressive measures in cluded s tate employees 
and former civil servan ts . These persons , who were oriented 
to pre s t ige mot ivat ion , inherited the following dut ies : 
a .  to adapt available technical know-how from abroad 
in domestic research and experiment s tation s as well 
as to consider market opportunities for new produc ts 
within the framework o f  planning organs ; 
b .  to  adapt know-how availab le in state enterprises 
abroad and in domestic research and experiment 
station s through credit institut ions , co-operatives 
and special offices ; 
c .  to communicate the know-how so obtained to the 
domestic private en trepreneurs through credit ins t i­
tut ions , co-op eratives and special o ff ices . 
This group of person s  was faced with losing the status 
symbol of being an employee in a state en terprise if they 
were economically un successful . The clan sys tem previously 
described insured their economic existence , in spite of the 
fact that this insurance was not fully voluntary . 
The changes in the sy stem of communicat ion were thus 
supplemented by a change in the personnel infrastructure 
with the obj ective of enabling the acquisit ion and communi­
cation of know-how . These planned aggress ive measures were 
largely identical with the const ituent measures which appear 
in the followin g  overview of the change of the economic 
system.  
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The regulat ory measures f olllld in the overview of changes 
in the economic system ( see Survey) had the obj ective of 
b ringing about structural changes beyond the mere techno­
logical re fo rms . The means fo r realizat ion of this obj ective 
were s tate en terprises as well as state officials in the 
b anking system and in economic institut ions . Modern entre­
preneurial and technical know-how was adopted by them to the 
degree necessary for satis fact ion of prest ige motivat ion . 
However ,  s :ince the retent ion of  their status through acqui­
s ition of income and pres tige depended on making profit s , 
satisfact ion of prest ige motivation implied an at titude 
oriented towards profits and favourable to innovat ion . This 
in turn contributed to the fact that successful entrepre­
neurial activity was increasingly regarded as having a status 
comparable to that of a civil servant . The b ehavioural 
change in the polit ical sys tem was thereby the causal elemen t 
fo r a change in the prest ige hierarchy . 
The development of non-private en terprise by the stat e , 
which also  had modern know-how at hand and which was prepared 
to commllllicate this to private industry , made it eas ier for 
the lat ter to achieve an overview of  the market and to make 
deci sions about the implementation of  innovations . The 
measures taken by the state to regulate domes t ic market con­
dit ions forced private indust ry init ially to accept the 
offers of the non-private sector . 
In the course of the process of developmen t ,  private 
en trepreneurs saw an opportllllity to achieve a status com­
parab le to civil servants through the measures taken by the 
state to secure market s and through the offer of know-how by 
state enterpri ses . The change in the prest ige hierarchy 
thus became the foundat ion for the transit ion from more 
reactive to mo re planned act ivity by private enterprise . 
The resulting in tensif ication and diversificat ion o f  
product ion led t o  an increased supply of consumer goods an d  
t o  higher per capita income . The precondition s  necessary 
for an increase in the significance of prest ige income were 
thus created and the des ire for prest ige income b ecame a 
dynamic elemen t for the acquisition o f  ab ilities and for the 
utilizat ion of modern technical know-how . 
I .  Problems 
I I .  Goals 
III. Constituent 
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B .  Entrepreneurial 
mobility 
C .  Financing 
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Transit ion from a pre-colonial 
to a colonial system 
Transition from a colonial 
to a post-colonial system 
1 .  Divergence between the conditions of production and the level of development 
of the forces of product ion 
2 .  Overstratif ication of the nat ive political elites 
Legitimizat ion of the political decision-makers as economic elites 
1 .  Development of the 
primary sector 
Traditional elites as 
mediators and opinion 
leaders 
Concentrat ion on agri­
culture , complemented by 
pull-in policy toward 
Japanese industrial 
enterprises 
2 .  Transformation 
of the system 
Securing communicat ion within 
and b etween systems by co­
operat ion between modernized 
and institutionalized t rad­
it ional b ehaviour patterns 
Change in the prestige hier­
archy in economic sphere by 
push-out policy 
3. Development of the 
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Tradit ional elites and state 
institut ions as mediators and 
opini on leaders ; foreign tech­
nical assistance in process ing 
Japanese statistics , regis­
trat ion of land ownership and 
quality 
Encompasses agriculture , 
industry , public adminis­
tration ) comple�nted by_ pull­
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Capital assistance on the p art of  the respective hegemonial power,  and mobilizat ion of 
domestic savings ;  cos t s  limited by re fraining from complementary measures such as 
consolidation of  land holdings 
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Access controlled to guide product ion and use of scarce foreign exchange 
Purchase of additional 
land by Taiwanese 
prohibited 
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limit ing the use of and 
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and technical innovat ions 
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